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ABSTRACT
Truth-Value Gaps in Natural Language
(May,

1980)

James H. Waldo, B.S.

University of Utah

M.A., M.A., University of Utah

Ph.D.

University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Terence Parsons
The bulk of this work is an attempt to deal with

sentences such as "The theory of relativity is shiny,"

which are called category mistakes by philosophers and

sortally incorrect sentences by linguists.
In the first chapter,

I

argue that the deviance of

these sentences cannot be based on purely syntactic

characteristics (as proposed by Chomsky

(

1965 )) or merely

by appeal to Grician maxims of conversation, and that any

account of such sentences must be given in the semantic
component of a grammar for a language.
In the second chapter, a number of alternative

semantic accounts of such sentences are investigated, in-

cluding the bivalent system proposed by Bergmann (1977),
the four-valued system developed by Martin (1975), and
the truth-value gap semantics advocated by Thomason (19"2).
IX

After showing that all of these systems fail to adequately
treat quantification,

I

argue that, while the differences

in the approaches can be traced to disagreements so fun-

demental that no one

oi

them can be chosen on the grounds

of adequately accounting for the data,

the type of approach

taken by Thomason is preferable to the others on the

theoretical grounds of simplicity and generality.
In the third chapter,

develop a truth-value gap

I

semantics for a fragment of English which includes both

sortally correct and sortally incorrect sentences using
the formal devices of partial functions,

supervaluations,

and sorted quantification which evaluates simple sortally

incorrect sentences ab being neither true nor false, retains
the classical truths of logic, and avoids the problems had

by Thomason's system concerning quantification.
In the fourth chapter,

I

show how the semantics

developed in the third chapter can be applied to the

seemingly unrelated problem of discourse concerning fictional objects.

Using the theory of nonexistent objects

developed by Parsons (1978) as a point of departure,

I

how this theory can be both simplified and enriched by
the use of a truth-value gap semantics.
x

show

Xn the final chap ^er,

I

discuss the effect accepting

such a semantic framework has on our view of language; the

relationship between this type of semantics and claims

concerning the psychological reality of linguistic theories;
and the possibilities of applying such a semantic theory
to the

investigation of metaphor.

xi
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CHAPTER

I

FOUNDATIONS
Introduc tion

.

The purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation

for the investigation of the semantics of sortally incor-

rect sentences.

In the lirst section of this chapter, we

will look at a number of examples of sentences which are

considered to be sortally incorrect, and at a variety of
attempts to explain what it is about these sentences which
makes them odd.

In the second section, we will look at

some accounts of sortally incorrect sentences based on one
of these explanations, namely, at attempts which treat

sortally incorrect sentences as strings which aren't really
sentences at all, but rather syntactically deviant
strings.

It will be argued that these accounts are flawed;

part of that argument will attempt to show that sortally

incorrect sentences are grammatical strings whose deviance,
therefore, cannot be traced to syntactic considerations.
In the third section of the chapter, we will look at
a sketch of a theory which treats the deviance of sortally

incorrect sentences as a pragmatic feature.

On such an

account, sortally incorrect sentences are grammatical and
are interpreted in much the same way that other grammatical
1

2

sentences are interpreted, but are odd because they are

never an appropriate part of any conversation.

Such a

theory will not be objected to because it is inadequate,
but it will be argued that such a theory is incomplete in
that it never specifies how to interpret these sentences.
The conclusion of the chapter will be that some sem-

antic account of sortally incorrect sentences must be given
in an adequate theory of language.

Chapters

II

This sets the stage for

and III, which discuss what such a semantic

account should look like.
Preliminaries

.

Just what kinds of sentences are sortally incorrect?
If all we want are examples, we are

in no trouble, as the

philosophical and linguistic leterature abound with sentences authors claim to be sortally incorrect.

A sampling

of the literature gives us, as a preliminary list,
1.3)

the

sentences
1.1)

This stone is now thinking about Vienna

(Carnap (1937). P1.2)

5)

My kangaroo is the fifth day of the week
(Passmore

(

1961 ), p. 141)

Ceasar is a prime number

(Reichenbach (1947),

3

P-7)
1.4)

Quadriplicity drinks procrastination (Russell
(1940)

166)

p.

,

1.5)

Saturday is in bed (Ryle (1953),

1

The number 5 weighs more than the number

.

6

)

(Drange (1966), p. 11
1.7)

.

8

)

)

(

1979 ),

Colorless green ideas sleep furiously (Chomsky
15)

The spooky forest frightens the potato (Katz
(

1.10)

6

311)

(1957), p.
1.9)

75)

The theory of relativity is shiny (Waldo
P-

1

p.

1964a)

,

p

.

413)

My toothbrush is pregnant (McCawley (1971),
p.

219)

The list could be extended, but it is certainly long

enough to give us the flavor of sortal incorrectness.
There does seem to be a definite pattern here, something

all these sentences have in common which makes them bizarre

.

Just from the list we can feel reasonably confident

that the sentence:
1.11)

The taste of lemon is breakable

is a sortally incorrect sentence

1.12)

,

while the string

Was well today they may my

4

while certainly deviant, is not a sortally incorrect sentence

(or,

in fact, a sentence at all).

But when we come to attempts to characterize sortally

incorrect sentences or say what it is that makes such sentences bizarre or deviant,

the unanimity found when we

look for examples disappears.

Few people who have written

about such sentences agree as to why these sentences are
bizarre;

indeed,

there is not even unanimous agreement

among these authors on whether or not sortally incorrect
sentences are even sentences.
So our first task is to look at some of the proposals

concerning the status of sortally incorrect sentences and

what goes wrong in such sentences.
overview of the approaches
to

to

By getting such an

this problem, we will be able

see some of the options open for dealing with them.
The first contemporary philosopher to discuss these

sentences at any length was Gilbert Ryle, who called such
This notion plays a central

sentences "category mistakes."

role in Ryle's criticism of dualistic theories of mind and
body, as Ryle (1968) claims that such theories "are a mistake of a special kind ... namely

,

a

category mistake"

(p 17

)

This remark is somewhat confusing in the present context,
as it is a claim that theories, not sentences are category

5

mistakes.

However, a plausible reading of Ryle is to

take him to be claiming that the sentences
which express

dualistic theories of mind and body are (at least some
of
them) category mistakes.

1

By reading Ryle in this way we

can say that the sorts of things he would call a category
mistake is the sort of thing we are calling a sortally

incorrect sentence.

Prior to defending his view that dualistic theories
are all category mistakes, Ryle attempts to "indicate what
is meant by the phrase

’category mistake

this by giving a series of examples.

(p 16)
.

He does

But this will hardly

help us in the current stage of our investigation, as we
have more than enough examples of category mistakes in

sentences 1.1)-1.10).
However, in another work Ryle (1953) does attempt to
give a general characterization of the notion of a category

"When a sentence is (not true or false but) non-

mistake.

sensical or absurd," says Ryle,
.although its vocabulary is conventional and
its grammatical construction is regular, we say
that it is absurd because at least one ingredient
expression in it is not of the right type to be
coupled or to be coupled in that way with the
other ingredient expression or expressions in
.

.

it.

.

.

(Ryle(1953)

.

p.

75)

Ryle follows this explanation with the following three

6

examples of what he takes to he sentences which commit

category mistakes:
am now lying

1.13)

I

1.14)

"He tero logical"

1.5)

Saturday is in bed

is he terological

Whether 1.13) or 1.14) are sortally incorrect sentences or
are examples of some other sort of problem is an issue

not want to address in this work.

However,

1

.

5

)

I

do

is

clearly the type of thing we want to count as a sortally
incorrect sentence.
While this account by Ryle provides us with more than
just some examples and does deal with sentences,

it is

still not much help in determining in a general way what

sentences are to count as sortally incorrect.

Ryle does

not provide us with any tests for determining the type of

ingredient expressions of a sentence, nor does he offer an

account of what type combinations are such that they
result in sentences which are sortally incorrect.
we are

Instead,

left with a criteria of sortal incorrectness or

category mistakes which relies on our intuitions concerning
the types of sentence ingredients, and these intuitions

seem far from clear.

But this passage does provide us with what Ryle takes

7

to be

two central characteristics of sortally incorrect

sentences or category mistakes.

First of all, Ryle con-

siders such sentences to be grammatical sentences of

English.

Secondly, Ryle claims that such sentences are

neither true nor false, but rather "nonsensical or absurd."

Whether Ryle takes "nonsensical or absurd" sentences to
have some truth-value other than true or false or to be

something else is not clear.
Theodore Drange (1966) agrees with Ryle concerning
the grammatical status of sortally incorrect sentences,

but disagrees with Ryle as to the truth-value of such
sentences.

Sortally incorrect sentences, which Drange

calls "type crossings," are grammatical sentences which
are false;

in fact,

says Drange,

such sentences are

"synthetic a priori falsehoods" ((1966),

p.

212).

Drange draws a distinction between simple type

crossings and complex type crossings.

The examples of

sortally incorrect sentences seen earlier, sentences 1.1)1.10), are all examples of simple type crossings according
to Drange.

An example of a complex type crossing given

by Drange is
1

.

15 )

That thing is green and a prime number

A simple type crossing,

says Drange,

is a sentence

"which

8

ascribes to something,

x,

a

property with which the type

associated is a class to which x does not belong,
"(p. 212)
a complex type crossing is a sentence

.vnile

xa tion into

"whose trans-

the language of symbolic logic applies to a

variable two properties at least one of which has associated with it a type none of whose members has the other

property"

212).

(p.

Further, according to Drange

,

type

crossings are "conceptually meaningless" as well as false,
in that sentences which are type crossings are such that

"we cannot understand what it would be like of it to be

true" (p

.

204)

Drange

Chapter

II;

'

s

view will be examined in more detail in

for the purposes of this overview it will be

sufficient to note how he characterizes sortaily incorrect
sentences.

Such sentences, according to Drange, are

syntactically sentences of a language, but are sentences
language which are always false

of the

.

The deviance of

such sentences can be attributed to the fact that these

sentences are conceptually meaningless.
Drange

'

s

Further, on

view sortal incorrectness is intimately tied to

reference, as the characterizations of both simple and

complex type crossings are given in terms of properties and
the things which are said to have those properties rather

9

Than in terms of the ways in which words of the language
are combined.
A rather different approach to sortally incorrect

sentences is taken by Richmond Thomason (1972) in a recent

attempt to account for sortally incorrect sentences.

Thom-

ason begins his investigation by noting that sentences like
1-16)

The color of copper is forgetful

are deviant in a way which "is not conveniently explained

by grammatical considerations," and that in the case of
such sentences "it's natural and plausible to say that the

deviation arises from the application of the predicate
to

something of the wrong sort"

((

1972

)

,p

.

While

209)

Thomason wishes to give a theory which will account for
such sentences, he states that "there will be no attempt
to

extend the distinction between sortally correct and

sortally incorrect sentences to all sentences, however
complex, nor will the distinction ever appear as an

essential part of the theory"

(p.

209).

Instead,

Thomason

regards the distinction between sortally correct and sort-

ally incorrect sentences as "informal, part of the data
be explained rather than the explanation"

So far,

(p.

to

209).

except for his refusal to make the notion of

sortal incorrectness a central part of his theory, Thom-

10

ason looks much like Drange

.

Both say that sortally

incorrect sentences are grammatical, and both say that
the
deviance of such sentences is the result of a mismatch

between the predicate and the subject of a sentence.

How-

ever, when it comes to the truth-value of such sentences,

Thomason returns to the line taken by Ryle, saying that
simple sortally incorrect sentences are neither true nor
false.

In fact,

Thomason goes beyond

F.yle

by stating that

simple sortally incorrect sentences have no truth-value
at all.
A very different approach from the ones we have seen

thus far is taken by Noam Chomsky

(

1965 ).^

According to

Chomsky, what we have been calling sortally incorrect

sentences are not, strictly speaking, really sentences at
all.

Rather,

strings like 1.1) -1.11) are ungrammatical

strings which will not be generated by a set of syntactic
rules in an optimal grammar of English.

We are fooled into

thinking that these strings are sentences because the
syntactic rules which must be violated to produce such

strings are,

in a sense to be made precise,

lower level

rules than those which must be violated to produce such

strings as 1.12), which are clearly ungrammatical strings.

Chomsky is even willing to say that we can order the rules

11

of the syntax in terms of levels in
such a way as to allow
us to say that sortally incorrect
sentences are "more

grammatical" then word salad strings like 1.12),
and hence
ohat we could consider sortally incorrect
sentences
to be

semi-grammatical."

But the important aspect of Chomsky's

account is his claim that sortally incorrect sentences
are

syntactically deviant.

This claim clearly marks a differ-

ence between Chomsky's approach and that of Ryle, Drange

and Thomason.

Because he considers sortal incorrectness

to be a syntactic phenomenon,

Chomsky will account for

these strings without reference to the semantics of a

language.

Hence Chomsky's account of sortal incorrectness

is based on properties of words and the way words are put

together rather than on properties and objects which are
the referents of those words.

An approach somewhat between that taken by Chomsky and
that taken by Ryle, Drange, and Thomason is put forward

by Jerrold Katz (1964a).

Katz agrees with Chomsky that

the sentences we are calling sortally incorrect are in

fact ungrammatical strings which will not be produced by
an adequate syntax of English.

However, Katz argues that

we must have some semantic treatment of these strings.

reason for this is different from the reasons Drange and

His

12

Thomason give for requiring a semantic treatment of such
sentences.

Since Drange and Thomason consider sortally

incorrect sentences to be grammatical, the semantic treat-

meant of such sentences which they give must show how and

why these sentences are deviant.

Katz accounts for the

deviance of these strings on syntactic grounds, but re-

quires that some semantic analysis be given for these sentences which will explain why these strings seem to make
some sort of sense.

So,

on Katz's view,

some semantic

analysis of sortally incorrect sentences must be given to
distinguish these "semi-sentences" from the word salad
sentences like 1.12) which, while also ungrammatical, are
also uninte rp re table

While we have not looked at all the authors who have

discussed sortally incorrect sentences, our brief look at
some of these authors has shown considerable diversity in
the way these sentences are handled.

It is not difficult

to establish a general typology of these approaches.

A

major division can be made between those approaches which
claim that strings like 1.1) -1.11) are ungrammatical
strings and hence are syntactically deviant, and approaches

which claim that the strings are fully grammatical sentences of English whose deviance is to be explained sem-

13

antically

.

Among approaches of the first kind we can

further distinguish between those that say nothing
about
hew these strings are to be interpreted,

such as the theory

given by Chomsky, and those which attempt to say something
aoout the semantics of such strings, such as the theory
gi /en by Katz.

Among the theories which claim that sort-

ally incorrect sentences are grammatical, we can distinguish between those like that given by D range

,

which say

that all such sentences are false and hence attempt to

account for such sentences in a semantics which is

traditionally bivalent; and those like Thomason’s,
which claim that such sentences are neither true nor false,
thus requiring a non-bivalent semantic treatment.

An approach which differs from all of these has been
referred to by some authors (for example, Thomason (1972))

without ever having actually been espoused.
approach,

On this

sortally incorrect sentences are treated as

syntactically grammatical and semantically non-deviant.
The seemingly deviant nature of these strings is accounted

for on this approach on pragmatic grounds.

On this

approach, sortally incorrect sentences are deviant because
there are no contexts in which such a sentence can be
used,

that is, any use of such sentences violates some

14

conversational maxim governing the use of language.
Clearly, which of the above approaches we decide to

adopt will to a large extent dictate or be dictated by
what
we

take the root cause of sortal incorrectness to be.

If

we say such strings are grammatical but semantically

deviant, we commit ourselves to the view that sortal

incorrectness is conditioned by the things which are talked

about by the language rather than a feature of the language
itself.

If,

instead, we take an approach which begins by

saying that strings like 1.1) -1.11) are ungrammatical, we
are committed to the view that sortally incorrect sentences
are products of words and language.

Finally,

if we

say

that sortally incorrect sentences are only pragmatically
deviant,

the phenomena of sortal incorrectness will be

a feature not of language or of the

things talked about

with the language but a feature of the way language is
used
It could be that there are arguments which would show,

independently of any theory, which of these approaches is
the correct approach.

such arguments

I

Unfortunately, if there are any

don't know them.

So the way that we will

proceed is to look at various theories which proport to
deal with sortally incorrect sentences in the hope that we

15

can determine,

on the basis of the adequacy of
the theories

based on each approach, which approach
is to be preferred.

Syntactic Accounts of Sortal Incorrectness

.

In this section, we will look at two
accounts of

sortal incorrectness which are based on the
intuition that
sortally incorrect sentences are not sentences
at all, but

rather are ungrammatical strings.

The first account, which

we will look at in some detail, was offered by
Noam

Chomsky (1965).

The second account, which can be viewed

as either a revision or an extension of the Chomsky

account, was proposed by Jerrold Katz

(

1964 a).

Some of

the criticisms we will look at are directed specifically

against certain features of these systems.

Other critic-

isms we will see in this section are more general in that

they proport to show that no syntactic account of sortally

incorrect sentences is possible.

Chomsky’s account of sortally incorrect sentences

is

given within a particular framework of transformational
generative grammar which has become known as the "standard
theory" of transformational grammars.
"a system of rules that can iterate

Such a grammar is

to generate an in-

definitely large number of structures;" (Chomsky (1965),

16

p.

°“

16)

these structures will correspond to the
sentences

lan S ua S e accounted for by the grammar.

The rules

of a transformational generative
grammar can be separated

into three sets or components: a phonological
component,

which "determines the phonetic form of a
sentence generated
by the syntactic rules"; a syntactic component,
which
specifies an infinite set of abstract formal objects,
each of which incorporates all information relevant
to a
single interpretation of a particular sentence"; and a

semantic component, which "determines the semantic inter-

pretation of a sentence"

(p.

16)

.

Most of the interesting

work in such a grammar is done by the syntactic component,

which specifies for each sentence of the language a deep
structure which is directly interpreted by the semantic

component and a surface structure which

is

interpreted

directly by the phonological component.
Two sorts of rules can be distinguished in the syn-

tactic component of a grammar.

One group,

the base rules,

"generate a highly restricted (perhaps finite) set of base
strings, each with an associated structural description"
(p.

17).

The other rules of the syntactic component will

be the transformational rules, which are used in "genera-

ting a sentence, with its surface structure, from its

17

oasis"

(p.

17).

For our purposes we can simplify this

organization of the grammar by ignoring the transformational component of the syntax (or restricting
our grammar
a

to

-

ra grcent which has only an identity transformation)

While this is a massive oversimplification of the
grammar

given in Chomsky's theory, it is one which will not
t

either his account of sortally incorrect sentences

or our criticisms of that account.
The base of a syntactic component will generate

simple phrase markers;

these can be represented by the

familiar "tree diagrams" of linguistics.

Such phrase

markers are "based on a vocabulary of symbols that includes
both formatives (the, boy
NP

,

V,

etc.)"(p. 15)-

,

etc.) and category symbols (S,

The rules which are used to generate

phrase markers are rewriting rules, which Chomsky defines
as rules of the form
.A - Z/X
Y
where X and Y are (possibly null) strings of
symbols, A is a single category symbol, and
Z is a nonnull string of symbols.
This rule
is interpreted as asserting that the category
A is realized as the string Z when it is in the
environment consisting of X to the left and Y
the the right... (p. 66)
.

.

While Chomsky allows for the specification of an appropiate environment in the definition of the form of rewrite

rules, all the rules we will look at will operate in any
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environment, that is, they will be context
free rewrite
rules where X and Y are both null.
At this point an example is in order.

category symbols

S

If we have the

(sentence), NP (noun phrase), VP (verb

phrase), Aux (auxilary), N (noun), V (verb), M
(modal),
and Det (determiner; and the formatives boy
9

.

nce gi

an<3

the

,

,

frighten

,

we could make a base component with

the following rewrite rules:

1.17)

S -

NP~Aux~VP

VP - V~NP
NP - De t"' N
NP - N

Aux - M
M - may
N

-*

sincerity

N

-»

boy

V - frighten

Det - the

Given this as a base component, we can generate the phrase
marker represented by the diagram
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1.18)

sincerity

M

V

may

frighten

which would be a representation of the deep
structure of
the sentence

1.19)

Sincerity may frighten the boy

The problem of sortal incorrectness comes up even
at
uhio simple stage

,

lor not only can we generate the phrase

structure represented by 1.18) using the rules in 1.17), we
can generate the phrase structure represented by
1

.
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incorrect sentence
1.21)

The boy may frighten sincerity

Thus early on in his account Chomsky must attempt to deal

with the problem of sortal incorrectness, as even so simple
.

a syntax as 1.17)

generates sortally incorrect sentences.

4
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Chomsky begins his account of sortally incorrect
sentences by noting that strings like 1.21) do not
seem
to be

deviant in the same way as a string like
1.22)

sincerity frighten may boy the

which he takes to be a string which is the result of clear
cut violations of purely syntactic rules.

Further, the

deviance of sortally incorrect sentences is not, on

Chomsky's view, of the same

.type

as the deviance of a

sentence like
1.23)

Oculists are generally better trained than
eye -doc tors

a deviance Chomsky takes to be purely semantic

The device Chomsky introduces to account for the

deviance of sortally incorrect sentences is what he calls

"selectional features."

These features are analogous to

the distinctive features used in phonological theory.

In

phonological theory, each lexical item is represented by
a matrix of features which taken together determine the

phonological realization of that lexical item.

In an

analogous way, says Chomsky, "each lexical formative

is

represented [in the deep structure] by a distinctive
feature matrix"

((

1965 ). p. 81).

This distinctive feature

matrix will serve as input to lexical insertion rules.
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Chomsky then introduces a new sort of rule into
the syntactic component of the grammar, which he calls
"selec-

tional restrictions."

These rules,

in effect,

constitute

restrictions on the generative capacity of the rules in
a

grammar like 1.1?)-- they will state restrictions on

such rules so that not every lexical item of a certain

syntactic category can be put together by the rules of
the grammar with every

category.
to

other

lexical item in another

For two lexical items of appropriate categories

be put together by a syntactic rule,

certain conditions

concerning the feature matrices of those lexical items
will have to be met.
To see how this theory works,

we can show how it would

account forthe deviant nature of sentence 1.21).

We

first need to add to the rules of 1.17) a lexicon which

stipulates the feature matrix associated with each of the
formatives.
1.24)

We will use the lexicon supplied by Chomsky:
(

•

(

.

(

sincerity
•

_4-N,

-f-Det

,

-Count, 4-Abstract,

.])

boy
.

,

,

[+N, 4-Det

,

+Count, 4-Animate

,

4-Human,

.])

frighten

,

[+V,+

Det [-(-Animate]

,

NP

,

4-[

4-Abstrac t] Aux

4-Object Deletion,...])
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(

may

,

[+M,

.

.

.]

(Chomsky
j'le

(

1965 ), p. 107)

can read the selectional features given by this lexicon

in the following way.

The features for sincerity tell us

that the word is in the syntactic category of Noun, can

occur after a determiner, is not a count noun and is
abstract.
verb,

The features of frighten tell us that it is a

occurs before a noun phrase, can take an abstract

subject and an animate object, and can undergo the trans-

formation "object deletion" (which is not a part of our
fragment of the grammar)
By supplimenting the grammar of 1.17) with these fea-

tures and the appropriate selectional restriction rules,
we can block the generation of sentence 1.21).

In 1.21),

the verb frighten occurs with a subject which has the

feature "-(-Abstract."

But the features of the lexical item

frighten are such that they do not allow the verb to occur
In the frame

"[+Animate

_!

Aux

[-(-Abstract],"

in fact,

the

feature specification might well specifically exclude such
a frame of occurence.

be

If not,

such a frame will certainly

excluded by the selectional restrictions which are rules

of the grammar.

So 1.21) can only be generated in a

Chomsky-style syntax with selectional features and restric-
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tions if we violate certain rules.

The rules that are

violated or relaxed in generating these strings
are not as
central to the syntax as those which appear in 1
.

hence

uhe

17

)

result of violating such rules is not a string

which is ungrammatical in the sense that the string
1.22)
^s ungrammatical.

But the generation of strings like 1.21)

does require the violation of some syntactic rules, hence

Chomsky labels such strings as "semi-ungrammatical."
so

All

rtally incorrect sentences will require the violation

of some selectional rules to be generated,

strings are at best semi-grammatical.

hence all such

Thus this way of

dealing with sortally incorrect sentences requires that

Chomsky develop a notion of "degrees of grammaticality

.

This notion is basically that strings which can be gen-

erated by a grammar by violating or relaxing rules con-

cerning selectional restrictions are more grammatical than
those which can be generated only by violating or relaxing

rules which do not concern selectional restrictions, but

only broader grammatical categories.

Both sorts of strings

are less grammatical than strings which can be generated

by the grammar without violating or relaxing either sort
of rule

,

and it is only members of this last group which

can be claimed to be genuine sentences of a language.

Stepping back for a moment, we can pick out two
central characteristics of the Chomsky account.
of these,

The first

which will be shared by any attempt to account

for sortally incorrect sentences in the syntactic component
of a grammar,

is that sortally incorrect sentences are at

least to some degree ungrammatical, that is, that they are
in some sense not well formed strings of the language.

Thus the rules which constitute the syntactic component
of the grammar of the language should not, when they are

strictly adhered to, generate such strings.

The second

feature of the Chomsky account, which may or may not be

shared by other syntactic accounts of sortal incorrectness,
is

the mechanism which blocks the generation of such sen-

tences--the lexical items are assigned selectional feature

matricies which dictate what lexical items can be combined
with what other lexical items by the syntactic rules of
the grammar to produce sentences of the

language

It is not suprising that proponents of the view that

sortally incorrect sentences are semantically deviant

grammatical sentences of a language criticise the syntactically based account of sortal incorrectness offered by
Chomsky.

Theodore Drange (1966) considers Chomsky's

claim that sortally incorrect sentences, which he calls
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type crossings, are semi-grammatical, and rejects
the

view because
.The sentence structure of type crossings
is the same as that of clearly meaningful sen.

.

tences.
But clearly meaningful sentences do
not have the property of being "less grammatical
than" anything else.
Hence, type crossings could
not have that property, either ...(( 1966
p
5 ^)
)

The argument Drange is presenting in the above passage can
be made explicit by charting it out in the following way.

His main argument is:
1.25)

Sortally incorrect sentences are fully grammatical

1

.
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)

No fully grammatical sentence is less gram-

matical than any other fully grammatical
sentence
1.27)

Therefore, sortally incorrect sentences are not
less grammatical than any other fully grammatical sentence

.

This argument is obviously valid, and just as obviously
the soundness of the argument depends on the

1.25)

truth of

if Drange can show that sortally incorrect sen-

tences are fully grammatical, he will have shown not only
that Chomsky's account of such sentences is in error, but

that any syntactic account of sortally incorrect sen-

tences which claims that such sentences are less than
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fully grammatical is in error.
Drange offers two arguments which attempt
to show that
^11 sortally incorrect sentences are
grammatical.
The

first of these, according to Drange, depends
on the principle that "since all clearly meaningful
sentences are

grammatical,

if a sequence can be transformed into
a

clearly meaningful sentence without at all changing
its
3

•

ruc

then the sequence must be grammatical" (p.
43 ).

Assuming this principle, Drange offers the argument:
1.28)

All sortally incorrect sentences can be transformed into meaningful sentences by substitution of at least one noun or noun phrase for

another
1.29)

Substitution of one noun or noun phrase for
another never results in a change of structure

1.30)

Therefore, all sortally incorrect sentences
are grammatical

An immediate problem with this argument is the explicit

assumption that all meaningful sentences are grammatical.
This assumption,

tying together the notions of semantic

anomalousness and syntactic deviance, is not one which

Chomsky must accept and indeed might will be rejected by
Chomsky.

However, we can avoid this problem by recon-
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structing D range
the phrase

'

s

argument by replacing every occurence of

"clearly meaningful sentence" with the phrase

clearly grammatical sentence."

Such a change would not

presuppose a connection between semantic deviance and
syntactic deviance, and would result in an argument which
I

believe Drange would accept which would have

1

.
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)

as

its conclusion.

Does the argument, so recast, show that sortally

incorrect sentences are grammatical?
is valid.

Clearly,

the argument

So if we can show that the premises are true, we

will be able

to

reject any account of sortal incorrectness

which claims that such sentences are less than fully

grammatical
The principle as recast seems unobjectionable.

It

now states that if a sentence can be transformed into a

clearly grammatical sentence without changing the structure of the sentence,

then that sentence is grammatical.

This follows from the notion of grammaticality
a property of the

structure of a sentence.

,

which is

Nor can we

easily fault 1.28), for Drange has characterized sortally
incorrect sentences as sentences which can be transformed
into grammatical sentences in just this way.

To go after

this premise would require that we find fault in Drange

'

s
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characterization of sortally incorrect sentences.

But we

don't have to go after 1.28) to reject this
argument, for
x.29) is a statement which Chomsky would clearly
reject.

Premise 1.29) states that the substitution of one
noun or noun phrase for another never results in a
change
in the structure of a sentence.

In effect,

1.29) claims

that the category of nouns or noun phrases are simple as

regards to sentential structure.

But this is just what

Chomsky has denied in introducing selectional restrictions
into the grammar,

for selectional restrictions are

features which subdivide grammatical classes such as noun
and noun phrase into groups which are different in syn-

tactically relevant ways.

To be different in syntac-

tically relevant ways is to be such that substituting a

noun or noun phrase of one sub-category for a noun or
noun phrase of another sub-category does result in a change
of the structure of the sentence.

So unless we have some

argument to establish the truth of 1.29)

the argument

which uses that as a premise against the treatment of
sortal incorrectness as a syntactic phenomenon simply begs
the question.

Drange does attempt to argue for 1.29), but unfort-

unately neither of the arguments he offers in support of
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uhat premise

1.31)

is sound.

The first argument he offers is:

English expressions can be divided into
function expressions and content expressions

1*32)

Only function expressions determine the
structure of a sentence

1.33)

All nouns and noun phrases are content

expressions
1.3^0

Therefore, nouns and noun phrases do not

determine the structure of English expressions

Unfortunately, Drange justifies
to

1 31) -1 33
.

)

by an appeal

the authority of current linguistic theory,

citing Hockett as his authority.

specifically

Since the time of the

Chomskian revolution in linguistics (and, more specific
ally,

since the time at which Chomsky proposed the stand-

ard theory of transformational grammars) the weight of the

authority of linguistic theory is firmly against
1.33).

undercutting Drange

'

s

1

.

31 )-

argument.

The second argument offered by Drange specifically

concerns the proposal to sub-divide the class of nouns
into classes which are syntactically dissimilar.

"The

question arises," argues Drange,
.as to whether such a division of nouns is
purely arbitrary (or ad hoc or whether there
Certainly there is
could be some basis for it.
a difference in type between a thought and, say,
.

.

)
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a hat.

But is this a difference between grammatical structure or a difference between two
kinds of content words? ... There seems to be no
good reason to say that the difference is a
grammatical one ...(( 1966
p. 4?)
,

This argument fails for a number of reasons, not the least
of which is that it begs the question.

If Chomsky's

account of sortally incorrect sentences is correct, then
there is a grammatical reason to differentiate between

classes of nouns.

But even without the assumption that

Chomsky's account of sortal incorrectness is the right
account,

there are distinctions such as number or, in

some languages, gender, which require a grammatical dis-

tinction between classes of nouns.

Hence Drange

'

second argument in support of 1.29) fails.

An alternative argument offered by Drange

to

show

that sortally incorrect sentences are grammatical is
1.35)

The negations of sortally incorrect sentences

are true statements
1.36)

True statements are grammatical

1

Any sequence is grammatical if its negation

.
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is

grammatical
1

.

33

)

Therefore,

sortally incorrect sentences are

grammatical
The obvious weak point in this argument is 1.36)."

Drange

31

supports this claim by stating that
"truth implies meaningfulness implies grammaticality"
(p.

50).

It is the

second implication in this chain which
Chomsky could reject
as he nowhere commits himself to the
view that only grammatical strings are meaningful.
In fact, the thrust of
the theory of semi-sentences given by
Katz (1964a), which
/viil

oe

discussed below, is to show how certain ungram-

matical strings such as sortally incorrect
sentences can
be given an interpretation in a Chomsky-style
standard

theory.

Without this connection between meaningfulness

and grammaticality and hence between truth and grammaticality, Drange

'

s

argument falls apart.

In another discussion of sortally incorrect sentences,

Richmond Thomason (1972) offers some arguments directed

specifically against Chomsky's account of such sentences,
as well as some arguments against any syntactic account
of sortal incorrectness.

Thomason's objection to Chomsky's

account is based on the added complexity that would be
required in the syntactic component of a language if that

component is to somehow exclude the generation of sortally
incorrect sentences.

Specifically, this argument objects

to the complexity added to the syntactic component by the

introduction of selectional features and selectional
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restrictions.

"There may be good syntactic reasons,"

Thomason admits,
...for classifying nouns according to whether
they are count, mass, or proper nouns, or
whether they take the pronouns "he," "she," or
it.
But to exclude sortally incorrect sentences... we will have to add a category of
"color. nouns" and a host of other equally
specific categories.
Besides the previous
rules of syntax there will also have to be
rules projecting categories onto complex
expressions. Even if the task of formulating
these. rules were- a straightforward one, their
addition would constitute a considerable complication to the grammar. ..( (1972) p. 211-212)
,

Thomason concludes that given this level of added complexity "it seems cruel or at least unsympathetic to burden

syntax with the task of disentangling sortally correct
from sortally incorrect sentences" (p. 211).

On the surface
ment.

However,

I

,

this is not a very persuasive argu-

think that the most charitable inter-

pretation of this passage would read it as an attempt

to

turn one of Chomsky’s own evaluation measures for grammars

against Chomsky's own theory.

Chomsky's view is that one

of the features we need to strive for in constructing the

optimal grammar of a language is simplicity of the rule

system which constitutes that grammar.

Thomason's point

seems to be that the account of sortally incorrect

sentences offered by Chomsky adds a whole new type of
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syntactic feature and a whole new set of
syntactic rules to
the grammar in order to block the
generation of sortally
incorrect sentences. By treating these
sentences as

grammatical and accounting for their deviance
in some
other component of the grammar, Thomason

seems to be saying

that we can simplify the grammar, doing away
with selec-

tional features and selectional restrictions.

Thomason

s

criticism is only devastating if simplic-

ity of the syntax is the major feature we are
to use in

deciding which is the best grammar.

Clearly this is not

a principle which Chomsky is committed to.

certainly must take a back seat
grammar.

to

Simplicity

the adequacy of the

So if sortally incorrect sentences are in fact

ungrammatical, any treatment of those sentences which
labels them as ungrammatical, no matter how complex, will
be more adequate

in accounting for the data than any

(possibly simpler) account of those sentences which treats
them as non-grammatically deviant.

Further, Chomsky

never meant simplicity to be a feature of only the syntax.
One is to choose the grammar which is overall the most

simple.

If one can simplify the syntax only at the price

of adding tremendous complication to the semantic com-

ponent of a grammar, for example, the first grammar with
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the more complicated syntax will still be
preferred on the

grounds that it is overall the simpler grammar.
the charge

To make

that treating sortally incorrect sentences
as

grammatical will simplify the grammar as a whole,
Thomason must show that some other treatment results in
a

total grammar which is more simple than the one proposed

by Chomsky, something which he has not done in his
argument.

Thomason seems to place more weight on his second
objection, which is directed at any attempt at treating

sortally incorrect sentences as syntactically deviant.
This argument is based on what Thomason labels the Prin-

ciple of Referentiality
1.39)

,

which he formulates as:

The Principle of Referentiality

:

The only

feature of singular terms relevant to de-

termining sortal correctness in subject-

predicate sentences is their reference

Thomason argues for this principle by trying to show that
there could be no counterexample to it.

Such a counter-

example would have to have the form of a sentence, "Pt"

which was sortally correct, with another sentence, "Ps"
which was sortally incorrect, where the object referred to
by "s" is the object referred to by "t".

"Such an example
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cannot arise," argues Thomason, "because
whatever reason
there is for the sortal incorrectness
of 'Ps' will carry
° Ver 4:0 ,pt
if ’s-t’ is true" ((1972), p. 212).
Thomason
further claims that the Principle of Ref
erentiality can be
extended to include definite descriptions
as
'

well as

singular terms.

Given the Principle of Referentiality

,

Thomason

argues against any syntactic account of sortal
incorrectness in the following way.
1.^0)

What

I

am now thinking about is shiny

In contexts in which

relativity,

Consider the sentence

I

am thinking about the theory of

the Principle of Referentiality dictates that

is sortally incorrect,

1.40)

1.41) 1.41)

as the sentence

The theory of relativity is shiny

is sortally incorrect and the referent of the phrase "what
I

am now thinking about" in 1.40) is the same thing as

the referent of the phrase "the theory of relativity" in
.

car,

But in contexts in which

I

am thinking about my

the Principle of Referentiality dictates that 1.40)

is sortally correct,

1.42)

My car is shiny

is sortally correct.

ness of

as the sentence

1 .40)

The sortal incorrectness or correct-

therefore,

is

determined by the context of
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of use,

specifically, the contextual determination of
the

referent of the phrase "what

I

am now thinking about."

But context and reference are pragmatic and semantic
_eauures, not syntactic features; hence no purely
syntactic

account of sortal incorrectness can possibly be correct.
Unfortunately, Thomason begs the question in this
argument.

The circularity arises in his defense of the

Principle of Referentiality

.

His defense of that principle

rested on his claim that no counterexample to the principle
was possible

,

for if a sentence "Ps" is sortally incorrect

and "s=t" is true then the sentence "Pt" will be sortally

incorrect for just the reasons the sentence "Ps" is

sortally incorrect.

This only follows on the assumption

that the only factor which determines the sortal correct-

ness or incorrectness of a subject-predicate sentence
is the referent of the

singular term in that sentence.

This presupposition simply is the Principle of Referentiality;

if it is not assumed we have no justification for

the claim that "Ps" will be sortally incorrect for the

same reasons "Pt" is sortally incorrect if "s=t" is true.
In Thomason's defense,

it should be noted that the

Principle of Referentiality is a reasonable principle if
we accept Thomason's characterization of sortal incorrect-
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ness,

on which a sentence is sortally incorrect
if it

predicates of an object a property of the wrong
sort.
-his characterization is given in terms
of the object and
the property referred to by the subject
and predicate of
a sentence.

Since sortal incorrectness, on this view,

depends on the referents of the words used in
the sentence,
it should make no difference what words we
use to refer
to that object or property,

Referentiality is justified.

and hence the Principle of

But Chomsky would certainly

deny the correctness of Thomason's characterization of

sortally incorrect sentences, as this characterization
precludes dealing with sortally incorrect sentences syntactically.

Thomason's characterization is based on the

idea that sortal correctness and incorrectness depends on

objects referred to by the words of a sentence, while

Chomsky takes sortal correctness or incorrectness to
to depend on the words themselves,

regardless of the

referents of those words.
At this point,

it should be noted that we have left

open *the question of whether or not sortally incorrect

sentences are to be considered as meaningful on Chomsky's
analysis.

It will be recalled that the arguments against

treating these sentences as grammatical offered by Drange
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were rejected in part because those
arguments presupposed
teat if we treat these sentences as
ungrammatical we must
,reat

i^hem

as uninterpre table or meaningless.

does not say much about this;

in fact,

Chomsky

the only remark he

makes is that "if interpre table at all, they
[sortally

incorrect sentences] are surely not interpre table
in the
manner of ^grammatical sentences^ ... rather it
seems that
,

interpretations are imposed on them by virtue of analogies
that they bear to non-deviant sentences"

((

1965 ), p. 76 ).

Thus -/homsky leaves it open as to whether such sentences
are interpre table.

But a variation of the Thomason argu-

ment we have just seen can be used to show that if

sortally incorrect sentences are

to be

treated as syntac-

tically deviant, they must also be treated as interpre table
Suppose that sortally incorrect strings are not only

ungrammatical but are also uninterpre table

.

Now again

consider the sentence
1.40)

What

I

am now thinking about is shiny

In a situation in which

I

am thinking about my car, 1.40)

will have the same truth-value as the sentence
1.42)

that is,

My car is shiny

it will be true if my car is shiny and false if

my car is not shiny.

Either way, 1.40) has a truth-value
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and hence an interpretation.
1

.
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Further,

is a grammatical sentence.

)

uation in which

I

But now consider a sit-

am thinking about the theory of relativ-

In such a situation,

ity.

in this situation,

1.40) will have the same truth-

value as
1

.

^1

)

The theory of relativity is shiny

which is a paradigm sortally incorrect sentence.

On our

beginning supposition, sortally incorrect sentences are
not interpretable; hence 1.41) will have no truth-value
and so 1.40) will have no truth-value and no interpretation.

Now we must ask whether 1.40) is grammatical in

cases in which it is uninterpre table

.

If it is not,

then

we are in the situation of saying that sentence 1.40)

grammatical in situations in which

I

is

am thinking about

my car and ungrammatical in situations in which

thinking about the theory of relativity.

I

am

But this is

unacceptable, as this would mean that the supposedly purely
syntactic notion of grammaticality must be at least part-

ially determined by the pragmatic and semantic features
of a sentence, as 1.40)

is

grammatical or ungrammatical

depending on the reference of the phrase "what
thinking about."

I

am now

So if we suppose that sortally incorrect

sentences are uninterpre table

,

we must also be committed

40

v ^ ew that some fully grammatical
sentences are

to

uninterpre table

But if we hold that some fully grammatical sentences
are uninterpre table

,

we then must ask why we are treating

sortally incorrect sentences as ungrammatical.

Since

we now allow fully grammatical sentences such as
1.40)

to

be semantically or pragmatically deviant (and thus
unin-

terpretable) we could just as easily allow that the sort-

ally incorrect sentence, 1.41), is also fully grammatical
but semantically or pragmatically deviant.

In fact, we

could say that 1.41) is deviant in exactly the way 1.40)
is deviant when what

of relativity.

I

am thinking about is the theory

Such an approach would have the advantage

of simplifying the grammar,

in that no new devices would

have to be added to the semantic component of the grammar
to make

the distinction between sentences which are

sortally incorrect and sentences which are sortally
correct.

The distinction between the two sorts of sen-

tences could be made in the semantic component, which is

already required to be constructed in such a way that it
marks some fully grammatical sentences as uninterpre table
Further,

this sort of approach would treat 1.40) and 1.41)

in exactly parallel ways in cases in which

I

am thinking
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acout the theory of relativity, marking both
sentences as
grammatical but uninterpre table a result which
has some

;

intuitive plausibility.
So it seems that Chomsky's account of sortal
incor-

rectness is in trouble if Chomsky rejects the position
that sortally incorrect sentences are interpre table
vve

.

Now

must ask how these sortally incorrect and semi-gram-

matical strings are to be interpreted.
a hint as to how he

Chomsky does give

thinks such sentences are to be inter-

preted when he says that "interpretations are imposed on
them by virtue of the analogies that they bear to non-

deviant sentences"

(

(

196 5 )

»

p-

76).

While Chomsky does

not say how we are to do such interpretation by analogy,

Jerrold Katz (1964a) attempts to give a theory which
interprets sortally incorrect sentences in just this way.
Katz begins his account by offering the following-

preliminary definition of a semi-sentence:
1.43)

"A string is a semi-sentence of the language

L iff it is not generated by an optimal

grammar of L and has sufficient structure to
be understood by the speakers of L"
p.

((1964a),

410)

Katz takes as his goal the construction of a theory which
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//ill

’

capture the second feature of this definition,
that
a theory

which will tell us when an ungrammatical

string of a language has sufficient structure to he
understood by a native speaker of that language.

theory presented is based on an explanation of

The

how speakers interpret semi-sentences.

"A

speaker knows,"

says Katz,
.a system of rules that enables him to
associate a non-null set of grammatical sentences with each semi-sentence.
This association is performed on the basis of the structure that the semi-sentence has.
And the
speaker's understanding of the semi-sentence
is nothing other than his understanding of the
sentences in the set with which the semisentence is associated ...(( 1964a) p. 411)
.

.

,

Katz labels the set of grammatical sentences with which a

semi-sentence is associated the comprehension set of that
semi-sentence; he calls the rules by which the association
is made

transfer rules.

The system of transfer rules, as sketched by Katz,

will include at most one rule for each rule in the grammar.
The transfer rule which corresponds to an actual grammat-

ical rule will state a relaxation of the grammatical
rule such that,

if we replace in the derivation or gener-

ation of a grammatical sentence the application of some
rule by the application of the corresponding transfer rule,
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the

result is a semi-sentence.

Associated with the set of

transfer rules will be a set of what Katz calls
"traffic
rules.

Traffic rules,

in effect,

restrict the combina-

tions of transfer rules which can be used to replace

actual rules of the grammar in generating a semi-sentence
in such a way that the application of transfer rules
does

not produce a sentence which is both ungrammatical and

uninterpre table
To interpret a semi-sentence,

according to Katz, we

must determine the comprehension set of that sentence.
Tne comprehension set of a semi-sentence will be determined

by some third component of the theory of semi-sentences.
This component will establish "a many-one mapping of

elements in SS [the set of semi-sentences! onto elements
in G(L) [the grammatical sentences of the language L] such

that the speakers understanding of

(

l<i<n)[ €G( L) ! is a

possible way of understanding *S [the semi-sentence!"
((1964a), p. 412).

following.

The idea here is something like the

By backtracking the transfer rules used in a

derivation of a semi-sentence

,

we can replace those

transfer rules by the corresponding rules of the grammar,

generating a set of grammatical sentences, each of which
is a possible reading of the

semi-sentence.

To have a
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reading a semi-sentence must have a finite but
non-null

number of semantically distinct grammatical sentences
in
its comprehension set.

If there is only one semantically

distinct sentence in a semi-sentence's comprehension set,
the semi-sentence is unambiguous;

if there are n seman-

tically distinct sentences in the comprehension set of a
semi-sentence, the semi-sentence is n-ways ambiguous.

An example .given by Katz concerns the semi-sentence
1.44)

which,

The ball hit by the man

on the proposed transfer rule given by Katz, has in

its comprehension set the sentences

1.45)

The man hit the ball

1.46)

The ball was hit by the man

and

Since 1.45) and 1.46) are, according to Katz, paraphrases
of each other and thus not semantically distinct,

the

semi-sentence 1.44) can be interpreted as having the same

meaning as sentences 1.45) and 1.46) if we assume that the
two grammatical sentences are the only members of the

semi-sentence’s comprehension set.
The above is only a brief sketch of Katz's proposal,

which in turn is claimed to be only a preliminary report
on how a theory of semi-sentences might be constructed.
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However,

think that the above sketch will suffice to

I

show that no theory of semi-sentences which
attempts to

interpret those sentences by analogy to fully grammatical
sentences will ever be adequate as an account of how we
can interpret sortally incorrect sentences.
The first problem with such a theory is that it is
not
a^

clear that a sortally incorrect sentence like
1.4?)

The taste of lemon is shiny

will have a finite comprehension set.
be

The rule that must

relaxed to get a transfer rule which would produce 1.4?)

would be along the lines of a rule on selectional restrictions.

If we follow Chomsky the violated rule would state

that only noun phrases marked "^concrete" could appear in
the frame

"

is shiny"

.

But tracing back in our deriv-

ation and replacing the transfer rule with the proper rule
will either block the derivation of any sentence, on the

assumption that the lexical items inserted in the base
must remain the same; or will allow sentences such as
1.42)

My car is shiny

1.48)

Neptune is shiny

and many, many others,
the level of the base.

if we allow new lexical items at

On the first assumption, sortally

incorrect sentences like 1.47) will be uninterpre table

,

and
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all of the problems of the earlier arguments will
arise

again.

On the second assumption, we get a comprehension

set which tells us that one possible reading for
1.4?) is
1.48)

,

at leas

which is obviously absurd.
t

account,

Katz seems to have been

partially aware of this problem at the end of his
for he claims that further semantic work must be

done before a fully worked out theory of semi-sentences

can be given.

In fact,

when he returns to sortally in-

correct sentences in a later article (1964b), he treats
these sentences as "anomalous" sentences whose deviance is

totally semantic

.

We will see more of this theory in the

next chapter.
A second problem with the treatment of sortally in-

correct sentences as semi-sentences is that such an account
appears to get the status of such sentences backwards.
the Katz theory,

sortally incorrect sentences are strings

which are ungrammatical but fully interpre table

.

Yet if

anything is wrong with these strings, it does not seem
be

On

to

traceable to the way the words are put together but

rather to the assignment of meaning to the string.
short,

In

it seems that such sentences are more likely to be

candidates for the status of grammatical sentences which
are semantically deviant than they are for the status of
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ungrammatical

"but

semantically non— deviant.

This brings us to a criticism of Chomsky's
theory
.vnich is

hinted at in Thomason's first argument against

mhat account of sortal incorrectness, when
Thomason states

that
...There may be good syntactic reasons for
classifying nouns according to whether they are
count, mass, or proper nouns... But to exclude
sortally incorrect sentences .. .we will have to
add a category of 'color nouns' and a host of
other equally specific categories ...(( 1972
p. 211)
)

Thomason

o

,

point does not seem to be very telling he^e

,

as

it is unclear in what sense a category like "concrete

noun" is more or less specific than a category such as

"count noun," which Thomason admits as a genuine syntactic
category.
here,

But Thomason does seem to be on to something

namely,

that there seems to be a difference in kind

between the clearly syntactic features which separate
classes of words and the features which are used to separate words in accounting for sortal incorrectness.

One striking feature of the selectional restrictions

Chomsky cites is that they correspond exactly to characteristics of the referent of the word.

For example,

Chomsky tells us that the lexical item "sincerity" is
marked as "+abstract" while the lexical item "boy" is

marked "+ animate," "thuman," and presumably,

"+concrete."
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These features,

on Chomsky's theory, are merely syntactic

markers on the words themselves, and hence it is only
coincidence that the referent of the English word "sinceri ty

is an abstract object while

English word
animate

,

Doy

the referent of the

is a set of things each of which is

human, and concrete.

implausible coincidence.

But this seems to be an

Instead,

it seems reasonable to

say that the selectional features of a lexical item are

determined by the referent of the lexical item, that is,
that the lexical item "boy" is marked with the selectional

features it has because it refers to objects which are
human, animate and concrete.

If this is the case selec-

tional features which are used to block the generation of

sortally incorrect sentences are determined by reference,

which is a semantic feature.

Hence such features ought

not to be taken as part of the syntactic component of the
language on a Chomsky-style theory which separates the
semantic and syntactic components of the grammar.
This criticism can be seen clearly if we consider a

hypothetical language, L*, which is syntactically exactly
like English,

but which differs semantically from English

in the following way.

The referent of the word "theory"

in L* is the same as the referent of the English word
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car," while

the referent of the word "car" in L* is
the

referent of the English word "theory."

Other than that,

the two languages are semantically exactly alike.

If we

^ollow Chomsky's account of sortal incorrectness and
consider sortally incorrect sentences to he deviant
because
of syntactic considerations,

the sortally incorrect sen-

tences of L* will be indistinguishable from those of

English

,

as the two languages have the same syntax.

Specifically,
1.49)

the sentence of L*

Some car is shiny

will be sortally correct, while the sentence of L*
1.50)

Some theory is shiny

will be sortally incorrect.

But 1.49) is the translation

of the sortally incorrect English sentence which looks

just like I.50). while I.50) is the translation of the

sortally correct English sentence which looks just like
1.49).

Given the translation relation holding between the

sentences of L* and the sentences of English, it is
reasonable to say that it is 1.49), which says that an
•

abstract object is shiny, which is sortally incorrect,
while I.50), which says of some concrete object that it is
shiny,

is sortally correct.

If this is the case,

it

follows that sortal correctness or incorrectness is
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dependent on reference or meaning and is thus a semantic
feature, not a syntactic feature.

Much the same sort of criticism of syntactic accounts
of sortal incorrectness is made by James McCawley (1971).

McCawley oegins his discussion of sortal incorrectness by
noting that
...It is not clear that such [ selec tional]
restrictions, to the extent that they are
valid restrictions, have anything to do with
deep structures and lexical items rather than
with semantic representations and semantic items
that appear in them.
If it in fact turns out that
"selectional restrictions" of all lexical items
are predictable from their meanings, then they
are not restrictions on how lexical items may
be combined but rather restrictions on how
semantic material may be combined ...(( 1971) p. 218)
,

McCawley'

s

point here is something like the following.

Chomsky's theory of selectional restrictions, and in fact
any theory which treats sortally incorrect sentences as

syntactically deviant strings, holds that the features
which determine sortal correctness or incorrectness are
features of lexical items.

However,

if it can be shown

that these supposedly syntactic features are in fact pre-

dictable from the meanings of the lexical items,

this would

be good evidence that the features which determine sortal

status are in fact tied to meanings rather than lexical
items and hence that sortal incorrectness is to be
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explained semantically rather than syntactically.
We have already seen some evidence that these selecoional _Leatu.es can in fact be predicted by the meaning
cr

a lexical item when we saw that there was a marvelous

correspondence between such selectional features of nouns
marked

^abstract

or

'-rhuman" and the

fact that nouns

so marked refer to entities which are abstract or human.

McCawley notes that to falsify the thesis that selectional
restrictions can be predicted from the referent of a term
all that would be need are two words with the same meaning

which have different selectional features.
this sort have been proposed.

Examples of

But according to McCawley

careful investigation of the proposed cases shows that
the words claimed to be synonymous in fact differ in meaning.

For example, McCawley notes,
...one might propose defining the English verbs
kick slap and punch as "strike with the foot,"
"strike with the open hand," and "strike with
the fist," suggesting that they have the meaning
"strike" with different selectional restrictions.
However... in the bizarre situation in which a
person had been subjected to surgery in which
his hands and feet were cut off and grafted onto
his ankles and wrists, respectively, it would be
perfectly normal to speak of that person as kicking
someone with his fist or slapping someone with
This implies that the verbs refer to
his foot.
the specific motion which the organ in question
performs and are thus not simply contextual variants
of strike... ((1971)* P- 218)
,

,
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McCawley considers another example from Japanese with
the
same result.

The proposed difference in selectional

restrictions can again be shown to actually be a difference in meaning.

Thus there appears to be some reason for

saying that selectional restrictions are predictable from

meaning and hence based on semantic considerations, and
no clear cases of two lexical items which have the same

meaning but are such that the replacement of one of the
lexical items for another changes the sortal status of
some sentence.
the

case,

It should be noted that if this is indeed

it provides us with new evidence in favor of

Thomason’s Principle of Referentiality

,

which in turn

gives new life to his argument against the possibility of
a syntactic account of sortal incorrectness.

McCawley presents a second argument designed

to show

that at least some sortally incorrect sentences cannot be

treated as syntactically deviant.

This argument is based

on the fact that "many so-called selectional restrictions
are actually not real restrictions,

them are quite normal," (p. 219

)

since

’violations' of

specifically, such vio-

lations are normal in reports of dreams or beliefs.

McCawley gives a number of examples, among which are
1

.
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)

I

dreamed that

I

was a proton and fell in
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love with a shapely green-and-orange

striped electron
1

.

52 )

Harry thinks that his toothbruch is trying to
kill him

)

ouch
1.52) sentences are, according to McCawley, clearly gram-

matical (although admittedly bizarre).

Yet both

1 51
.

)

and

violate the selectional restrictions postulated by
Chomsky, nence both 1.51) and I.52) should be ungrammatical
or at best semi-grammatical.

Actually, examples like I.51) and I.52) do not show

directly that there are grammatical sentences which violate selectional restrictions.
1

.

For neither I.51) nor

are themselves clearly sortally incorrect.
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Rather,

they are sentences which have as parts sentences which are

sortally incorrect.

We cannot claim that the sentential

parts of a grammatical sentence are in all cases required

grammatical sentences themselves, for there are

to be

sentences such as
1

.

53

)

One isn't speaking English when one says that

twas brillig and the slithey toves did gyre

and gimble in the wabe

which are grammatical sentences of English which contain

ungrammatical sentences as parts.

But clearly McCawley
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not making the simple-minded claim that sortally
in-

correct sentences are grammatical because such sentences
can appear as parts of grammatical sentences.

Instead,

McCawley is pointing out that sortally incorrect sentences
can grammatically appear in positions which require a

grammatical sentence, such as in the reports of dreams or
beliefs

McCawley admits that someone who accepted a theory
like Chomsky's "might suggest that a person who says
thing's like

1.54)

My toothbrush is alive and trying to kill me

observes different selectional restrictions than normal
people do" ((1971),

p.

219).

In effect,

this would be to

say that such a sentence is grammatical for that person

because of a difference between that person's ideolect and
the standard dialect of English.

But this sort of move

would be pointless, McCawley argues,
...since the difference in "selectional
restrictions" will correspond exactly to a
difference in beliefs about one's relationship
A person who utters
to inanimate objects.
[1.54)7 should be referred to a psychiatric
clinic, not a remedial English course ...( (1971)

,

p.219)

So while one might claim that someone who did not consider

sortally incorrect sentences to be ungrammatical simply
had a non-standard syntax, such a claim would correspond
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exactly to that person having a standard syntax
but a

non-standard view of the world which was related
to that
syntax by that person's semantics.

McCawley

s

criticisms of syntactic approaches to

sortally incorrect sentences seem to cast grave doubt
on
the adequacy of such an approach.

It does appear that the

selectional features proposed by Chomsky are at least
predictable from the meaning of a lexical item if not

actually features of the referent of that lexical item.
If these features are predictable,

it would seem to

in-

dicate the possibility of a semantic treatment of sortally

incorrect sentences which would be simplier (since there

would be no need to duplicate the selectional restrictions
derived from the semantics in the syntactic component) and
hence,

on Chomsky's own criterion of what makes a grammar

preferable, a semantic account would be preferable to the

syntactic account.
semantic,

If selectional features are actually

then an account which tries to make such

features syntactic is merely confused; again a semantic

account would be preferable.

In either case, McCawley

has given evidence to support Thomason's Principle of

Referentiality

,

and hence the argument which Thomason

presented against syntactic accounts of sortal incorrect-
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ness may again be put forward, now without
circularity.

ms

These criticisms, along with those seen
earlier in
section, all point in the same direction:
sortally

incorrect sentences are semantically deviant
rather than
syntactically deviant. At best, these criticisms

lead us

t0

re

.i

e ct

attempts to account for sortally incorrect

sentences in the syntactic component of a grammar.

At

worst we have a very strong motivation for attempting
to

construct a theory of sortally incorrect sentences which
deals with such sentences semantically to enable us to

compare such a treatment with syntactic treatments we have
seen.
We will,

therefore, leave syntactic accounts of

sortal incorrectness, and turn our attention in the next

chapter to attempts at dealing with sortal incorrectness
in the semantic component of a grammar.

First,

however,

we will briefly look at what could be called a pragmatic

approach

to

the problem.

A C onversational Account

.

Having rejected the possibility of accounting for

sortally incorrect sentences in the syntactic component of
a grammar,

we will now turn to an account which explains
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the deviant nature of these sentences
by appealing to the

notion of maxims governing the general
structure of conversation.

It should be noted at the beginning
of this

discussion that no such account of sortal
incorrectness
has, to my knowledge, ever been fully
articulated
or

defended in the literature.
oO

However,

it is not difficult

construct such an account from the principles
governing-

conversation which have been argued for by a number
of
authors, most noteably H.P. Grice 1972 ).
(

The guiding intuition underlying the study of con-

versational maxims is that "taling is a special case or

variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior" (Grice
(

(1972)

p.

,

68)

The goal Grice sets is the discovery of

.

general principles which underlie this purposive behavior.
That such principles exist Grice takes to be shown by the
the fact that

.Our talk exchanges do not normally consist
of a succession of disconnected remarks, and
would not be rational if they did.
They are,
characteristically, to some degree at least co.

.

operative efforts. Each participant recognizes
in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set
of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted
direction.
This purpose or direction may be
fixed from the start.
or it may evolve during
the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or
it may be so indefinite as to leave considerable
lattitude
But at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as
c onversa tionally unsuitable ...(( 1972
p. 66)
.

.

.

.

.

)

,
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1 1

is

"the

purpose of Grice's invest; iga.fi on to arrive at

the principles which determine which conversational moves

will be unacceptable in a given conversation.
Grice proposes one general principle governing con-

versation which he calls the Cooperative Principle, which
he

formulates as
1.55)

The Cooperative Principle

;

Make your conver-

sational contribution such as is required, at
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted

purpose or direction of the talk exchange in

which you are engaged.
Grice then proposes four maxims of conversation, which if
they are followed will lead to results which accord with
the Cooperative Principle.

We can formulate these four

maxims as:
1.56)

Make your contribution as informative as is

required (for the current purposes of the
exchange)

,

and do not make your contribution

more informative than is required.
1.57)

Do not say what you believe to be false,

or

that for which you lack adequate evidence.
1.58)

Be relevant.

1.59)

Be perspicuous.
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itfs

--l

could attempt to account

four

sontal incorrec tness

such a framework in the following way.

Sortally in-

correct sentences are grammatical and are interpreted, but
they are sentences which are such that any utterence of

them will yeild a conversational act which does not follow
the Cooperative Principle.

The deviant nature of sortally

incorrect sentences is not the result of the linguistic
features of the sentence, but is rather the result of the
lack of any possible use for such a sentence.
For example, consider the sentence
1.60)

The taste of lemon is breakable

This sentence is clearly one we would want to call sort-

ally incorrect.

On the conversational account of sortal

incorrectness hinted at above, the deviant nature of 1.60)
is explained by the lack of conversational contexts in

which that sentence would be appropriately uttered.

Indeed

it is difficult to think of a conversation in which 1.60)

would count as a relevant remark.

Thus sentence 1.60)

would seem to be such that any utterence of it would
violate one of the maxims of conversation, in this case
the maxim 1.58)-

Further, sentence 1.60) and other sort-

ally incorrect sentences seem to be clear cases of
sentences which are not true, so even if they were rele-
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/ant to a conversation their utterence would seem
to

violate maxim 1.57).
i.he

above account is hardly a detailed theory of

mortal incorrectness as a conversationally based phenomenon,

indeed,

de /eloped

I

have no idea how such a theory would be

Deyond the above sketch.

However, some import-

ant features of this kind of account can be stated without

working the theory out in any more detail.

First,

it

should be noted that on the conversational account sortally

incorrect sentences can be judged as both deviant and
grammatical,

that is,

their deviance is not a consequence

of their violating any syntactic rules of the language.

Secondly, a conversational account is neutral as to how we
are to interpret such sentences.

Such an account would

seem to have to allow that such sentences are interpretable, as on this sort of account the deviance of such

sentences is pragmatic, not semantic.
tion,

hov/ever,

the

Beyond this restric-

theory favors no particular semantic

treatment of sortally incorrect sentences.

Thomason (1972) objects to a conversational approach
of dealing with sortally incorrect sentences on the

grounds that on any such account, "any assignment of

truth-values to category mistakes must be arbitrary, or

6l

else depend on an extraordinary and unexplained
feature
of the English language"
chink,

(p.

217).

is f undementally misdirected.

Such a criticism,

I

It is certainly

-rue that a Grician account says nothing about
how we are
to
i

L

ass ^-g n truth-values to sortally incorrect
sentences, and

also true that on this kind of account sortally

incorrect sentences are pragmatically rather than semantically deviant, and thus must be interpreted in some way.
But this interpretation will take place in the semantic

component of the grammar.

It is thus not suprising that

the rules governing conversation do not have anything to

say about interpreting sortally incorrect sentences--

interpretation of such sentences is not one of the jobs of
this component.

To criticise

the conversatinal account

for this failure is like criticising the design of a

bicycle because following that design results in a bicycle

which can'

add.

However, even if we can account for the oddity of

sortally incorrect sentences by appeal to conversational
maxims which the utterence of such sentences violate, we
have not given a full account of these sentences.

On the

conversational account sortally incorrect sentences must
be

interpre table

.

The failure of the conversational
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account to give such an interpretation is not
a drawback
_n that account, but the job of interpreting
such
sen-

tences must still be done.

We must still give some account

in the semantic component of the language of
sortally in-

correct sentences.

The Grician account can tell us that

these sentences are never appropriate to a conversation,

perhaps because they add no information or because they
a --

always false.

But we still need some semantic theory

which interprets sortally incorrect sentences in such a
way that they never add information or are always false.
At this point in our investigation the conclusions
we have reached have been largely negative.

We first saw

that there are major problems inherent in any account of

sortally incorrect sentences which treats such sentences
as syntactically ill formed (ungrammatical) sentences.

We

also saw that an attempt to account for sortally incorrect

sentences by claiming that such sentences violate conversational maxims was incomplete, as such an account does
not provide any mechanism for interpreting such sentences
but holds that these sentences are interpre table

.

Thus

both accounts fail because they are not able to take into

account or explain semantic features of sortally incorrect
sentences.

These facts are some evidence in favor of
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attempting to account for sortally incorrect
sentences in
-ne semantic component of a
grammar.
We will now
turn to

oome attempts to construct such a semantic
account.
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Footnotes --Chap ter

I.

Actually, Ryle ( 1968 may not have taken
sentences
^he sorts of things which are category
?
mistakes
as
13 exarn Ples
this work leave the issue in doubt'.
How° V Qr
0rk 0 the notion of category mistakes
^
i
Y claims
53/ he clearly
that sentences are the thina's
which are category mistakes.
)

,

m

,

.

-,

:

2

Sentences 1.13) and 1.14) are both formulations of
Gne 0G i^e c l as sic paradoxes.
Bergmann (1977) argues that
ouch sentences should be dis tinguished from category
mistakes or sortally incorrect sentences; she calls sentences like these "type mistakes."
It is not clear to me
that such a distinction can be made, but like her we
will
a/oid the paradoxes in at least the quest for some simplicity.
If we wished to account for these paradoxical
sentences along the lines of the account of sortally
incorrect sentences we will present, we could try to do so
using as a base the work of van Fraassen 1970 ).
1

(

3m
The theory being ascribed to Chomsky here is not one
which he currently holds. However, this theory is the
only one I know of which specifically deals with sortally
incorrect sentences in the syntactic component of a
transformational grammar.
4

Actually, it may not be suprising that a simple
grammar produces sortally incorrect sentences, as one
might hold that the simplier and less constrained a grammar
the less likely it is that that grammar will make the
subtle syntactic distinctions needed to account for sortally incorrect sentences.
'"Later, we will argue that premise 1.35) is also one
which should not be accepted. But we will postpone that
discussion, as even if we accept that premise Drange
argument is flawed.
'

CHAPTER

II

SEMANTIC ACCOUNTS OF SORTAL INCORRECTNESS

Introduction
In the las

t

.

chapter we saw that there are grave prob-

lems with attempts to account for sortally
incorrect sen-

tences as syntactically deviant strings of a language,
and
ohat attempts to account for the deviance of sortally
in-

correct sentences by appeal to pragmatic rules surrounding
tne use of language rested on the assumption that such

sentences are to be interpreted without telling us how we
give such sentences their interpretation.

This failure of

syntactic accounts and incompleteness of pragmatic accounts

along with various features of sortally incorrect sentences
noted in the arguments of that chapter lead to the con-

clusion that some sort of semantic account of sortally
incorrect sentences is necessary.

We will begin our in-

vestigation of what kind of semantics is needed for such
an account in this chapter.
We will employ the following strategy.

In the first

section, we will briefly discuss what constitutes a sem-

antic theory for a language

,

and point out the problems in

deciding what data need to be explained or accounted for
by a semantic theory for sortally incorrect sentences.
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In
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the following sections,

we will look at a number of
recent

proposals for a semantics of sortally
incorrect sentences,
rhese theories will be laid out in
as sympathetic a fashion
possible we will pause only to note
technical difficulties in the theories as they arise.
Some
,

of these

technical problems will be major enough to
cast grave
douots on the adequacy of the approach in
question.
Howe/er, we will have a number of alternatives
open after

looking at these proposals, none of which is clearly
preferable to the others on the grounds of accounting
for
the
to a

data.

The last section of this chapter will be devoted

discussion of which approach we should pursue.

Methodological Preliminaries

.

Before looking at proposals for how to give a semantics for sortally incorrect sentences, we should say a few

things about what a semantics should look like and what we

want such a semantics to do.

In this section we will

address two questions-- what is a semantic theory, and
what data concerning sortally incorrect sentences should
such a theory account for?
We will,

in most of what follows, adopt the goals and

guidelines for a semantic theory laid out by Davidson (1975)

67

and Lewis

1972 ).

On the most basic level, a
semantics for
a language will be a theory
which describes and elucidates
(

the meanings of the words, phrases,
and sentences of that

language.

This is a rather vague description,
which David-

son and Lewis attempt to make precise.
stated by Davidson,

The problem, as

is that "a theory of the semantics
of

a natural language aims to give

the meaning of every mean-

ingful expression, but it is a question
what form a theory
should take if it is to accomplish this"
((1975), p. 18).

hot suprisingly, Davidson answers his own
question, sug-

gesting that "a theory of truth for a language does, in
a minimal but

important respect,

.

.

.give

the meanings of all

independently meaningful expressions on the basis of their
structure"

(p

.

18

)

"By a theory of truth," continues Davidson,
a set of axioms that entail,

language
true"

,

(p.

"I

mean

for every sentence of the

a statement of the conditions under which it is

18 ).

This connection between a semantics for a

language and a theory which specifies the truth conditions
for the sentences of that language is stated even more

explicitly by Lewis, who asserts that "semantics with no
treatment of truth conditions is not semantics" ((1972),
p

.

169).

1
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Such systems of rules for determining
the truth conditions of the sentences of a language are
familiar to

philosophers who work with model- theore tic semantics
for
artificial languages using the techniques poineered
by
Frege (1970),
10

Tarski

(

1969 ), and Carnap

(

1937

).

Attempts

extend this technique to natural languages have been

made by a number of philosophers and linguists
such as

Davidson (1975)* Lewis (1972), Parsons (1972), Partee
and Montague (1974a, 1974b).

(

1972

The ideas behind such

attempts to connect meaning and model-theore tic semantics
are laid out by Lewis, who states
.the meaning for a sentence is something
that determines the conditions under which the
sentence is true or false
It determines the
truth-value of the sentence in various possible
states of affairs, at various times, at various
places, for various speakers, and so on. .Similarly, a meaning for a name is something that
determines what thing, if any, the name names
in various possible states of affairs, at various
times, and so on. .. Similarly a meaning for a
common noun is something that determines which
(possible or actual) things, if any, that common
noun applies to in various possible states of
affairs, at various times, and so on... (Lewis
p. 173-174)
(1972)
.

.

.

.

,

,

In following this account of what constitutes a sem-

antics, we will adopt as our goal a model-theore tic

account which specifies the truth-conditions of the sentences of (at least a fragment of) a language such as

)
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English which includes serially
incorrect sentences.
tral

Cen-

this account will he the
specification of a finite
number of rules which will specify
the meaning of complex
sentences
terms of the meanings of the
parts of such
sentences.
All but one of the proposals for a
semantics
for sortally incorrect sentences we
will look at in this
chapter will share this goal; the one
exception, presented
by Katz, has a different set of goals
which will be discussed when we look at that proposal.
oo

m

Before discussing what results we want to
get from
°ur semantics, we should note one aspect of
technique.
ohe

In

accounts of sortally incorrect sentences based on

model-theoretic semantic techniques, the definition of
truth is always given for a formal logical language rather

than for a natural language such as English.

The rationale

oehind this is partially an attempt to keep things simple
since these artificial languages do not have such natural

language features as ambiguity and vagueness.

Further,

the

formal languages are connected to natural languages in
that it is generally assumed that the natural language

sentences which interest us can be translated into the

artificial language for which the semantics is given without loss of those features which give rise to the problems
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of sortal incorrectness.

In the proposals we will look
at

in this chapter such a translation
is assumed;

in our final

account of sortally incorrect sentences
offered in the next
chapter a method of translation will be
made explicit.

the semantics for the

If

formal language succeeds in capturing

the

data we wish to explain concerning
sortally incorrect
sentences we can then use the formal language
semantics
,

as a model for a direct semantics for
English.

Having decided that what we are looking for in
a
semantic account of sortally incorrect sentences
is
a

theory of truth for such sentences, we now need
to decide

what data that theory must account for.
oO

The obvious place

start is to ask what we should expect from our theory

concerning simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect
sentences like
2.1)

The theory of relativity is shiny

We want to end up with some sort of explanation for the

judgements of native speakers of English that such sentences are deviant.

But how to accomplish this in a theory

of truth is unclear, and different authors have put

forward different suggestions.

Another piece of data which

seems fairly safe is that such sentences ought not to be

evaluated by the theory to be true under most, if not all,
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2onditions.

A final piece of data which
seems generally

agreed upon by those who have offered
semantic accounts
°~ mortally incorrect sentences is
that we should be
a 1 e t0 trace

the deviance and lack of truth of
such sen-

tences to the fact that the referent of
the subject of the
sentence is not the right sort of thing to have
predicated
of it the property which is the referent
of the predicate
°f

Ulh- e

sentence.

clear.

Again,

this requirement is not very

But it does have the advantage that nearly every

author who discusses sortal incorrectness agrees to

it.

Beyond this, there is little agreement as to just
wha

u

da

oa

explain.

a semantic

Indeed,

theory of sortal incorrectness must

one feature of semantic accounts of

sortally incorrect sentences which is immediately striking
is the

diversity of what these theories take to be the

facts for which they should account.

While there might

be differences in the details of syntactic accounts of

sortal incorrectness, all syntactic accounts agree that
such strings are really ungrammatical sequences which are

not to be generated by an optimal grammar of the language.
Thus all syntactic accounts agree on the datum that

sortally incorrect sentences are not sentences at all, and
the

differences in the accounts concern what technical
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devices are used to block the generation
of these strings.
Beyond the agreement cited above, no such
commonality
ls

be

ound in the differing semantic accounts
of sortally incorrect sentences.
On some semantic accounts,
"°

-

simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect
sentences are
evaluated as false; on other accounts these
sentences are

evaluated as having some third or fourth truth-value;
and
on others these sentences are evaluated' as having
no truthvalue at all.
be

The cause of this diversity often seems to

technical choices made by the person offering the

treatment

,

as a problem which is solved one way in a

bivalent framework is often solved another way in a multivalued theory or in one with truth-value gaps.

But while

these various approaches may seem to arise in response to

purely technical problems, they have a major impact on
the philosophical underpinnings of an account.
is

Hence it

difficult to separate the questions of which semantic

theory is correct and what data such a theory should

account for.
We will,

therefore, not attempt to decide what data

a theory must account for at this point beyond that cited

above as the data which is generally agreed upon.

In-

stead, we will look at a number of accounts of the seman-
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tics of sortally incorrect sentences.

Except in the case

0f our dlscu ssion of the theory
offered by Katz (1964b),
Which is explicitly designed to
deal

with natural languages

ln a non-m °del- theoretic
framework,

we will illustrate

the semantics in question by
applying it to the simplest

possible language.

When we look at model-theore tic seman-

tic accounts, we will first look
at how that account would
a P^opos i tional or non-quantif ied
predicate logic,

-nen,

if necessary,

we will see how we can extend that

account to a first order predicate logic with
quantification.
uhe

To further simplify our initial investigation
of

current options for a semantics for sortal incorrect-

ness, all of the example languages we will look at will
be

given an extensional semantics.

We will return to the

question of what data the theory ought

to

explain in the

last section of the chapter, when we will discuss which of
the approaches

(if any)

looks the most promising as an

account of sortally incorrect sentences.

Once this is done

we can turn to Chapter III and the construction of a

semantics which will more adequately model a significant

fragment of English which includes some sentences which are
sortally incorrect.
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-- 1

/a-4e

n

ineories of S o r ta 1 Inc orrec tness

„

.

The obvious place to begin our investigation
is to
009

if we can fit sortally incorrect sentences
into a

standard model-theore tic semantics for a simple
artificial
language.

If is generally agreed that simple subject-

predicate sortally incorrect sentences such as 2.1) are
not true.

In the standard semantics for simple logics all

sentences are either true or false, so simple subjectpredicate sentences which are sortally incorrect will in
^his sort of semantics be evaluated as having the

value false

truth-

.

We can use a standard formulation of the rule which

evaluates simple sentences to obtain this result.

As-

suming that the language we are using to model English

contains names and predicates and that the simple sentences
of this language have the form "s is P" where "s" is a

name and "P" is a predicate, the rule which will evaluate
the truth-value of such sentences will look something like:
2.2)

"s is P"

by

s

is true

if and only if the object named

has the property denoted by P; otherwise

"s is P"

Given such a rule

,

is false.

the sentence which would be the trans-

lation of 2.1) into our simple language would be evaluated
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as false for the following reasons.

Sortally incorrect

sentences predicate of an object (in
the case of 2.1), the
° b ^ ect we refer
in English by the phrase "the
theory
oi relativity") a property of
the wrong sort (in 2.1), the

property denoted in English by the phrase
"is shiny").
Since the object is not the right sort
of thing to have
the property,
2.2)

it does not have the property.

Hence rule

tells us that the translation of 2.1), and
for anal-

ogous reasons the translations of all simple
subject-

predicate sortally incorrect sentences, will be evaluated
as false

This approach agrees with our preliminary data in
ohat no simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sen-

tence will be evaluated as true on the theory.

Further,

this theory opens the door to an explanation of the truth-

value of sortally incorrect sentences in terms of the

object which is the referent of the subject term of the
sentence being of the wrong sort

to

have the property

which is the referent of the predicate of the sentence.
In the above explanation we moved from an object being of
the wrong sort to have a property to that object not having

the property, a move which is certainly plausible.

This

gives us a connection between sortal status and truth-
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value which allows us to connect
our theory of truth to a
theory of sorts.

Having dealt with simple
subject-predicate sentences,
we can move on to sentences
built up from

simple sentences

us ing the standard sentential
logic connectives.

The

simplest connective is negation, which
is a unary operator
Again following the practice of standard
model-theore tic
semantics for simple logics, we can define
the truthvalue of the negation of a sentence using
a rule something
like
2.3)

if "A"

is a sentence,

then "neg A" is true if

and only if "A" is false; otherwise "neg A"
is false

.

This approach gives us the result that the negation
of a

sentence is true if that sentence is false

,

the double

negation of a sentence has the same truth-value as the
sentence, etc.

Applied to simple subject-predicate sort-

ally incorrect sentences the rule give us the result that
the negations of all such sentences are true,

their double

negations false, etc.
Rule 2.3) tells us how to evaluate negations of

sentences in our formal language

.

The question now is

whether the assignments of truth-values to these sentences
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agree with our intuitions about
the truth-values of negations of sortally incorrect
sentences in English.
One way in which we negate
a sentence in English is
by
prefixing that sentence with the
phrase "it is not the
case that."
According to our simple theory,
then, the

result of prefixing a simple
subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentence with that phrase
should yeild a true
sentence.
This prediction is confirmed by
sentences like
2.4)

It is not the case that the theory
of relativity
is shiny

which does,

in fact,

seem to be true.

So at least in this

case the simple theory seems to work for
sortally incor-

rect sentences.

Unfortunately, there are other constructions in

English which seem to be negations which do not fit in
with
the simple theory so nicely.

One of these constructions

forms what seems to be the negation of a simple subject-

predicate sentence by inserting what has been called a

negating word, such as "not," before the predicate of the
sentence.

Using this construction, we would negate sen-

tence 2.1) using the negating word and get the sentence
2.5)

The theory of relativity is not shiny

According to our simple theory, if 2.5) is in fact a
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negation of sentence 2.1) on a par with
2.4), it will also
ce evaluated as true.
Indeed, many find this
outcome of

the simple

theory unobjectionable.

But this opinion is not

universally held, as some claim that 2.5) is
just as
deviant as 2.1) and hence should not be evaluated

as true.

This problem is compounded if we consider a
third

construction in English which also appears to be some
form
oi

negation, namely, the use of negating prefixes such
as

non-

or

un-

on predicates.

If this construction is

considered to be a negation in the same way the negating
phrase

it is not the case that,"

the simple theory tells

us that if we take a simple subject-predicate sortally

incorrect sentence such as
2.6)

The taste of lemon is breakable

and form a negation of that sentence by using a negating
prefix, getting
2.7)

The taste of lemon is unbreakable

the result is a true sentence.

Further,

the

double

negation of a false sentence is itself false, so if we can
use negating prefixes to form negations the sentence
2.8)

It is not the case that the taste of lemon is

unbreakable
will be evaluated by our simple theory as having the truth-
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value false.

But these results are counterintuitive,
as
strikes most as just as clear a case
of a sortally
-.--correct sentence as 2.6) and
hence should be evaluated
as false on this theory, while 2.8)
strikes most speakers
as a sentence which is true.
So we seem to have an objection to a simple theory which evaluates
simple subjectpredicate sortally incorrect sentences along
)

the lines of

^.2),

negations of sentences along the lines of
2.3), and
considers all three constructions we have been
calling

negating constructions to be variants of the same
operation
on sentences.

There are at least two ways we can go to avoid these

problems.

ihe first is to simply bite

the bullet,

accepting

the theory's evaluation of 2.5) and 2.7) as true and 2.8)

as false.

Taking this line requires that we reject our

(perhaps questionable)

intuition that 2.5) is just as bad

as simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences

and our (much stronger) intuitions that 2.7) is sortally

incorrect and hence ought not to be evaluated as true
and that 2.8) is a true sentence, not a sentence which is
false

Another way out is

to

reject the claim that all three

of the constructions we labelled as "negating" constructions
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are to be treated formally
in the same way.
By taking this
llne
° ne could clalt" that
the insertion of the
negating
particle and the use of negating
prefixes do not form
’

sentences which are to be evaluated
using a rule like 2-3).
Since sentences using these
constructions are not to be

evaluated using this rule, nothing
about the semantics we
have sketched so far commits us
to the
claim that 2.5)

and 2.t) are true or that 2.8)
is false.

One could, of

course, combine these approaches,
claiming that 2.5) is
a negation on a par with 2.4)
and thus is true while 2.?)
is not such a negation.
I

m really not sure what to say to
someone who wants

allow that we can negate simple subject-predicate
sentences with all three of the constructions discussed
above
to

to get a sentence which is evaluated using a
rule like

2-u)

hot only would someone who took this way out be

forced to assen

u

to

the unbreakabili ty of tastes,

he would

have to assent to the unwed status of numbers and the

incorrigability of fruits.

Holding that negations of

sortally incorrect sentences formed with negating prefixes
are true just doesn’t correspond to our intuitions con-

cerning such sentences.

Since these intuitions serve as

the data which needs to be explained by the semantic theory,
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proponent of this line seems to be
placed in the
position of denying the data.
une

The more attractive line of defense
for someone who

wants to account for sortally incorrect
sentences in a
semantics as close as possible to the
one given for standard
two-valued logics is to take the second
alternative,

denying that some of the constructions
discussed above are
actually negations governed by semantic rules
like 2.3).
The approach would be some variant of the
following.

We

iorm genuine negations (that is, negations which
are eval-

uated by rules like 2.3)) in English by prefixing
a sentence with the phrase "is is not the case that."

This

accounts for our intuition that a sortally incorrect sentence prefixed by this phrase,

like 2.4),

is

true.

However,

sentences which use negating prefixes, like 2.8), are not
sentences of the right form to be evaluated in the semantics by clause 2.3);

in such sentences,

negation is being used.

some other form of

Such an approach would rely on a

distinction between what we could call "sentence negation,"
which is exemplified by sentences which begin with the
phrase "it is not the case that;" and what we could call

"predicate negation," exemplified by sentences which use
a negating prefix on a predicate.

On such a theory we
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could also account for the conflicting
intuitions concerning sentences in which the
negating particle
"not”

is

inserted before the predicate, saying
that such sentences
are ambiguous, capable of being
read as either sentence
negations or as predicate negations.
When read in the

former way, these sentences are judged
to be true; when
read
the latter way these sentences are
not necessarily

m

trUe

*

S uch a

theory could say that sentence and predicate

negation are two different sorts of negation,
or could
claim that the distinction is based on the
scope of a

single negation operation.

Such an approach has much to recommend it.

The first

advantage is that the distinction upon which it rests,

which we are indicating by distinguishing between "sentence

negation

and 'predicate negation" corresponds nicely to

a syntactic

distinction between forms of negation argued

for by Klima (1964).

Klima argues that there are syntactic

differences in the behavior of what he calls "sentence
negation" and "predicate negation" in English.

On the

tests that Klima gives, sentences prefixed with the phrase
"it is not the case that..

."

are cases of sentence negation

sentences in which the predicate of the sentence is prefixed with what we are calling a negating prefix are cases
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of predicate negation; and
sentences in which the negation
particle "not" occurs before the
predicate are ambiguous,

allowing for both readings.

Hence a semantic theory

Which distinguishes between the two
sorts of negation draws
a distinction which is nicely
parallelled in the syntax of
a natural language.
However, our account can’t end by
merely noting that there are differences
in these kinds of
negation.
Since we now have at least two forms
of negation
we need at least two semantic
rules to tell us how
to

evaluate sentences in which these different
forms occur.
By distinguishing two forms of negation
we avoid the

problems of the simple theory, but we must now extend
that
simple theory to determine the semantics of our new
form

of negation.
ih-is

is

the problem addressed by Mennie Be ngmann

(1977) who develops an account of sortally incorrect sen-

tences designed to save classical bivalent logic from the

problems posed by sortally incorrect sentences by developing a semantics which makes a distinction between two forms
of negation.

Bergmann begins by characterizing sortally

incorrect sentences in the following way.

"Any predicate

in natural language," she claims,
.

.

.may be assigned both an extension and a
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so r t al range.
The extension of a predicate is
the collection of all those entities
to which the
predicate is true while the sortal range
consists of all those entities to which the
predicate is significantly applicable.
When the
entity designated by the subject expression
of
,

an atomic statement (a predication) falls
outside of the predicate's sortal range, the
statement is sortally incorrect. ..( 1977
p. 6l)
)

,

xhis characterization fits in nicely with our
earlier

intuitive account of simple sortally incorrect sentences
as sentences which predicate of an object a property
of
the wrong sort.
io

What the Bergmann characterization adds

the notion of a sortal range

,

which allows us to give a

formal treatment of the notion of being "a predicate of
the wrong sort,” namely, a predicate P is of the wrong

sort to predicate of an object
o

is

o

if and only if object

not
2.9) included in the sortal range of

P.

The semantics Bergmann constructs is specifically

designed to deal with the problems of negations of sort-

ally incorrect sentences.

The minimal results she wants

from her semantics are

All sortally incorrect sentences are false
2.10)

if "P"

is a sortally incorrect sentence,

the

sentence "it is not the case that P" is true.
2.11)

If "S is P"
so are

is a sortally incorrect sentence,

"S is not P" and "S is non-P"

;

since
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such sentences are sortally incorrect
they are
false

.

To get these results,

Bergmann makes a distinction between

what she calls "internal" and "external" negation.

Inter-

nal negations are exemplified by sentences of
the form
S

is not P" and "S

is non-P"

;

these are to be distin-

guished from external negations of the form "it is not the
case that P.

The latter construction forms a genuine

negation of the sentence "P," when the phrase "it is not
ohe

case that.

.

."

is prefixed to a false sentence

the

result is a true sentence, even if the sentence so prefixed is sortally Incorrect.

Such a negation is to be

interpreted as denying that the matrix sentence is true.
This is not the case with sentences which are internal

negations, for in cases of internal negation "something
more is at stake," specifically,
be

internal negations "can

taken as indicating that the denotation of the subject

expression falls outside the predicates extension but
within the sortal range" ((1977).

p.

66-67).

We can see how the theory works by developing a sem-

antics for a simple, non-quantif ied predicate logic.

We

define a language L as having the primitive vocabulary:

Predicates:

for any n^l,

the n-place predicates
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Individual constants: a,, a

,

a.

"L

Logical signs:

-

Y

,

ie

.

,

.

.

.

J
(,

)

can now define the set of sentences of L as
the smallest

set S such that:
2

.

12

)

^

'

•

•

are individual constants of L and

>

n n ls an n_
P lace predicate of L,
m
.

2.13)

if A.B6S,

then "(~A)",

"

(

A-B)

then

,

"

"

(

yA) "6S

Having set the syntax, we can now construct a semantics for L.

Let D be some non-empty set of objects.

de f ine a sortal

We

specification, R, on D as a function from

n-adic predicates of L to ordered pairs of subsets of D n

specifically, where P^ is an n-adic predicate of

L,

R(P^)=<R 1 (P|J)

Intuit-

2

,

R (P^)>, where

.

1
ively, R (P^) will be the extension of P n while
m
m

be

the

sortal range of Pj\

To complete

2
P.

(P

n
m

)

,

will

the specification

of an interpretation, we must specify a function ref

from individual constants of L to members of

D;

intuitively

this function is such that for any individual constant

a^ of L, re (a
n

)

is the

object denoted by a^.

We now

define a model M relative to a sortal specification R on

domain D to be M=<R,ref>.
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We now define a valuation, T,
of L for domain D on a
model M=<R,ref> as a function from
statements of L to
{T,F} such that

2.14)

V^ P t
m l*

ref t
n
(

2 15
.

)

2.16)

2.17)

'

_T if and onl .y if <ref t

,i:

n^
1
)>€R (P n

m

(

±

)

.

.

)

V(A-*B)=T if and only if V(A)=F or V(B)=T

V(~A)=T if and only if V(A)=F
v( p m t i

•

•

=T

•

and

° n ly

2.18)

ref(t )>CR 2 (P n
n
m
V(y(A-B))=T if and only if

2.19)

V(y(~A) )=T

2.20)

V(y(yA) )=T

if <ref(t

1

)

V( yA =V( y b)
)

=t

We can now supply interpretations of the operations

logic.

The y operator will truely apply to all and only

sortally correct sentences, as such it is a formalization
of the notion "is sortally correct."

The only negation

in the system at present is external negation,

operates like classical negation.

which

Prefixing this negation

operator to a true sentence results in a false sentence
while prefixing it to a false sentence (whether sortally

correct or incorrect) results in a true sentence.
2.20)

Clause

tells us that the claim that a sentence is sortally

correct is always sortally correct; while clause

2

.

19

)
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tells us that the external negation
of a sentence is always
a serially correct sentence.
Clause 2.18) tells us that,

m

the case

of conditional sentences,

is catching;

sortal incorrectness

a conditional is sortally incorrect
if either

part of that conditional is sortally incorrect.

With this base, Bergmann fleshes out her language
by
defining three new connectives:
2

.

21

)

—

)

A

2.22)

A&B =

2.23)

-A

A->~A

df

The first of these,

—

(A-

,

—

B)

A&yA

i

—

,,

functions exactly like external

negation as far as its effect on a statements truth-value,
but differs in that if a statement, "A," is sortally in-

correct then the statement
rect.

The

"

—

i

A"

is also sortally incor-

conjunction operation is also normal in its

treatment of truth-value

,

but is like the conditional in

that if either conjunct is sortally incorrect,

the entire

conjunction is sortally incorrect.

2

Definition

.

23

)

introduces internal negation, specifically defining the
internal negation of a sentence as the conjunction of the
claims that the matrix sentence is false and that the

matrix sentence is sortally correct.
Perhaps the best way of seeing how this semantics
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works is to see how it deals with some of our examples
of

sortally incorrect sentences.

Our paradigm sortally in-

correct sentence,
2.1)

The theory of relativity is shiny

will translate into L as a sentence of the form "P^a

m n

where the intended interpretation will have R^(P^) be the
set of things which are shiny, and R 2 (P^) be the set of

things the predicate "is shiny" can be significantly

predicated of.

Further, ref (a

)

will be whatever object

in the domain is the theory of relativity.

sumably,

Since, pre-

the theory of relativity is not even the right

kind of thing to be shiny, sentence 2.1) will be assigned
the truth-value F.

Further,

since the theory of relativity

is not a thing to which we can significantly predicate

the predicate "is shiny,"

the sentence "yCP^a^)" w iH

also be assigned the truth-value

F,

i.e.,

2.1) will be

interpreted as being sortally incorrect.
The semantics was designed to reflect the distinction

between internal and external negation.

We can see how the

theory accomplishes this by seeing how it deals with the

sentences
2.4)

It is not the case that the theory of relativity
is shiny
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2

.

5)

The theory of relativity is not shiny

-ne first of these is to be understood
as the external

negation of sentence 2.1), and will thus be
translated
into L as

MP^)

.

"

The second is to be understood as

the internal negation of sentence 2.1)

,

and thus will be

translated into L as the sentence "-(P^a )."
tence 2.1)

is assigned the

truth-value

^iii 4e assigned the truth-value

T.

F,

Since sen-

sentence 2.4)

In addition,

since the

external negation of any sentence is sortally correct, the
sentence "y ~(P^a

)

(

correct.
2.5)

n)

will be true, so 2.4) is sortally

"

This is not the case with 2.5), however.

is an internal negation,

is really

Since

our representation of 2.5)

an abbreviation of the sentence

2.24)

1
—.(P^
)&y(P a
m n'
m n'
5

)

Since 2.1) is sortally incorrect,

this conjunction has a

second conjunct which is false, hence 2.5) is evaluated as
F.

Further,

2.24) will be

judged as sortally incorrect on

this semantics, as a conjunction is sortally correct if

and only if both conjuncts are sortally correct.

The

second conjunct of 2.24) is sortally correct, as all

sentences of the form "yA" are sortally correct, but the

first conjunct is not--that conjunct is an abbreviation of
the sentence

"P^a -^P^a " which is a conditional with a
m n
m n
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sortally incorrect antecedent, and hence a
conditional
which is sortally incorrect. Since a
conjunction with one
sortally incorrect conjunct is itself sortally
incorrect,

-•5) will be evaluated as false and sortally
incorrect.

This system has a number of features which
are worth

noting.

The first of these is that the notions
of truth-

value and sortal status have been separated.

This is

reflected in the truth conditions for sentences of the
form
/A

the

;

-ruth or falsity of this sentence is not deter-

mined by the truth-value of sentence "A" but rather by the
sortal status of the sentence.
of

uhe

A second noteworthy feature

account is that the notion of sortal incorrectness

has been extended so that it is a feature of all sentences,

not just a feature of simple subject-predicate sentences.
In light of the truth conditions for the y operator, we can

define the set of sortally correct sentences of the

language L on a model M=<R,ref> with domain D as the

smallest set
2.25)

such that

C

if <ref (a
"P

m

n

)

,

.

.

.

ref (a^

2

m

)>CR (P

m
)

then

a...a n+m "€C

r n

2.26)

if A is a sentence of L,

2.2 7)

if A,B£C

"~A" and "yA"€C

then "A-B"€C

Clause 2.25) reflects our intuitions concerning simple
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subject predicate sentences, saying
that such a sentence
is sortally correct if and only
if the sentence predicates
of an object or set of objects a
predicate of the proper
sort.

Clause

2

.

26

)

extends the notion of sortal correct-

ness to external negations and claims
about a sentence’s
sortal status, telling us that all such
sentences are

sortally correct.

conditionals

,

The final clause extends the notion
to

telling us that a conditional is sortally

correct if and only if both the antecedent and the
consequent of the conditional are sortally correct.

Having laid out the system and seen how it works, we
can now ask whether it does what we want it to do, specifically,

does it satisfy the requirements 2.9)--2.1l).

It

certainly meets the requirement set out in 2.11) if we
interpret the sentences "S is not P" and "S is non-P" as

being the internal negations of the sentence ”S is P"

,

for

if the latter sentence is sortally incorrect the first two

sentences will be sortally incorrect and false.
ately,

2.11)

is the

Unfortun-

only requirement that is met; on

Bergmann's theory both 2.9) and 2.10) are false.
The cause of this problem is the wedge that has been

driven between the notions of sortal incorrectness and
truth-value.

The two notions diverge once we get away
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-rom atomic sentences, simple external
negations or claims
t0 sortal correctness; if we
restrict our

attention to

these sentences all sortally incorrect
sentences are
false and no true sentence is sortally
incorrect.
But
once we move to sentences in which
the conditional plays a
par., this correlation disappears,
for then we can have
jnl.v

true sentences which are sortally incorrect.
oi

An example

such a sentence would be any conditional whose
anteced-

ent was an atomic sortally incorrect sentence.

Since

atomic sortally incorrect sentences are all false and
any

conditional with a false antecedent is true, such a sentence will be evaluated as true

.

But such a sentence will

also be a conditional with a sortally incorrect part, and
all such conditionals are sortally incorrect.

So such a

sentence will be sortally incorrect and true, violating

condition 2.9).

Further,

the external negation of such a

sentence will be false, so we have sortally incorrect

sentences the external negations of which are false, violating condition 2.10).
The problem is that the 'notion of sortal incorrect-

ness has been extended so that it goes beyond cases in

which we have clear intuitions.

Our intuitive notion of

sortal incorrectness (which Bergmann also holds) is that
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a sentence

is sortally incorrect if it ascribes to
an

object a property of the wrong sort.

But this intuition

only guides us in the case of simple subject-predicate

sentences; when we extend the notion to all sentences
our

intuitive ground is lost for we are unable to pick out
the subject or the property being ascribed to that
subject

in the sentence

One way out for Bergmann is to weaken the requirements
2.9)

and 2.10) on the system, requiring only that all

subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences are false
and that the external negation of all subject-predicate

sortally incorrect sentences are true.
requirements in this way Bergmann'
those requirements.

s

If we weaken the

system will satisfy

But even if we do this,

the system

has the counterintuitive consequence that there are sort-

ally incorrect sentences (although no sortally incorrect
atomic sentences) which are true.

Perhaps this is a con-

sequence we could learn to live with.

The only cases of

true sortally incorrect sentences are molecular sentences

where our intuitive notion of sortal incorrectness does
not apply.

So it might be claimed that the fact that some

of these sortally incorrect sentences are true only vio-

lates intuitions about the truth-value of sortally incor-
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rect conditioned by our intuitions concerning the
relation
°f

truth-value and sortal correctness in atomic sentences.

Rather than casting doubt on the theory, the consequence
that there are true sortally incorrect sentences can
be

taken to show that our intuitive correlation between
sortal incorrectness and truth-value is simply not extendable to all sentences.

However,

the separation of the notions of truth and

sortal status leads Bergmann into unacceptable consequences
once she extends her language to include quantification.
We can replicate her program by extending the language L to
the language L'

by adding to the vocabulary of L the var-

iables x 1( x ,x^,... and the logical sign "V." 2
2
terms of

L'

we will mean the individual constants and the

variables of L'

We now define the formulas of L'

.

the smallest set S'

2.28)

if

y

if A B£S
,

to be

such that

Vm

are terms of L

’
,

so are

"

(

~A )

'

and

m
then "P t

m-place predicate of L',
2.29)

By the

r n

"

"
,

(A-B)

"

,

an

is
.

.

.

t

"GS

n+m
,

"(yA)"

and "(\/x^)(A)"
The sentences of L' will be all the formulas of L'

in which

no variable occurs free.

Let D be a non-empty domain and M be a model such that
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M=<R,ref> where R is a sortal specification and ref is a
re

ference function as specified for L

assignment function,

We now define an

.

relative to M on D as a function

d,

from terms of L' to members of D such that if a

individual constant of L*

d(a )=ref(a ).
n
n

,

n

is an

Where t. is any
J
0

term of L' and y is any variable of L', we can define a

bivalent satisfaction function
D relative

S

d

on a model M with domain

to an assignment function d as a function from

formulas of L'

to {T,F}

2.30)

S (P

2.31)

S

2.32)

S

2.33)

S

d

d
d
d

jV"

such that

W

(A-B)=T iff

(~A)=T iff

S
S

d

1
= T iff <d(t ),...,d(t
)>€R (P“)
n
n+m
d

(A)=F or S (B)=T
d

(A)=F

((Vy)A)=T iff S ,(A)=T for all assignment
d

functions

d'

on M which differ from d in at

most the value of d'(y)
S

2 3 '-*)
.

p
d V<
(

eR

2.35)

S

2.36)

S

2

-

37

)

S

2

.

33

)

S

d
d

d

2

“V--W )=T

iff <d(t

n)

i{t

n+a

]>

(p”)

(v(A-B))=T iff S d (vA)=S d Y B)=T
(

(v(~A))=T
(y(yA))=T

d(

y( (Vy)A)

)

= T iff S

ment functions

d'

d

,(yA) = T for all assign-

on M which differ from d

in at most the value d'(y)
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We can now define a bivalent
valuation v of LM with domain D as
2-39)

for any formula of L' A

,

on a model

v(A)=T iff

for all satisfaction functions S

S

(A) = T

on M;

d

other-

wise v(A)-F
The counterintuitive result which
comes immediately

from this treatment of quantification is
that most ordinary universally quantified sentences will be
evaluated as

being sortally incorrect.

For consider the universally

quantified sentence
2.40)

(Vx )(P^x -P^x
5

5

)

5

sentence is sortally correct only if, for every

assignment of values to variables as specified in

2

.

d

38 ),

2

1
d(x^) 6 R (P 1 ) and d(x^)£R 2 (P^).
2

This will only be true in

cases in which R 2 (P 2 )=R 2 (P 2 )=D, that is,

the universal will

be sortally correct only if the predicates "P 2 " and "P 2 "
^

I

significantly apply to all of the objects in the domain.
So on this account of sortal incorrectness the seemingly

innocuous sentence "all men are mortal" is sortally in-

correct on any domain that includes a single object to

which we can not significantly apply the predicate "is a
man" or the predicate "is mortal."

This is not a case

where we don't have an intuition about the sortal status
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of the sentence and thus can be
content with letting the

theory decide the question.

In this case,

the theory is

simply at odds with a clear intuition
concerning the sortal
status of the sentence.
We can not say
that in this case

the theory tells us a suprising fact
about universally

quantified sentences which we had not noticed
before; in
this case the

theory is simply wrong.

Where does the theory go wrong?

when we add quantification
suggested by Bergmann.
the

to

the

The problem arises

theory along the lines

The quantification introduced in

theory is unrestricted, that is to say, the variables

range over every object in the domain, regardless of the

sort of the object.

Because of this, we are virtually

assured that any universally quantified sentence of the
language will be sortally incorrect, for there are very
few predicates which can be significantly applied to

everything

.

But, as we saw, Bergmann'

s

treatment of

quantification treats universally quantified sentences as
sortally correct only if the predicates in the sentence
can be significantly applied to every object in the domain.
This technical problem having to do with quantific-

ation should not, however, be taken as an overriding
objection to the bivalent approach to sortal incorrectness
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taken by Bergmann.

The problem arises not because
Bergmann

takes sortally incorrect subject-predicate
sentences to be
±alse but rather because she treats
quantification in her

language as quantification over all entities
of all sortal
types.
jVhat is needed to patch the hole
in the system is
n0b a re j ec tion of bivalence but a different
way of dealing

with quantification.
Rather than attempt to come up with a new method of

quantification for Bergmann'

s

system, we will go on to look

at some other accounts of sortally incorrect sentences.

^iH

1

i©

We

turn to this system, for while we leave it with a

technical flaw it is still a viable candidate for a semantic

theory of sortal incorrectness.

Indeed,

the

system

does have its failings, but these are minor in that they
do not show that the basic approach of treating sortally

incorrect subject-predicate sentences as false is untenable.

Whether or not it is worth while attempting to solve the
problem this system has in its treatment of quantification
will depend on the theoretical merits of the overall system,

which will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

Many-Valued Theories of Sortal Incorrectness.
Both of the semantic theories of sortally incorrect
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sentences we looked at in the last section
began with the
jasic intuition that simple subject-predicate
sortally
incorrect sentences were not true and concluded
from that
that such sentences should be evaluated as
false.
We will
now look at semantic accounts which reject this
as
a base.

The theories we will investigate in this
section begin with
the intuition that simple subject-predicate
sortally in-

correct sentences are not true, but also claim that sentences such as
2.5)

The

theory of relativity is not shiny

are both straightforward negations of simple subject-

predicate sortally incorrect sentences and are themselves

sortally incorrect and hence are not to be evaluated as
true.

Since the negation of a false sentence is a true

sentence,

the failure of simple subject-predicate sortally

incorrect sentences and their negations to be true is taken
to show that these sentences have some

then either true or false.

truth-value other

According to the theories we

are about to look at, an adequate semantics for sortally

incorrect sentences must be one modelled on some semantics
for a many-valued logic.
The most conservative many-valued approach is one

which allows for three truth-values.

On such a theory
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sentences can be true, false, or have
some third truth/alue.
This third truth-value is identified
by

some (for

example

Routley

,

(

1969)

)

as "non-significant" and by
others

aS

oor tally incorrect"; a third alternative
is to label
the uhird value as simply "neither
true nor false."
In

'

what follows we will simply refer to
the third truth-value
oy using the letter "N," the
interpretation of this value
will vary from theory to theory.
It is this third truthvalue which is had by simple subject-predicate
sortally

incorrect sentences.

The theories proposed differ in the

way that they complete their semantics, that is,
in the
way they specify the truth conditions for the
connectives.
In any semantic theory which has at least a third

truth— 7 alue we can distinguish between two sorts of negation.

The first yeilds a false sentence when prefixed to

a true

sentence and yeilds a true sentence when prefixed

to a sentence with either of the

other truth-values.

We

can informally state the truth conditions for this sort
of negation, which we will symbolize as
2

.

46

"
)

— A"

is false

otherwise

"

— A"

"

— ",

if and only if "A"

as
is true,

is true.

The second form of negation, which we will symbolize as
is a bit more complicated.

When prefixed to a true
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sentence this connective gives us a false
sentence and
when prefixed to a false sentence this
connective gives
us a true sentence.
However, then this connective is prefixed to a sentence with the third truth-value,
the result
io a

sentence which also has that third truth-value.

The

truth conditions for this sort of negation can
be informally-

stated as
2.47)

"~A"

is true

if and only if "A” is false;

false if and only if "A" is true; and N if

and only if "A” is

N.

We will follow van Fraassen (1971) and call the latter
form
of negation "choice negation" and the former form of neg-

ation "exclusion negation."

Adding a third truth-value and being able to distinguish between two forms of negation allows a three valued
system to account for what we have been calling negating

constructions in the following way.

Again consider the

sentences
2.4)

It is not the case that the theory of relativity
is

shiny
theory of relativity is not shiny

2.5)

The

2.7)

The taste of lemon is unbreakable

Intuitively, we have judged 2.4) to be true, 2.7) to be
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sortally incorrect and hence to have the same truth-value
as simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect
sentences,

and 2.5) to be either true or sortally incorrect.

On a

three valued system, we could account for this by saying

that sentence 2.4) is a case of an exclusion negation of
a matrix sentence which is neither true nor false and
hence
is

true;

sentence 2.7) is a case of a sentence which is a

choice negation of a matrix sentence which is neither true

nor false and hence is itself neither true nor false; while
2.5)

is ambiguous,

having one reading on which it is

equivalent to 2.4) and another on which it is equivalent
to 2.7)

While the introduction of a third truth-value allows
us to distinguish between choice and exclusion negation,

we can also ask if this distinction corresponds to two

readings of negation in English.

There are two ways

I

can

see of motivating this distinction by appeal to English.
The first of these would read exclusion negation as a

metalanguage operator, roughly interpreted in English as
the phrase "it is not true that..."

Given the truth con-

ditions for exclusion negation, which take true sentences
to

the value false and any other sentence to the value

true,

this interpretation of exclusion negation is natural.
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Since the interpretation of this form
of negation involves
jhe notlon of truth, standard
formal semantic techniques
would relegate this connective to the
metalanguage used
to give the semantics for the
object language in question,
hence the object language would contain
only choice negation, and the difference in truth-value
between negations

like 2.4) and 2.?)
a negation whose

that is,

can be explained in that the latter is

truth-value is tied directly to the world,

the sentence is true or false or neither depending

on the relationship which holds between a thing
and a

property, while the former is actually a sentence about
the object language

(in this case, English), and hence is

true or false in virtue of the way the matrix sentence is

evaluated.

The fact that the distinction between the two

sorts of negation has not been noticed before can be

explained by noting that English is often used as its
own metalanguage, and the failure to distinguish between

English constructions which are used to talk about the
world and similar constructions which are used to talk about

English is a common mistake.
A second way of handling the introduction of two

negation operations would be

to claim that the

forms both occur at the same level in English.

two negation
We saw in
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last section that Klima has argued
that there are synact-LC reasons for distinguishing
between what he calls
"sentence negation" and "predicate negation";
using Klima’s
syntactic data we could indentify exclusion
negation with
sentence negation and choice negation with
predicate
the

negation.

can

m

The fact that the distinction has gone
unnoticed

this case be explained by noting that
investigations

into negation in English are usually done
with the assump-

tion that every sentence is either true or false.

On this

assumption, choice and exclusion negation are semantically
identical.

It is only when a third value is introduced

into the semantics that the two forms of negation become

distinc t

Regardless of the interpretation we give to the two
forms of negation, a three-valued semantics which assigns

all simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences
a value

other than true or false has the following intuit-

ively attractive features.

Because simple subject-predicate

sortally incorrect sentences have a third truth-value, we

can account for the intuition that such sentences are
deviant by pointing out that they have a truth-value which
does deviate from those of classical logic.

With the

two kinds of negation available to the three-valued theory,
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we can also account for the
0f Slmple

intuitions that some negations

sub ject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences

are true while others are just as
deviant as the matrix

sortally incorrect sentence, as the exclusion
negation of
such a sortally incorrect sentence will
be true while the
choice negation of such a sentence will
have
the third

truth-value, which as we noted before is classically

deviant
However, there are technical problems with a threevalued account which arise once we attempt to
complete the

semantics by giving the truth conditions for the remaining
logical connectives.

We can see how this problem arises

oy considering what truth conditions we would want to
give

in such a theory for disjunction.

The semantics for the operation of disjunction must

tell us what the truth-value of a disjunction is given the

truth-values of its disjuncts.

In giving a semantic

account in a three-valued system we are attempting

to

extend classical two-valued logic rather than revise it, so
our semantic account of the connectives should be normal,

that is,

it should agree with the classical two-valued

semantic account for that connective in cases in which the

components of the molecular sentence have only the classical
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.ruth values.

The problem then reduces to deciding
what

we want the truth-value of the
sentence to be when one or

more of its parts has the third truth-value.

There are two common ways of giving a
normal defini-

tion of disjunction in a three-valued logic.

Kleene (1952)

labels these as "weak" and "strong" disjunction;
we will

adopt these labels here.

In giving the truth conditions

for strong disjunction, we follow the intuition
that a

disjunction with one true disjunct is true no matter what
the value of the other disjunct and false only if
both

disjuncts are false.

This yeilds a truth- table definition

for a three valued-system disjunction operation of
2

.

48)

v

T

F

N

T

T

T

T

F

T

F

N

N

T

N

N

Weak disjunction, on the other hand, is based on the

intuition already encountered in Bergmann's bivalent theory
that deviance is

'

catching", that is, that any molecular

which has a component with the third truth-value will
itself have that third truth-value.

Following this intu-

ition yeilds as a definition of disjunction in a three-

valued theory the truth-table
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2.49)

xhe choice

V

T

F

N

T

T

T

N

F

T

F

N

N

N

N

N

of which form of disjunction we incorporate

into the theory depends, at least in part,

pretation

o±

the

third truth-value.

on our inter-

A theory which inter-

prets the third value as "non-significant" or "nonsense"
would,

if it also interpreted the English "or" as strong

disjunction, be committed to the unacceptable claim that
the sentence

2.50)

Either today is Friday or the theory of
relativity is shiny

is true on Fridays and nonsense or non-significant on

other days of the week.

Thus it seems that if we wish to

interpret the English word "or" as strong disjunction, we
are forced to interpret the third truth-value as something-

like "neither true nor false," while if we wish to inter-

pret the third truth-value as "nonsense" or "non-significant" we will be required to interpret the English "or"
as weak disjunction.

While it is clear that it makes a difference which
form of disjunction we choose for our semantics, it is
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not clear which form we ought to choose
on the basis of the
data.
Our intuitions seem to pull in both
ways.

If

tooay is Friday, there is some pressure
to say that any
disjunction which has as one of its disjuncts
the sentence
uo day is Friday" is true.
If this is the case, then
sentence 2.50) is a disjunction which is true
on Fridays,
and hence we ought to incorporate strong
disjunction into
our system.
to

However,

there is also intuitive plausibility

the claim that 2.50)

Fridays,

is a deviant sentence even on

for one of the disjuncts of the sentence is

sortally incorrect.

Since three-valued systems identify

the deviance of sortally incorrect sentences with the

evaluation of those sentences giving them the third truthvalue,

following this intuition would require that we

evaluate

2 .$ 0

)

as having the third truth-value even on

Fridays, a result we would only get by incorporating weak

disjunction into our system.

I

know of no evidence which

would decide this matter one way or the other, so we are
left in the position of having two alternatives which

differ in important respects without having a clear-cut

reason to choose one alternative over the other.
Nor is the only technical problem with the three-

valued approach to sortal incorrectness confined to deter-

110

mining whether to use weak or strong
connectives.
There
is also a problem common to
both sorts of connectives,
arising
cases where the two kinds of connectives

m

give

us the same result.

Both weak and strong disjunction tell
us that a disjunction of two sentences each of which
has the third
truth-value will itself have the third
truth-value.
This
seems to be correct if we consider a sentence
like
2.51)

Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the taste of lemon is breakable

Since both disjuncts are sortally incorrect,
the

they will have

third truth-value and the value of the disjunction will

also oe

N

regardless of whether we interpret the English

"or" as weak or strong disjunction.

as sentence 2.51)

parts.

This seems reasonable,

seems to be just as bad as either of its

But now consider the sentences

2.52)

Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the

2.53)

theory of relativity is not shiny

Either the taste of lemon is breakable or the
theory of relativity is shiny

Both of these sentences are disjunctions, with one disjunct a sortally incorrect sentence and the other disjunct
the negation of a sortally incorrect sentence

.

We cannot

Ill

evaluate these sentences immediately,
as we must first
decide which of the two forms of
negation is being used
_n the

second disjuncts.

Unfortunately, either way we

decide creates problems for the three-valued
account.

Suppose we decide that the form of negation
being
used in the second disjunct of the above
sentences is

choice negation.

Then both sentences will have a second

disjunct which has the third truth-value, as the
choice

negation of a sentence with truth-value N also has
truthvalue N.

Then,

using either weak or strong disjunction

Uo our interpretation of the main connective of the sen-

tences,

both

2

.

52

)

and 2.53) will be disjunctions both of

whose disjuncts have truth-value

N,

and will therefore

both have the third truth-value themselves.

This seems

right for 2.53), but problematic for 2.52).

For 2.52) is

a sentence

of the form "P or not P," a form of a classical

tautology, and hence ought to be true.

(myself among them)

intuitively judge

If this is the result we want,

Indeed many people
2

.

52

)

to be true.

then our three-valued theory

will not account for the data if we interpret the negations
in 2 52
.

)

and 2.53) as choice negation.

This may not be seen as a fatal blow to a defender
of a three-valued account of sortal incorrectness.

After
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all,

such a person might say, we only
expect sentences of
form P or not P" to be true
because we are conditioned
by classical bivalent logics.
The only reason we expect
such sentences to be true, the
defender might continue,
is because we take them
to say that either sentence "P"
is
true or that that sentence is false,
which is presupposed
by bivalent theories.
But in

moving to a three-valued

system we have rejected this presupposition.

The fact that

we fail to get some of the
classical results of logic

only to be expected.

is

Whether or not this reply is adequate

will be discussed later.
We are not,

however, forced to give up the truth of

2.52) in a three-valued system.
ohe

If we decide to interpret

negation in the second disjunct of that sentence as

exclusion negation, the second disjunct will be the exclusion negation of a sentence with the third truth-value and
will,
to

therefore,

oe

evaluated as true.

If we

then decide

interpret the disjunction using the strong version of

bhe disjunction connective,

the whole sentence will be

evaluated as true, saving the truth of all sentences of the
form "P or not P."

Unfortunately, if we take this tack

and treat 2.53) on a par with 2.52), which seems reasonable
on the basis of their form, we must also evaluate 2.53) as
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orue

For 2.53) will now be a strong disjunction
one of

.

whose disjuncts is the exclusion negation
of a sentence
with the third truth-value.
But we began with the intuition
wia

o

2.53)

is

just as bad as other sortally incorrect

sentences, and hence should itself receive the third
truth-

value
data.

.

So this approach also fails to account for
the

Worse still, this approach does not even seem to

have a plausible explanation for why it fails to account

for the data.
To obtain the result that 2.52)

is true while 2.53)

has the third truth-value requires that we interpret the

sentences in the following way.
have the same logical form,

While the two appear to

in fact they are very different;

the first has as its second disjunct the exclusion negation

of a sortally incorrect sentence while the second has as

its second disjunct the choice negation of a sortally

incorrect sentence.

If we then interpret "or" as strong

disjunction, we get the result that
2.53) has the third truth-value.

2

.

52

)

is true while

While this accounts for

the intuitions we have concerning the two sentences,

it

does smack of being an ad hoc explanation, as it basically

requires us to interpret sentences of the form "P or not
Q"

in one way when sentence P is distinct from sentence Q
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and

m

another way when sentence P is the
same as sentence
So while this solution does
account for the data, it is
less than fully satisfying.
A more radical way of avoiding
the above problem with

the three-valued approach is to
accept the

differs in truth-value from

2.52)

2

.

53

)

intuition that

even though the

logical operators in the two sentences
are the same, and
conclude from this that we must reject the
approach of
the

three-valued system at the point at which that
system
evaluates sentences as having one of three
truth-values.
Instead,

some have advocated an approach to sortally

incorrect sentences based on a four-valued logic.
A recent attempt at giving a four-valued account
of

sortally incorrect sentences is that given by John Martin
(1975)

Martin begins by characterizing sortally incor-

•

rect sentences (which he calls category mistakes) using
the Wittgensteinian notion of a language game.

"A category

mistake," says Martin,
.may be informally characterized as a
predication unprovided for by the rules of a.
language game... Each condition for the operation
of. a language game may be called a presupposition.
Then, a category mistake is a failure of
what we may call sortal presupposition ...(( 1975
.

.

.

.

)

>

p.66)

The account Martin offers is built on Herzberger's theory
of truth and presupposition.

The most important aspect of
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that theory for Martin's account of sortally
incorrect

sentences is, according to Martin,
...that to say of a sentence that it
means. that it has two properties.
The
that it corresponds to the world.
The
is that all the presuppositions of the
are themselves true
(1975)
p. 75)
.

.

.

(

is true

first is
second...
sentence

,

The four truth-values of Martin's system are
built on this

distinction between correspondence to the world and satisfaction of presuppositions.

Each of the four truth-values

will be an ordered pair, where the first member of the

pair indicates correspondence to the world and the second
indicates satisfaction of presuppositions.
logic is two-dimensional,

that is,

The resultant

the truth-value of a

sentence depends on features along the two dimensions of

correspondence and satisfaction of presuppositions.
four truth-values, which Martin labels
be

T,

t,

f,

and

The
F,

can

interpreted as "corresponds to the world and has all

true presuppositions," "corresponds to the world and has

some false presuppositions," "does not correspond to the

world and has some false presuppositions," and "does not

correspond to the world and has all true presuppositions,"
respectively.

Since simple subject-predicate sortally

incorrect sentences have some false presuppositions,
specifically, those which Martin calls the sortal pre-
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suppositions, they fall into the categories of sentences

with truth-values of t or truth-values of

f.

We can also

represent Martin's truth-values as ordered pairs.
indicates satisfaction and

Where

1

indicates failure of satis-

0

faction we can identify the truth-values and ordered pairs
as T=<1 1>
,

,

t=<l 0>
,

,

f=<0 0>
,

,

and F=<0,1>.

By identifying his four truth-values with ordered

pairs in this way, Martin is able to construct a four-

valued valuation function,
v

and

v'

.

Let v and

v'

w,

from two two-valued functions

be two-valued valuations,

says

Martin, "the characteristic functions of the set of sentences that correspond and are presuppositionally secure,

respectively.

Then a four-valued valuation w may be con-

structed as follows: w(A)=<v(A), v'(A)>" ((1975),

p.

76).

For a simple sentential logic with the usual syntax we can
define v in the usual way as a function from sentences of
the

language to the set {0,1} such that, where A and B are

sentences

etc.

2.5^)

v(~A)=l iff v(A)=0

2 .55)

v(AvB)=l iff v(A)=l or v(B)=l

2.56)

v( A&B)=1 iff

v(A)=v(B)=l

We can define v' as a function from sentences to

{0,1} such that, where A and B are sentences,

11 ?

2.57)

v'(~A)=l iff v'(A)=l

2.58)

v’(AvB), v'(A&B), v'(A-B), v'(A--*B)=l
iff

V (A)=v' (B)=l
-his definition of the characteristic
function of sentences

whose presuppositions are satisfied reflects
Martin's

acceptance of the principle "that an expression with a

sortally deviant part is itself sortally deviant"
P-

((

1975 ),

74).

If we restrict the above theory to a language all
of

whose sentences are presupposi tionally secure, the system

reduces to a two-valued logic with the truth-values T=<1 1>
,

and F=<0,1>, representing correspondence and failure of

correspondence, respectively.

All four values come into

play only if we are dealing with a language which contains
some sentences which are not presupposi tionally secure.

On Martin's view, sortally incorrect sentences are deviant
just because they are cases of sentences which have false

presuppositions, hence any sortally incorrect sentence
will have either the truth-value t=<l

0>

or f=< 0 0 >
,

Further, any sentence which has as a part a sentence which
is sortally incorrect will itself have one of these

two

truth-value s
On the face of it, Martin's account shares a failure
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of one of the three-valued systems we
looked at in that the

sentence
2

.

52

)

Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the theory of relativity is not shiny

//ill

not have the value

T

and hence will not be evaluated

as true in the full-blown sense.

Since this sentence has

as parts sentences which are sortally incorrect,

have to have either the truth-value t or

f;

be evaluated as a sentence with truth-value

it will

in fact it will
t.

One problem

we saw with the three-valued theory which evaluated

2

.

52 )

as having the third truth-value was that 2.52) has the form
of a tautology, and thus our intuition was to say that the

sentence was true

However, Martin avoids this problem by noting that
his theory must be seen within the larger context of

Herzberger's theory of truth and presupposition.

One tenet

of this theory is that logic does not deal with a full

blown notion of truth but rather restricts its attention
to the

single dimension of correspondence.

a sentence

So to say that

is a tautology is only to say something about

the correspondence satisfaction of that sentence.

All

tautologies on Martin's system will satisfy the correspondence criterion, but those which are sortally incorrect
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or have parts which are sortally
incorrect will not have

all their presuppositions satisfied
and will, therefore,
oe

evaluated as having the value

t

rather than

T.

Martin’s system gives us the following
results concern
ing sortally incorrect sentences.
All simple subject-predicate sentences which are sortally incorrect
have either
,ne

truth-value

t

or f

so none of these sentences are

,

true or false in the full blown sense of
truth and false-

hood*

Further, any complex sentence with a sortally in-

correct part will also fail to be either fully true or
fully false.

However,

tautologies and contradictions with

sortally incorrect parts, while neither fully true nor
fully false, are true or false with respect to the notion
of

truth and falsehood dealt with in logic, namely,

the

notion of truth and falsehood which Martin calls correspondence

.

Martin extends this system to a first-order quantified
language by interpreting the quantifiers substitutionally

and treating universal quantification as a form of infinite

conjunction.

Let L be a first order language with names,

n-place predicates, variables, and with negation, conjunction, and universal quantification taken as the primitive

logical operations.

The

sentences of L are defined in the
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usual way.

Let "Zx/t" be the result of
replacing all

occurences of t in

Z

by

x.

A four valued model for L
will

be an ordered pair <D,V> where
D is some non-empty domain

individuals and V is a function from
names, n-place
predicates, and sentences of L satisfying
the conditions:
01

2.59)
2.60)

if A is a sentence of L,
if t is a name of L,
d€D,

v(r
2.61)

if P

)

,

t f F}
,

,

then V(t)<=D and for all

there is some name

t'

of L such that

)=d

n

then V(P n

is an n-place predicate of L,

is a function from D

2.62)

then V( A €[ T

n
if A="P t

1

...t

H

n

n

to {T,t,f,F}

then V(A)=V(P n )(Y(t

2.63)

if A="~B" and V(B)=<x,y>,

2.64)

if A="B&C

"

,

V( B

)

)

1

V(t

)

R ))

then V(A)=<l-x,y>

=<x y> and V(C)=<w,z>, then
,

V(A)=<x*w, y.z>
2.65)

if A="(V’v)B"

,

and x,y are the least values such

that there is a

t'

such that V(Bt'/v)=<x,y>

then V(A)=<x,y>
In reading the requirements on V contained in

2

.

63)

2

.

65)

it must be remembered that the four truth-values have been

identified by Martin with ordered pairs.
The semantics for a quantified four-valued system given

above is somewhat odd, requiring for example in clause
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2.o0)

that every member of the domain be
named by some term
of the language.
This, however, is an outcome of
Martin's
use of substitutional quantification
and does not bear
direc tly on his treatment of sortal
incorrectness.
There is a problem, however, with Martin's
truth conditions for the universal quantifier given
in clause 2.65).
In fact, on the most reasonable
interpretation of Martin’s

truth conditions for universally quantified
sentences, we
seem to get the same counterintuitive result we
got in

Bergmann's bivalent semantics, for it requires that any

universally quantified sentence which contains a predicate
which is not sortally correct for every name in the language
(and hence every object in the domain) will have an un-

satisfied sortal presupposition.

For 2.65) tells us that

the value of a universally quantified sentence is the least

value had by any sentence which results from removing the

universal quantifier and substituting some name of the
language for the quantified variable.

To begin with,

is not clear that there will be a single least value,

it

for

if we have a quantified sentence whose substitution instan-

ces all have either the value t=<l

0>

or F=< 0

,

1>

it is

unclear which of these counts as the least value x,y.

But

even if this could be specified Martin would be in trouble.
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For consider the example of a clearly
innocuous, sortally
correct sentence such as "all men are
mortal." Since,
presumably, the theory of relativity is
not the right sort
01 thing to be mortal, the
substitution instance of the

above sentence with the name of the
theory of relativity

substituted in for the variable will fail in its
sortal

presuppositions (since a sentence fails of sortal
presupposition if any of its component senteces fail). So
this

substitution instance will have either the truth-value
t=<l,0> or f=<0 0>
,

.

Either way, there will be a substitu-

tion instance of "all men are mortal" which yeilds a

truth-value which is less than T=<1 1>
,

intuitions,

.

So counter to our

the quantified sentence is not true--it is at

best a sentence which corresponds but fails in sortal
presupposition.
Again,

Clearly this is an unacceptable consequence.

this flaw does not show that Martin's four-

valued semantics for sortally incorrect sentences cannot
be modified to give an acceptable system.

Whether or not

it is worth the effort of attempting to find such a mod-

ification will be discussed in the last section of this

chapter
Sortal Incorrectness and Truth-Value Gaps.
An approach to the semantics of sortally incorrect
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sentences which is often confused with three-valued

accounts is based on the intuition that simple
subjectpredicate sortally incorrect sentences, while being
fully

grammatical strings of a language
all.

,

have no truth-value at

This approach is based on the semantic system for

presuppositon developed by van Fraassen (1966b, I968,
1970 a) which was first applied to the problem of

1969,

sortal incorrectness by Thomason (1972).
I

0

is

important at the outset to see the difference

bw tween this sort of approach and the three-valued systems
we saw earlier.

A three-valued approach begins by saying

that simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences are neither true nor false and hence have some
third truth-value.

The truth-value gap approach agrees

that these sentences are neither true nor false, but does

not introduce a third value as the value of those sentences.

Instead,

this approach claims that these sentences

literally have no truth - value at all.
a distinction without a difference.

This may seem to be

However, when dealing

with the logical connectives the distinction makes a major
difference.

When defining the truth conditions for the

logical connectives, a three-valued account must, if it
treats these connectives as truth functional, treat all
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simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences in
tne same way, as all such sentences
have the same truthvalue.
As we saw, this caused some problems
for three/alued accounts, as there is some intuitive
backing in

distinguishing the truth-values of the sentences
2.52)

Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the theory of relativity is not shiny

2.53)

Either the taste of lemon is breakable or the
theory of relativity is not shiny

To distinguish these
a

two on the bases of their truth-values,

three-valued theory is forced to say that the second

disjunct is different in the two sentences, despite the
fact that they appear to be identical.

No such problem

need arise in a system with truth-value gaps.

Such a

theory can treat the logical connectives as truth functional
in that the truth-value of a complex sentence will be

determined by the truth-values of its parts if those parts
have a truth-value.

But no such determination is required

in cases in which one of the parts of a complex sentence

lacks a truth-value.

left open.

How we deal with such sentences is

Lack of a truth-value is no more a separate

truth-value than lack of color is a separate color.

Thomason's account relies heavily on the intuition
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that the deviant nature of sortally
incorrect subject-

predicate sentences is the result of the
object referred
t0 ky
subject of the sentence being the wrong
sort of

hung

to have or lack the property which is
the referent

of the predicate of the sentence.

He reflects this in

his system by introducing the notion of a
sortal specif-

ication, which is one of the semantic determinants
which

must be specified when giving a model for a language.

A

sortal specification will have the form of a function
from

predicates (or n-place relations) of the language to objects
(or n- tuples of objects)

in the domain.

Intuitively, the

sortal specification will map a predicate to the set of

objects which are of the right sort to have or lack the

property referred to by that predicate.

We will call this

set of objects the sortal range of the property relative
to that sortal specification.

A simple subject-predicate

sentence which says of an object within the sortal range
of a predicate that it has the property referred to by

that predicate will be either true or false.

However, if

the sentence says of an object outside the sortal range of
a predicate that the

by the predicate,
false

object has the property referred to

the sentence will be neither true nor
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We

° an

cons1:ruc " a simple language to
illustrate how

such a model works.

Let L be a language with an infinite

number of names t^t^t^,...; and an
infinite number of
n-place predicates (for n>0) P^.P^.P*
Keeping the
language as simple as possible, we define

the set of sen-

tences of L as the smallest set
2.o6)

if

^

•

•

such that

is an n-place predicate of L and

P^.

•

S

•

t

n
m+n are names of L, then "P t m ...t m+n
J

6S

Obviously, L is a very simple language containing no

logically complex sentences, however, it will suffice to
illustrate the role of a sortal specification in settingup a model.
To specify a model of L requires that we give a domain,
a sortal specification,

and an evaluation function.

So a

model will be a triple <D,S,V> where
2.67)

D is a non-empty set (the domain)

2.68)

S

is a function from n-place predicates of L to

subsets of D
2.69)

iX

(the sortal specification)

V is a function from names, n-place predicates,

and sentences of L such that
a)

if t

b)

if P^ is an n-place predicate of L,

n
in.

is a name of L,

V(t )€D
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V( p ^) E S(P^) D n
E
c)

if A is a sentence of L of the
form
"

P

mV’' t j+n"

V (t.

V(t

+n )>€V(P^)

j+n

^^m^
j-his

)>
5

then V A = T iff <V(t.)

’

^

;

A( p ^)
an<^

)

V(A)=F iff <V(t.)
but <V(t.)

f

...

f

V(t.

+n )>

is undefined otherwise

semantics works in the following way.

The

oor^al specification maps n-place predicates
into subsets
of the nth cartesian product of the domain;

intuitively,

the n-tuples which are in the set which is the
sortal

range of a predicate will be the things which are
of the

right sort for the property referred to by that predicate.
The interpretation function,

V,

then maps names in the

language to objects in the domain and n-place predicates
into subsets of the nth cartesian product of the domain;

intuitively,

the set of n-tuples of objects which the

interpretation function maps a predicate to will be the
objects of which that predicate can be truly predicated of.
Note that clause 2.69b) specifies that the objects in
this extension set of a predicate must be members of the

sortal range of that predicate.

This captures our in-

tuition that only sentences which are sortally correct can
be

true (in the case of subject-predicate sentences).

A
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further connection between the sortal
specification and the
truth-value of a sentence is given in
clause 2 69 c), for
.

according to this clause a sentence can
only be evaluated
as false if the objects referred
to by the names in the

sentence are in the sortal range of the
predicate and are
no

in the set of n- tuples which form the
extension set of

u

that predicate.
oi

Any sentence which says of objects outside

the sortal range of a predicate that they
have the

property denoted by that predicate will have no
truth-value
at all; the interpretation function V is undefined

for such

sentences
I t

is a

may strike one as odd that the sortal specification

mapping to (sets of n-tuples of) objects from predicates

rather than a mapping to objects from properties.

This

would seem to allow for two predicates to differ only in
their sortal range and not in their extension sets.

Given

the usual convention under which the meaning of a predicate
is identified in first order extensional languages with

the extension set of that predicate,

this seems to give us

the result that two predicates can have the same meaning

without having the same sortal range

.

This would certainly

run counter to our intuitions.
The problem here is not with the sortal system, but
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with the identification of the meaning
of a predicate with
its extension set.
In standard predicate logic

this ident-

ication is made possible by the fact that
if two predicates have the same extension set, the
sentences formed
by concatenating a name of the language
with either of the
two predicates will have the same
truth-value.

not the case in the above system.

This is

For suppose we have

two predicates,

P

but S(P)^S(Q).

While it will be the case on this model

and Q, and a model such that v(P)=V(Q)

that for any name of the language a,

"Pa"

is true if and

only if "Qa" is true, it will not be the case in the model
that "Pa" is false if and only if "Qa" is false.
a be

For let

the name of an object in the domain which is in the

sortal range of the predicate P (but not in its extension
set) and not in the sortal range of predicate Q.

"Pa"

is sortally correct and false,

incorrect and has no truth-value.

Then

while "Qa" is sortally
So while the two

predicates denote properties which are true of all the
same objects,

they do not denote the same property, for one

property which

is false

of some objects for which the

other is undefined.

We can,

therefore, no longer identify

is a

meaning with the extension set of a predicate

,

as the

sortal range of a predicate now plays an important part
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m

the meaning of predicates.

While this may at first seem

disconcerting, it is hardly implausible
that sortal features
should be part of meaning.
By evaluating sortally incorrect
subject-predicate

sentences as neither true nor false, Thomason
marks these
sentences as semantically deviant. However,
he must also
supply us with some way of evaluating the
truth-value of
sentences which are logically complex but which
contain

oortally incorrect subject-predicate sentences as
parts.
As with three-valued theories, a theory of sortally

incorrect sentences which evaluates some sentences as

being without truth-value should define the truth conditions
for logically complex sentences in a way which is normal,
that is to say,

in such a way that the truth-value of a

complex sentence all of whose parts have one of the two
truth-values has the truth-value given in classical logic
to such a sentence.

theories,

The problem, as with three-valued

is to decide what truth-value we should assign

to complex sentences

which have parts which themselves

lack a truth-value

Thomason deals with this by using van Fraassen's

method of evaluation by supervaluation.

Very roughly, the

idea behind this method of evaluating logically complex
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sentences is this.

Suppose that we have a logically
complex

sentence which has as a part at least one
sentence which
lacks truth-value.
To determine the truth-value
of the

sentence we see what the truth-value of
that sentence
would oe if all the parts of the sentence
which actually
have a truth-value had whatever value they
in fact have

and if the part or parts which lack truth-value
had one of
"

ne

'^

wo classical truth-values.

In cases where we have

only one sentential part with no truth-value, this
means
i^hat

we see what the

truth-value of the complex sentence

would be if this part had the truth-value true and what the
value of the complex sentence would be if this part had
the truth-value false,

techniques.

using standard two-valued evaluation

If the complex sentence has the same truth-

value in both cases, we evaluate the sentence as having
that truth-value.

If,

however, the truth-value of the

complex sentence varies depending on the truth-value we

assign to the truth-valueless part, we assign no truthvalue at all to the sentence as a whole-- its truthvalue will not be defined.
The formal mechanism used to obtain this result

proceeds in three stages.

We must first specify a partial

valuation, which will assign to the simple sentences of
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our language the values true,
false,

or no value at all.

then specify a set of extended
valuations relative to
that partial valuation.
These extended valuations will
assign a truth-value to every sentence
of the language,
we

bo .h simple and complex.

Simple sentences are evaluated

as either true or false,

the only restriction being that

if a sentence

is evaluated as either true or false
by our

beginning partial valuation, that sentence must
receive the
value assigned to it by the partial valuation
in every
member of the set of extended valuations relative
to that

partial valuation.

Simple sentences will all receive

either the value true or false on an extended valuation-sentences which are not given a truth-value by the original

partial valuation are given some value, which can vary
from one extended valuation to another.

Complex sentences

are then evaluated by the extended valuation in the trad-

itional fashion.

This is possible since

,

on an extended

valuation, all the simple sentences of the language have
some truth-value.
to a

The set of extended valuations relative

given partial valuation will include two members for

every simple sentence which is given no truth-value by
that partial valuation, one which assigns that sentence
the value true and another which assigns that sentence the
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vaiue false

'

No sen tence of any complexity lacks
a truth-

value on an extended valuation.
The final step in the evaluation process
is to eval-

uate the sentences of the language on the
supervaluation

induced by the partial valuation.

The value of a sentence

on the supervaluation can be simply defined in
the following
vvay.

If all the extended valuations evaluate the
sentence

as having the same truth-value, the supervaluation will

assign that sentence that truth-value.

If,

however, there

are members of the set of extended valuations which are

such that one of those extended valuations assigns the

sentence the value true while another assigns the sentence
the value false,

the sentence is assigned no truth-value

by the supervaluation.
To demonstrate how we get these results formally,

let

us extend our simple language L to the language L+C

which will include logically complex sentences based on
the unary connective for negation and the binary connective

for disjunction.

The primitive vocabulary of L+C

is that

of L with the addition of the one-place connective
the two-place connective "v"

We define the set of

sentences of L+C as the smallest set
2.70)

if ACS

and

S'

such that

(the set of sentences of L)

,

then ACS'
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2.71)

if A,B£S +

,

then "~A",

"AvB"£S +

0xher conne,= tives can be added to the
language by defining
them in terms of negation and
disjunction in the standard
way.
The first step in giving a
supervaluation semantics

for

is to specify a partial valuation.

L-rC

This is no

problem, as the models for L will be
partial valuations
1

°r L+ '"

Hence we can define a partial valuation,
PV, for

•

as a triple <D,S,V> satisfying conditions

2. 67

)

-2. 69 ).

dote that specifying the partial valuations
in this way

gives us the result that subject-predicate
sortally in-

correct sentences are evaluated by the partial valuation
as having no truth-value.

We must now specify the set of extended valuations

relative to a partial valuation PV on L+C.
be

This set will

set of all four— tuples I=<D,S,V,V > such that

the

,

2.72)

D S
,

and V are the domain, sortal specification,

and evaluation function, respectively, specified
in the partial valuation PV;
2

.

73

)

V

is a function from members of S +

of sentences of L+C)
a)

to {T F}
,

(the set

such that:

if ACS (the sentences of L) and V(A)

defined,

then V'(A)=V(A)

is
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b)

if A="~B",

then Y'(A)=T iff V'(B)=F,

otherwise V*(A)=F
c)

if A=" BvC

"

,

then V'(A)=T iff V'(B)=T or

V'(C)=T, otherwise V'(A)=F
j\/e

will call the set of all extended valuations

I

+
.

We will pause for a moment to take note
of some of the

features of these extended valuations.

Each of these

extended valuations is a bivalent valuation, in that on
each extended valuation every sentence of L+C is given a

truth-value.

Further,

on each of the extended valuations

negation and disjunction are classical.
a sentence will be

The negation of

true only if that sentence is false and

will be false only if that sentence is true

,

while a dis-

junction is true if either disjunct is true and false only

when both disjuncts are false.

It should be noted that

extended valuations differ from each other only in the
last member of the four-tuple-- the domain, sortal specification, and partial valuation function are all copied

from the partial valuation PV.

This insures that simple

subject-predicate sentences which are given a truth-value
on the partial valuation will all receive that very truth-

value on all of the extended valuations relative to that

partial valuation.

At the level of simple sentences,
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members of the set of extended valuations
will differ only
-n the values they give to sentences
which are not given
a truth-value by the partial valuation.
These sentences
will be given some truth-value on the extended
valuations,
but what truth-value they receive may vary
from one member
of that set to another.

Finally, we need to define the value of a sentence
of
on the supervaluation induced by a partial valuation

Ih-C

PV.
to

Where
3-

I

+

is the set of extended valuations relative

partial valuation FV on L+C

,

we can define the value

of a sentence A of L+C on the supervaluation induced bv
PV,

denoted (A)

°PV
,

as

Spy
2.74)

(A)

S^,.

=T iff V

'

(

A =T for all l€l'
)

;

(A)

=F

5

-

iff V'(A)=F for all l€

P

*"
;

otherwise (A)

"

^

is undefined

Some of the results of such a supervaluation semantics
are similar to those obtained in a three-valued system

using choice negation and strong disjunction.
choice negation,
a false

sentence,

As with

the result of negating a true sentence is

the result of negating a false sentence

is a true sentence,

and the result of negating a sentence

which is without truth-value is a sentence which is also

without truth-value.

As with a three-valued system using
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strong disjunction, the supervaluation
system gives us the
result that any disjunction with one
true disjunct is true,
no matter what the value or lack
of value of the other
disjunct
However, the supervaluation system given above
differs
~

rom a three-valued system in its treatment
of classical

tautologies and contradictions.

Remember that in a three-

valued system with choice negation and strong
disjunction
not every sentence of the form "Pv~P" was true;
specifically
if "P" was a sentence with the third truth-value the
sen-

tence

"Pv-P" also had the third truth-value.

In a

supervaluation semantics, on the other hand, every sentence which has the form of a classical tautology is

evaluated as true while every sentence which has the form
of a classical contradiction is evaluated as false.

To see

this requires only that we note that all the members of the

set of extended valuations are classical valuations.

From

this it follows that every member of the set of extended

valuations will evaluate all classical tautologies as true
and all classical contradictions as false.

Since all of

the members of the set of extended valuations agree on
the value of these sentences,

the supervaluation will

evaluate classical tautologies as true and classical
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contradictions as false, irrespective
of the truth-value
or lack of truth-value
of the component parts of
those
sentences. Whether or not this
is an advantage will be
discussed later.
There remains now only the
project of extending this
of system to a quantified
language.
Thomason presents
his treatment of quantifiers
in a very simple language,
which has a single one -place
predicate, "P", one binary
predicate, ”Q” and a single individual
constant, "a".
In reconstructing his system, we
will use as primitive

connectives negation, disjunction, and the
universal
quantifier.

Thomason does diverge from usual quantified

^

languages in that he allows for many-scrted
quantification,
which he indicates by using different styles
of individual
variables.

In this language, we will use only two
styles

of variables,

x-^x^x.^

and

y^yg.y^...

By the terms

of the language we will mean either the individual
con-

stant of the language or one of the variables (of either
sort).

We may then define the set of sentences of this

language, which we will call QL, as the smallest set QS
such that
2.75)

if w,s are terms of QL then "Pw" and "Qws"

are members of QS
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2

.

76

if A,B are members of QS

)

,

then so are "~A"

"AvB"
2 77
‘

if A is a member of QS and u a
variable (of

)

either style) then "(u)A" is a member
of QS
A partial valuation of QL will
be a four-tuple <D
lf D

such that D

2

and D

2

,S,Vi>

are non-empty sets (the domains of
the

variables); S a function mapping P to a
subset of D-^D
Q

oo

subset of (D^UD

a

^

2

and

(the sortal ranges of those

predicates); and V a function which maps a to
a member of

DfUD^

P

to a subset of S(P),

and Q to a subset of S(Q).

Intuitively, V(P) will be the set of objects in the
domain
of which P is true while V(Q) will be the set
of objects
in the domain which stand in relation Q.
A QL assignment of values to variables will be a

function g from variables of QL to objects in the domain
such that if

is a variable of the first type,

g(x

)€D-^

while if y^ is a variable of the second type g(y )€D^. An
n
extended valuation of QL relative to a partial valuation

PV=<D

,

1

,

2

S V>
,

and g assignment of values to variables is

a five-tuple I=<D
V are

1

the domains,

,D

,

2

S Y,
,

V’> such that

D0

,

S,

and

sortal specification, and evaluation

function, respectively, given in PV and

V

is a function

from terms, predicates, and sentences of QL such that
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2-78)

V'

2-79)

if u is a variable of QL
(of either style),

(a)=V(a)

V'(u)=g(u)
2.80)

V(P)cV'(P) and V* (P)n (S(P) -V(P)
)=0

2.31)

V(Q) EV'(Q) and V’ Q) n(S(Q)
-V(Q) )=0
(

2.82)

if u is a term of QL then
V'(Pu)-T iff
V' (u)€V' (P)

2.83)

if u,v are

<V

(u)

,

V'

(

2*84)

if

2.85)

if A= "BvC

"

2.86)

if A= "

)

2

•

87)

terms of QL then V'(Quv)=T iff
v )>£ V (Q)
'

then V'(A)-T iff v (B)=F
,

(

n

then V' (A)=T iff V'(B)=T or V»(c)=T
B"

then V’(A)=T iff for all V" just

like V’

except, perhaps, for the value of

V"(x

V" ( B)=T

n

)

,

if A ="(y )B" then V'(A)=T iff for all V”
n

just like V* except, perhaps,

for the value of

v M (y ), V" (B)=T
n

2.38)

if V’(A)/T and A is a sentence of QL,
V'

(

A =F
)

A sentence is true on an extended valuation
a partial valuation P7 if and only if V'
mo

T

then

I

relative to

maps that sentence

for all g assignments of values to variables; other-

wise the sentence is false on that extended valuation.

•
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The set of extended valuations,

I

+
,

relative to a partial

valuation PV is the set of all extended
valuations
isfying conditions 2. 78) -2. 88). A
sentence

sat-

I

of QL is true

on the supervaluation induced by a
partial valuation PV
if and only if it is true on all extended
valuations l£l +

;

false if and only if false on all extended
valuations I^I 4";

and undefined otherwise.
•

By now we should be fairly suspicious of quantified

o /o .eras

which attempt to deal with sortally incorrect

sentences.

attempted

Both systems we have seen previously which
uo

apply an analysis of sortally incorrect sen-

tences to a quantified language had as an outcome that the

sentence "all men are mortal" is sortally incorrect.

So

an obvious first move is to see how Thomason's system

handles this sentence
As it stands

,

the language for which Thomason has

given a semantics is not rich enough to allow us to translate the sentence into a sentence of the language.

However,

by adding another one-place predicate to the language we

could have a translation of the sentence, and we could
extend the semantics to include this in an obvious way.
However, it is not at all obvious how we are to

translate the sentence "all men are mortal" into the sorted
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quantified logic given by Thomason.

The problem concerns

which sort of variable we should use in the
translation
of the sentence.

Thomason says very little about how one

decides which style of variable to use when
translating an
English sentence into his formal language.
Two possibilities seem open to us, depending on how,

if at all,

the

sorted variables interact with the sorts of the predicates.
The first possibility would take the variables
to be

sorted independently of the sorts of the predicates.

This

seems to be indicated by the way Thomason has set up his

system

,

as the different styles of variables range over

different subsets of the domain, D

1

and D 2> while the

sortal ranges of the predicates are specified as subsets
of the union of these separate domains.

So it is possible

that both the sortal range and the extension of the pred-

icates which are the translations of "is a man" and "is

mortal" neither fully exhaust nor are fully exhausted by
the range of either style of variable.

If the sortal

range and the extension of these predicates are not fully

exhausted by either of the variable's domains, then no
matter what style of variable we pick there will be objects
in the domain of the variables which are outside of the

sortal range of the predicates.

Assuming that everything
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WhiCh iS a man is raorta1

’

this will result in the
trans-

lation of the sentence "all
men are mortal" being
evaluated
as having no truth-value.
If the sortal range and
the
extension of the predicates are
not fully contained in the
domain of either style of
variable, then translating
the
sentence using either style of
variable will not result
a sentence which says
about every man that he is mortal
it will only say that every
man in the domain of the choosen
variable is mortal.

m

An alternative to this problematic
treatment of the
variables is to take the domains of the
styles of variables
to coincide with the sortal ranges
of predicates.
While
nothing in the formal machinery dictates
such a relationship between the variables and the
predicates, examples
given by Thomason in his article do use the
different
stales of /ariables to quantify over the sortal
ranges of

different predicates.

If this alternative is adopted, we

should translate the sentence "all men are mortal"
using
vhe style of variable which ranges over objects
of the

correct sort to be both men and mortal.
An immediate question we must ask is whether or not
the sortal ranges of these two predicates coincide.

If

they do not, we must still decide which of two possible
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styles of variable we should pick
to quantify over in trans
lating our sentence.
But it does not seem unreasonable
to
assume that the sorts of things which
we can truly or
falsely say are men coincides with
the sort of things
which we can truly or falsely say
are mortal.
If this is

the case,

then we can have a single style of
variable with
domain a single sort, and we can evaluate
the sentence with
respect to only those sorts of things.
It should turn out
that the sentence is true for all those
objects, and hence
the sentence will be evaluated as true.

So Thomason's

system,
^he

interpreted in this way, appears to be superior to
other quantified systems we have seen in at least
its

treatment of this sentence.
By assuming that the sorted variables range over
domains which coincide with the sortal ranges of predicates
we also obtain the correct result in cases of quantified

sentences which we would intuitively want to classify as

serially incorrect, such as "all theories are shiny."
the case of this sentence,

In

the variable we choose will have

to range over the sort of one of the predicates "is a

theory" or "is shiny."

In either case the variable will

not range over the objects which are within the sortal
range of the other predicate.

Hence the truth-value of
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of the quantified sentence will vary
from extended valuation
to extended valuation, being false
on some but true on
3 "hers
So the sentence will receive no
truth-value on
.

me supervaluation, giving us the result we
want.
Unfortunately, we get these results only at the
cost
of making some fairly strong assumptions.
The first of
..hese

is that the domains of the sorted variables
will

coincide with the sortal ranges of predicates.
in

the

s

Nothing-

true ture of Thomason's semantics guarentees us

this result.

Even if this result were guarenteed, we must

make the further assumption that the sortal ranges of

different predicates are either identical or disjoint.

If

this is not the case and there are predicates which have

sortal ranges which overlap but are not identical, Thom-

ason will be forced into either saying- that any quantified
sentence which is contingent but has occurences of both

predicates followed by the same variable
nor false,

is

neither true

or introduce a third variable which has as its

domain the intersection of the two sortal ranges.

An additional unattractive feature of the Thomason

quantification system is that on his treatment, sortally
incorrect sentences which are quantified are all ambiguous.

As we saw before,

the

sentence "all theories are
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shiny" could be translated using either a variable
which
has as its domain the sort of things which can
be theories
or a variable which has as its domain the sorts of
things

which can be shiny.

These different translations do not

represent mere notational variants of the same sentence,
for the choice of variable determines in an important

respect what things the sentence is about.

The two

translations differ in meaning, for they make claims about

different sets of objects.

Even with these drawbacks the Thomason system

is a

viable alternative as a semantic account of sortally in-

correct sentences.

Whether or not his approach deserves

further development will be discussed in the last section
of this chapter.

Katz and Sortal Inc orrec tness

.

A final theory of sortally incorrect sentences we

will look at is that given by Katz (1964b).

This theory

differs fundamentally from those we have looked at

previously in that it is not an attempt to give a modeltheoretic account of the truth conditions for sentences of
a language.

Instead,

it is built into a different sort

of semantic framework of the type advocated by Fodor and
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and Katz

(

1964b)

This type of semantic theory has as its
goal not the

assignment of truth-values to sentences of a
language but
rather "the construction of a set of rules which
represents
what a fluent speaker knows about the semantic
structure

his language that permits him to understand its
sentences

(Katz (1964b), p.

519-520).

Specifically, the

oort of knowledge such a theory is designed to represent
is

the knowledge a speaker exhibits when
.he differentiates semantically acceptable
from semantically anomalous sentences; he recognizes ambiguities stemming from semantic relations; he detects semantic relations between
expressions and sentences of different syntactic
type and morpheme constitution; and so forth.
((1964b), p. 522
.

.

.

)

Hence must of the thrust of this sort of semantic theory
is to

attempt to elucidate semantic relationships which

hold between different sentences of the language, and to

explicate and account for ambiguity and senselessness
(or anomaly)

in sentences of a language.

The structure of the theory envisioned by Katz takes
the semantics of a language to have two components.

The

first of these Katz calls the dictionary, which "provides
a meaning for each lexical item of the
p.

520).

According to Katz,

language"

((

1964b)
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in a majority of cases a dictionary entry
consists of a finite number of sequences of
symbols, each sequence consisting of an initial
subsequence of syntactic markers, followed by
a subsequence of "semantic markers," then, optionally, one "distinguisher " and finally a
"selection restriction." Dictionary entries can
be represented in the form of tree diagrams.
where each sequence in the entry for a lexical
item appears as a distinct path rooted at that
lexical item... Each complete path, each sequence,
represents a distinct sense of the lexical item
in whose entry it appears ...(( 1964b
p. 523)
.

.

^

,

.

)

The second component of such a semantics is a set of

what Katz calls projection rules.
is

to provide a semantic reading for syntactically complex

expressions of the language.
the

The role of these rules

The projection rules take

information supplied by the dictionary along with the

syntactic structure of a phrase and give as output a semantic reading or readings for the phrase built from those

lexical items by those rules.

The structure of these pro-

jection rules is complicated and will not be discussed in
this section;

for our present purposes it will suffice

merely to state their function.
The

two components of such a theory are designed to

give a set of semantic readings to every sequence of lexical items of a language produced by a generative syntax

for that language.

These semantic readings will be paths

up a structure tree in which the bottom of the tree

is
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formed by the dictionary entries of the lexical
items

which make up the sentence.

The tree itself will show

now the projection rules put together the appropriate

parts of the dictionary entry for combined lexical items
to form meaningful phrases up to the level of the

sentence.

Features such as ambiguity, anomaly, and synon-

omy can be determined by such trees.

If the set of paths

up the

tree is empty,

alous;

if there are n distinct paths up the tree

greater than
the

full

1)

the sentence is semantically anom-

(for n

the sentence is n-ways ambiguous; and if

trees for two sentences are identical, the two sen-

tences are synonomous.

Katz considers sortally incorrect sentences to be
cases of sentences which are anomalous.

As such,

these

sentences will have no paths up the semantic tree which
gives such sentences a reading.

The mechanism which

guarentees that no such path will be available for sortally
incorrect sentences is to be found on the level of the

dictionary entries for the lexical items which make up the
sentence.

More specifically, any path for a sortally

incorrect sentence will be blocked because of the inter-

play between the selection restrictions of the lexical
items of the sentence.

The selection restrictions on a
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lexical item "determine the combinations
into which the
item can enter and the sense(s) it
bears in those combinations" (p. 524).
The example Katz gives is the
selection
restriction on the lexical item "honest" when
used
in the

sense of the lexical item "chaste."
*

°r

‘-his

The dictionary entry

lexical item with this sense has the selection

restriction "(Human) and (Female)."

This selection restric

Lion has the effect of saying that the lexical
item can

have this sense "just in case the head it modifies
has a

path containing both the semantic marker (Human) and
the
path semantic marker

(

Female )"(p.

525)

If no such sem-

antic markers are present in the path, the sense of "honest

which is synonomous with "chaste" is blocked; if other
senses of the term are also blocked because of analogous

problems with selection restrictions the sentence will be

anomalous
This approach to sortal incorrectness is very much
like that taken by Chomsky, who blocks the generation of

sortally incorrect sentences by introducing selectional
restrictions at the level of syntax.

However,

the Katz

system treats selection restrictions as semantic features
of the lexical items in question,

thus avoiding some of

the problems which led us to reject Chomsky’s account.
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Katz says nothing about how we are
to treat logically
complex sentences which have serially
incorrect sentences
as parts, nor does he say anything
about quantified sentences which we would judge intuitively
to be sortally
incorrect.
However, this is not suprising, as his
system
io not an attempt to deal with the
logical notions of

truth or validity.

The concern of the theories we looked

at earlier with these logical notions can be
treced at

least partially to the fact that those theories
grow out
of the tradition of formal semantics.
- 3

Since Katz has

jected such an approach as a foundation for the seman-

tics of natural languages, he should not be expected nor

required to answer the same sorts of questions as are

answered in model-theoretic accounts.
The above discussion of Katz's approach is merely a

sketch, and some features of the account have been totally

ignored.

Katz never gives a complete example of a dic-

tionary entry nor does he ever discuss in detail how the

projection rules are to function, and we have not attempted
to fill in these blanks.

Whether or not the theory is worth

further exploration will depend on the results of the

next section, where we will finally attempt to decide which,
if any,

of the approaches to sortal incorrectness we have
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seen so far is the most promising
candidate for supplying
us with an adequate theory.

Making a Choice

.

In the previous sections we
have seen five different
ways of approaching the problem
of giving a semantics for

sortally incorrect sentences.

Each of these theories say

something different about sortally
incorrect sentences, and
most have some features which we found
to be at least
c

^-

a Problematic.

of these theories,

if any,

it is now time

to

decide which

is the most promising candidate

as an approach to the problem.
The

i

irst decision we must make concerns what sort

of framework our semantic theory should have.

We have

two alternatives --we can either attempt to give a
semantics

for sortally incorrect sentences using a system modelled

after the semantics given for formal languages, or we can
use the sort of framework advocated by Katz and Fodor.
The Katz/Fodor semantic framework has at least one

advantage over the formal semantic models in that it
treats natural language directly.

The four model-theoretic

accounts we have seen are all ways of dealing with sort-

ally incorrect sentences in formal languages.

Implicit in
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these accounts is the supposition that either we
can translate from natural languages into the formal languages
without loss of important features of meaning or that
the

mechanisms used to deal with sortally incorrect sentences
in the formal language are the same as the mechanisms
we would have to use in accounting for sortally incorrect

sentences in the natural language.

The Katz/Fodor model

needs to make neither assumption, as no formal language is

ever appealled to.

English directly.

Their model for semantics deals with
Since the sortally incorrect sentences

we are attempting to account for are sentences of English,

this direct confrontation with the data simplifies the

sort of semantics advocated by Katz and Fodor.

However, it is not clear how much of an advantage this
feature gives to a Katz/Fodor style semantics.

Trans-

lation from natural language to artificial languages is a
skill taught in most elementary logic classes.

Even more

relevant to this issue are grammars for fragments of

English like that of Montague

(

197 ^a,

197^+h)

which have

mechanical translation procedures mapping English sentences
to

formulas in an artificial language for which a model-

theoretic semantics is given.

Ideally, a fully adequate

semantics for sortally incorrect sentences in a natural
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language would,

if it gave a model-theoretic
semantics for
an artificial language, include
such a translation procedure.
But there seems to be no problem
in principle

about making such a shift from natural
to artificial
language s

Beyond this dubious advantage to the
Katz/Fodor
approach are a number of disadvantages.
Perhaps the

strongest criticism of that kind of approach
is made by
Lewis 1972 ), who argues that a semantics
of
that type

(

which does not deal with the notion of truth "is
not a
semantics'
bhe

But,

(p.

169).

A Katz/Fodor semantics relies on

decomposition of lexical items to semantic markers.
says Lewis,
.Semantic markers are symbols items in the
vocabulary of an artificial language we may call
semantic Marke re se
Semantic interpretation by
means of them amounts merely to a translation
algorithm from the object language to the auxiliary language Markerese. But we can know the
Markerese translation of an English sentence
without knowing the first thing about the meaning of the English sentence: namely, the conditions under which it would be true
Translation into Markerese is at best a substitute
for real semantics ...(( 1972
p. 169)
.

.

;

.

.

>

.

)

.

.

,

The fact that the Katz/Fodor method stops at the level
of semantic markers, continues Lewis,

"prevents Markerese

semantics from dealing with the relations between symbols
and the world of non-symbols-- that is, with genuinely
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semantic relations"

(p.

170).

Put in another way, Lewis' point
is at least partly
.he following.
The role of semantics is not
merely to
explain the semantic relationships which
hold among different sentences of a language, but
to explicate the relations
which hold between language and the
world.
The Markerese
which is the result of a Katz/Fodor
semantic system may
reach the first of these goals, but cannot
adequately
tie language and the world together,

as the semantics

Slops with other symbols and never ties itself
to the

world
This point is of special relevance in attempting
to

account for sortally incorrect sentences.

On the Katz/

Fodor approach, the deviance of sortally incorrect sentences is traced to selection restrictions, which are

restrictions on which lexical items can meaningfully be
put together with other lexical items.

But the intuition

we wished to capture was that sortally incorrect sentences

are the result of predicating a property of an object

which is of the wrong sort to either have or lack that
property.

On the Katz/Fodor approach to semantics we

could never capture this intuition, as that sort of theory
is

incapable of talking about either objects or properties,
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which are not symbols but are (at
least in some sense)
objects in the world.
Another consideration against the adoption
of a Katz/
Podor model is the following. Suppose
that we
could give

an adequate Markerese account of the
semantic relations
among English sentences on which all sortally
incorrect
oub jec t-predicate sentences come out as
lacking a reading

and are hence anomalous.

We would still need to answer

the question of what truth-value these sentences
have.

Since such sentences are not given a reading,
l

presumably) not be true.

false

,

they will

But whether such sentences are

or have some third truth-value

,

or have no truth-

value at all is a question which is not addressed by Katz.

Even if we had an answer to that question, we would still
need to decide how those sentences affect the truth-value
of logically complex sentences which have them as compon-

ents.

To do

this would require something along the lines

of a semantic theory like those given for formal languages.

If we are going to have to give such a theory anyway,
we might as well start with trying to give such a theory.
The answer to our first question,

then,

is that we

will pursue a semantic theory of sortal incorrectness

within the framework of model-theore tic semantics.

This
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still leaves us with four alternatives
and the option of
rejecting all the approaches we have seen so
far in favor
of something completely different.
But we have decided
on the form of the approach.
Now we must decide on the

substance

At the most basic level,

the

formal semantic theories

we have looked at differ in the truth-value

truth-value)

(or lack of

they assign to subject-predicate sortally

incorrect sentences.

An obvious way to decide on the

preferred approach, therefore, would be to decide what the
truth-value of those sentences should be.
that these sentences are false

,

If we decide

we would have good evidence

that some theory like Bergmann's is the proper approach;
if we decide

that such sentences are neither true nor

false but do behave truth-func tionally with respect to the

logical connectives, we will have good grounds for adopting
a multi-valued approach to sortal incorrectness; while

if

we decide that those sentences are neither true nor false

and further do not behave as though they have some other

truth-value

,

we will have good grounds for adopting a

truth-value gap approach like Thomason's.
This project, however,

is not as easy as it seems.

While there does seem to be a uniform intuition among
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philosophers who address the problem of
sortally incorrect
sentences that such sentences are not
true, no such
com-

monality can be found as to what truth-value,
if any, such
sentences do have.
Our intuitions do not
seem to guide us

here;

they most certainly do not guide us all
in the same
direction.
What we seem to need is some sort of argument
which we can appeal to to answer the question.
One philosopher who has argued that simple
subject-

predicate sortally incorrect sentences are false is Drange
(

1966

Drange claims that sortally incorrect sentences

).

can be shown false because their negations "can be proved
true... by appeal to premises whose truth is itself beyond

question"

((

1966 ), p. 24).

An example of a proof which

Drange gives to show that the sortally incorrect sentence
2

.

89

is false

)

The theory of relativity is blue

is

2.90)

The theory of relativity is a theory

2.91)

Theories are abstract entities

2.92)

No abstract entities are concrete entities

2.93)

Only concrete entities are colored

2.94)

Only colored entities are blue

2.95)

Therefore,

In this argument,

the theory of relativity is not blue

says Drange,
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the

oottom line follows logically
from the
SS
Ch ° f Whi ° h is a true statement.^
ment
+?
Thfrpfn
Therefor,
the
proof is sound and thn«*
th ® truth of its coSHTSiion.
ConS
gth ° f thls proof it seems
undentaMp?p
undeniable
thatP??
the negations of type crossings
[sortally incorrect sentences! are
true state?
a d
i*? er ® f ° re
type crossings themselves
may
ma? be
he legitimately characterized
as false
s tatements ... since the
falsity of type crossings
6
ap P^l to a priori premifes
?! t b 1 ishe<J
alone
ne
1 1
it ?
follows
that type crossings must be
a pri_ori falsehoods ...((
1966)
p. 25)
.

.

.

d

’

'

’

’

•

'l'‘

^

,

Of course,

if Drange

’

s

proof works, he has only shown that

the sortally incorrect sentence
2.89)

is false.

However,

clear how we would go about constructing a
similar

i'J

argument which would show that any subject-predicate
sortally incorrect sentence of the form "S is F" is false;

such

proof would have a form something like;

a

2

.

2

.

2

.

is an entity of sort T

96

)

97

)

No entity of sort T is an entity of sort Q

98

)

Only entities of sort Q are P

2.99)

S

Therefore,

S

is not P

This sort of argument fails to convince those who
hold theories which deny that sortally incorrect subject-

predicate sentences are false.
to
2

.

The problem, according

Routley (1969) is that to obtain the proper conclusion,
99 ),

we must understand premise 2.98) as saying something

like "everything which is not of sort Q is not P."

But
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Routley and other non-bivalent
theorists would deny the
truth of the premise so understood,
saying that when interpreted
that way the premise is sortally
incorrect
and therefore cannot be true.

m

Routley does admit that there is a way
of understanding
the premises
this kind of argument in such a way
that

m

they are true.

To do this requires that premise
2 98
.

)

be

understood as saying something like "it is
not true of
any entity which is not of sort
Q that it is a P."
But
if this is the way we understand the
premise,

ion must be read "therefore,

the conclus-

it is not true that S is P."

Routley would not deny the truth of this, but such
a conclusion falls short of establishing that sortally
incorrect sentences are false because their negations are
true.
To move

from the conclusion Routley will allow to a con-

clusion like 2.99) requires that we assume that if a sentence is not true then its negation is true.

But this

only follows in a bivalent logic or a multi-valued logic

with a certain sort of negation (exclusion negation).

In

a system with truth-value gaps or in multi-valued systems

with choice negation, no such move is possible.
to

the point,

More

the move from the conclusion "it is not

true that S is P"

to the conclusion "S is not P" and from
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there to the conclusion that
"S is P" is false is only

justified

m

a system in which every
sentence

true or false.

is

either

So if Drange s argument is
valid,

it will
not be sound (or at least will
not be based on a priori
obvious truths as premises), while
if it is an argument
all of whose premises are
obviously true, it can only be
made valid by begging the question.
'

,

Routley replies to these kinds of
arguments by offering an argument designed to show
that the only adequate
semantics for sortally incorrect sentences
(which he calls
"non-significant sentences") is a multi-valued
theory.

theory which is not multi-valued, argues Routley,
-would be quickly discredited as inconsistent:
since the .classical negation of a non-significant
sentence is, by definition, also non-significant,
xor some sentence p both p and ^p would be false
the theory. ..( (1969)
p. 368)
*

*

.

.

m

,

ihe pro olem

Routley is noting here is one we saw in con-

nection with the simple bivalent theory we discussed in
the second section of this chapter.

There we noted that

the sentences
2

.

2

.

1

)

The theory of relativity is shiny

5

)

The theory of relativity is not shiny

are both judged by some (but not all)

incorrect.

to be

sortally

If we have a theory which says that sortally

A
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incorrect sentences are false, then
we must say that both
2-i) and 2.5) are false if the
intuition that both are

sortally incorrect is accepted.
is

But,

says Routley,

2.5)
the negation of 2.1) and so we
are in the position of

saying that for this sentence, both
it and its negation
are false,

thus throwing our system into the
class of

inconsistent theories.
The first thing we should notice
about Routley'

argument is that it does not show the necessity
of a multivalued approach to sortally incorrect
sentences.
At
best

it shows that bivalent approaches
.o

inconsistency.

by adopting
a

o

to the

problem are doomed

We can avoid the inconsistency, however,

a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps.

So

oest Routley has eliminated one competitor to the
multi-

valued approach he advocates; he has yet to clear the
field.

But even if we restrict Routley'
is directed

fails.

s

argument so that it

against only bivalent theories, the argument

In this argument, as Bergmann (1977) points out,

"Routley makes an important assumption: that the classical

negation of a sortally incorrect sentence is itself sort-

ally incorrect"

((

1977 ), p. 64 ).

the assumption that 2.5)

This,

in turn,

rests on

is the classical negation of 2.1).
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But as we saw in Bergmann's system, there is
no requirement
that this be the case.
We can develop a system with two
sorts of negation on which 2-5) is not the classical
negation of 2.1) and avoid the inconsistency
charged by Routley.

So Routley'

s

argument does not show even the weaker con-

clusion that sortally incorrect sentences cannot be accounted for in a bivalent system.
An argument designed to show that sortally incorrect
suo j ec t-pre dicate sentences are without truth-value can be

constructed from the intuitions given by Thomason (1972).
Again, consider the sentences
2.52)

Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the theory of relativity is not shiny

2.53)

Either the taste of lemon is breakable or
the

theory of relativity is not shiny

Both of these sentences are disjunctions, which have as
their first disjunct a sortally incorrect sentence and as
their second disjunct some form of a negation of a sortally

incorrect sentence.

The first of these,

says Thomason,

is a sentence which has the form of a classical tautology

and is therefore to be evaluated as true, while the second

sentence is said by him to be sortally incorrect and therefore ought not to be evaluated as true.

If this is the
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case,

it shows that sortally incorrect
sentences cannot he

assigned the same truth-value on a semantics
which treats
"he connectives of disjunction and
negation as truth-functional and treats sentences 2.52) and
2.53) as cases of
two sentences which have the same logical
form.
jhe

For if

sentences have the same logical form and simple

owo

subject-predicate sentences which are sortally incorrect
have the same truth-value (no matter what that truth-value

may be),

sentences 2.52) and 2.53) should have the same

truth-value.

To distinguish the two sentences by their

truth-value requires that we either claim that the sentences do not have the same logical form, or that we deny

that disjunction and negation are truth-functional,

or that

we accept the view that sortally incorrect subject-predic-

ate sentences are without truth-value.

The first of these

alternatives is highly implausible while the second
requires that we propose a radical change in the nature
of the logical connectives.

The most reasonable alterna-

tive is to accept the third alternative,

in which case we

would be accepting the basic foundation of Thomason's

approach to sortally incorrect sentences.
I

can see no flaw in this argument if one agrees with

Thomason's intuitions that 2.52) is true and 2.53) is not.
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But these intuitions are not universally
held.

A proponent

of a multi-valued approach who takes the
negations in the

second disjuncts of these sentences to he choice
negation

deny that

-vould

2

.

52 )

is

true, accepting the consequence

that not all sentences of the form "Pv-P" are true.

Berg-

mann explicitly denies that sentences like
2.52) are true,

asking
...why should the s tatement
he true, if
neither. disjunct. is true?...
fail to see the
virtue in retaining the set of classical tautologies if this is the result ...(( 1977
p. 71)
.

.

.

)

Bergmann,

in fact, claims that sentence 2*52) is false, and

that our intuition that it is true is the result of con-

fusing that sentence, which on her system has a second

disjunct which is the internal negation of a sortally

incorrect subject-predicate sentence, with the sentence
2.100)

Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
it is not the case that the theory of relat-

ivity is shiny
which,

she says,

is true.

second disjunct is,

But 2.100) is true because its

on Bergmann'

s

theory,

the external

negation of a sortally incorrect sentence, and thus is
true.

So Bergmann'

s

attack on this argument is two-

pronged--she not only disagrees with Thomason in her judgement of the truth-value of sentence

2

.

52

),

she disagrees
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with him as to the logical
form of that sentence,
denying
ohat it is a sentence
with the form of a classical
taut-

ology
A striking feature of
the objections presented
against

arguments for the truth-value
(or lack of truth-value)
of
simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences is
tne fundamental level at
which those criticisms are lodged.
The objections take the form
of denying the truth of premises the arguer takes to be
obvious truths (indeed, in one
case, a Pr iori truths), or the
logical form of a sentence

m

used

the argument,

or the validity of some move in
the

argument.

Nor are these disagreements confined
to those
who are proponents of different
approaches to the problem.
Both Drange and Bergmann agree that simple
subject-

predicate sortally incorrect sentences should
be evaluated
as false, but Drange takes sentences
like
2.5)
to

oe

The theory of relativity is not shiny

classical negations of subject-predicate sortally

incorrect sentences and hence sentences which are true,
while Bergmann takes such sentences to be the internal

negations of subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences
and hence sentences which are false.

Given this fundemental disagreement among the pro-
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ponents of different semantic
approaches to sortally incorrect sentences, it is difficult
to see how any argument
presented in favor of one approach
can avoid criticism
by a P r °P° nen ^ of another
approach.
If the proponents of
the various approaches cannot
even agree on the truthvalues o^
obvious truths," the logical structure
of sentences,

or the rules of inference which
preserve validity,

the common agreement concerning
the ground rules for argu-

men

u

which make such argument possible is
missing.

With-

out some agreement on these basic issues,
arguments for or

against the different approaches will lead
nowhere.
If our intuitions concerning the status
of sortally

incoirect sentences cannot be used to decide on an
approach
and if the common agreement which allows for argument
is

missing, how are we to decide which approach is the one
we should adopt?

cut cards.

One method would be to flip a coin or

A more rational decision procedure,

is to compare

however,

the different theories in an attempt to

decide which of them leads to the best overall explanation
of sortal incorrectness.
We are dr iven to this because we find ourselve s in
the following position.

The only data which are agreed

to by all the participants in the debate are

that sortal
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incorrectness is caused by some flaw
in the matching of
object and property; that sortally
incorrect sentences are
in some way deviant; and that
sortally incorrect sentences
are not true.
All the theories we have looked
at give
us these results, with the
possible exception of Martin’s
four-valued theory which allows for
the possibility
that

oortally incorrect sentences can
correspond even though
they have some unsatisfied presuppositions,
making these
sentences "sort of true" in the same way
all classical
tautologies are at least "sort of true."
Since

these are

the only data agreed to by all the
participants in the

debate, we are in the position of having the
data underde

termining the theory,

that is, we have incompatible

theories all of which account for the available data.

When

we are in such a position we cannot decide between
the

theories on any basis other than that of which theory has
the preferable internal structure

Two criteria which are standardly used in deciding

between incompatible theories all of which account for
the same data are simplicity and generality.

criteria are vague at best, and while

I

Both of these

will try to say

something about how they are to be applied in this case
do not claim to be able

to make

them precise.

To

these

I
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two vague criteria we will add
a third,

equally vague

criterion, which we will refer to
as logical conservatism.
By logical conservatism I mean
something
like the

following.

Whatever approach we adopt in attempting
to
account for sortally incorrect sentences,
we should

strive

to

re ° ain as much of classical logic
as possible.

practice,

In

this requirement tells us that if we
have two

competing approaches, each of which accounts
for the data
and neither of which is to be preferred on
other grounds,
we should pick whichever system is
most like classical

logic.

Of course, it may not be easy to tell which
of two

systems is

mos

o

like

classical logic.

But as a minimum

requirement we should strive to come up with an account
of sortally incorrect sentences within the framework of a

system which, when restricted to sentences all of which
are sortally correct, gives us the same results as classical logic
The criterion of generality is no more capable of

being given a precise characterization than the criterion
of logical conservatism, but the idea behind it is reason-

ably straightforward.

Given two competing theories both

of which account for the data,

one of which accounts for

that data in a way which is applicable to other problems in
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natural language while the other uses
mechanism or devices
Which are not the first account is
to be preferred.
The
rational behind this is tied to our
third criterion, that
>

°~

simplicity, in that the more data which
can be accounted

j-or

oy a technique or mechanism the
simplier the overall

theory of language will be.
The

third criterion, simplicity, is no more
precise

than the other two although it is a little
more widely

appealed to in attempts to choose between theories.

The

idea is allied to the metaphysical principle of Occum's
razor.

Where the latter proscribes against the needless

multiplication of entities, the criterion of simplicity
proscribes against the needless multiplication of complexJust what constitutes complexity in a theory has

ity.

never been spelled out in a satisfactory way, and no
a otemp

here.

t

at making the notion precise will be undertaken
The best that can be hoped for is that the reader

will agree with my claims that one theory is less complex
than another in certain appropriate respects.

Given the vague nature of the criteria which we will
be appealing to to determine which approach to take

dealing with sortally incorrect sentences,

I

in

can hardly

hope to give a proof that one approach is to be preferred
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above all others.

What

I

do hope for Is that the following

discussion will convince the reader
that the approach I
choose to pursue is in fact the
preferable approach. At
worst, the following discussion will
indicate to
the

reader why

I

way in which

have choosen to approach the problem
in the
I

do.

To get back to the

job at hand, we must now decide on

the basis of our vague criteria which,

if any,

of 'the four

approaches to sortally incorrect sentences which
remain
as viable alternatives we wish to pursue.

Our choice is

between something like Bergmann's bivalent theory, Thomason's truth-value gap analysis,

the four-valued approach

advocated by Martin, or some variant of a three-valued
theory

All four of the approaches satisfy our minimal condition of logical conservatism, that

is,

all the systems

proposed reduce to classical logic when restricted to
sentences which are not sortally incorrect (or problematic
for some other reason)

.

This is obvious in the case of

Bergmann's system, for if all the sentences considered in
that system are sortally correct,

the distinction between

internal and external negation disappears and the operator
for "is sortally correct," the y operator, will prefix
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any sentence of the language
and result in a sentence
uh_ch is true.
Thomason's system also reduces
to classical
logic if all the sentence of
the language are sortally
to

correct.

In such a case the partial
valuation will give

all atomic sentences a
truth-value,

extended valuation relative

to

leading to only one

that partial valuation.

This extended valuation will be
classical, and the super-

valuation induced by the partial valuation
will have only
a singleton set of extended
valuations to look at in evaluating a sentence. So the value of a
sentence on the super-

valuation Will, trivially, be the value of the
sentence on
that single classical expended valuation.
The multi-valued theories will also reduce
to classical,

two-valued logic when applied to languages all the

sentences of which are sortally correct.
logics,

For three-valued

this is a result of our insistence on defining the

connectives in what we called a "normal" form.

Martin's

system will redice to a logic with the two truth-values
T -<1,1> and F-<0 1>
,

,

the evaluation function in this logic

will replicate that of classical logic.
While the minimal condition is met by all of the

different systems, it does not seem to be the case that
all of the systems are equally conservative with respect
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to

the outcomes of other issues
generally considered of

logical relevance.
the

Way the

One place where this is
apparent is in

bill’s rent

systems deal with the classical

tautologies and contradictions.

Once we allow serially

incorrect sentences into the language,
it is no longer the
case in three-valued systems that
all sentences which have
.he form of classical tautologies
are evaluated as true
and all sentences which have the form
of classical contradictions are evaluated as false.

Sentences which have these

forms will have the third truth-value if the
component

parts of that sentence have the third truth-value
(regardless of whether we choose the strong or weak
versions of
the binary connectives)

in a three-valued logic which takes

as a primitive choice negation.

To retain the truth of all

sentences which have the form of a classical tautology and
the falsity of all sentences which have the form of a

classical contradiction, we must include the strong versions of the binary connectives and interpret negation as

exclusion negation.

While this strategy will retain the

truth of tautologies and the falsity of contradictions,
we saw in our discussion of three-valued theories that

adoption of this strategy also gives us as true sentences
which we intuitively judge to be just as bad as sortally
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incorrect sentences, such as
2-53)

Either the taste of lemon is
breakable or the
theory of relativity is not shiny

defender of this sort of three-valued
approach could
merely say that this intuition is
incorrect,

and that the

correct intuition is that all simple
subject-predicate
sortally incorrect sentences have the
third truth-value,
1 r°m which
it does not follow that all sentences

judged to

oe

as bad as simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect

sentences also have the third truth-value.
iA/hile

this approach is logically conservative,

a fatal drawback.

it has

The negations of sortally incorrect

subject-predicate sentences will now all be evaluated as
true.

So why don’t we do away with the third truth-value,

say that sortally incorrect subject-predicate sentences
are false, and simplify the system by getting rid of the

extra truth-value?

The reason given for rejecting the

bivalent approach by Routley is that saying that all sort-

ally incorrect sentences are false leads to a contradiction
in the system, as the negations of sortally incorrect

sentences are themselves sortally incorrect sentences.
This argument looses any force it may have had on the above

approach, for we now have a system in which the negation of
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a sortally incorrect sentence,

itself or not,

bought

m

is

true.

whether sortally incorrect

The price of logical conservatism

this way is the undermining of any
reason to

na/e a third truth-value.

So it appears that this sort of

three -valued approach is not the system
we ought to pursue

Another alternative we noted earlier as open

to the

advocate of a three-valued theory was the "bite
the bullet
approach, in which we would simply reject the claim
that

all classical tautologies are to be evaluated as
true and

all classical contradictions are to be evaluated as
false.
If this

is

the reaction of the three-value proponent,

then

the three-valued approach is not logically conservative;

indeed, adopting such an approach to sortally incorrect

sentences will require a major revision in logic.

While

it may be that there could be some reasons to adopt such
a radical strategy,

such an approach is less preferable

than approaches which account for the same data and which

retain the classical tautologies as true and the classical

contradictions as false.

Our criterion of logical con-

servatism tells us that we should only revise classical
logic when there is no alternative.
are at least three alternatives.

In this case,

there

So the bite the bullet

approach is one we will also reject.
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The

third alternative for the three-value
advocate

appears to be the most promising.

On this approach, the

three-valued system will include both choice
and exclusion
negation and the strong versions of the
binary connectives
Sentences like 2 52 ), which appear to have
the form of
classical tautologies, will be interpreted
as having the
.

form of strong disjunctions,

the second disjunct of which

has the form of the exclusion negation of a
sortally in-

correct subject-predicate sentence.

Hence that sentence

will be evaluated as having the truth-value true.

Sen-

tences like 2.53), however, which do not have the form
of

classical tautologies, will be interpreted as disjunctions

with a second disjunct which is a choice negation of a

sortally incorrect subject-predicate sentence.

Such a

sentence will be evaluated as having the third truth-value
thus corresponding to the intuition that sortally incor-

rect sentences which do not have the form of a classical

tautology or contradiction have the third truth-value, no
matter what their logical complexity.

Such an approach

is logically conservative with regards to its treatment of

the tautologies and contradictions (although it must

insist that such sentences utilize only one of the two
forms of negation)

,

yet retains the intuition behind the
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three-valued approach to sortal
incorrectness.
While this may be the best line
of defense for the
three-valued theorist, it is
objectionable on at least
counts.
The first is the ad hoc fashion
in which the
logical forms of the sentences
2.52) and 2.53) are decided
On the surface the two sentences
appear to
have the same

logical form,

differing only in that they have
different
f i rst disjuncts.
On this approach, however, they have
different logical forms, and this difference
occurs in the
CQnd dl sjunct.
This difference in form seems motivated

—

one

reason only--to make

2

.

52

)

turn out to be evaluated

as true without requiring that 2.53) also
be evaluated as
true.

Such an ad hoc feature is troubling enough now when

we are assuming that some sort of translation
from English

in

oO

the formal language for which we give a semantics
is

possible.
to

The problem would be magnified if we attempted

specify a mechanical translation procedure from English

into the formal language, as that translation procedure

would have to specify that the negation of a sortally incorrect sentence is translated as one kind of negation in
some contexts and as another kind of negation in other

contexts.

I

can see no way of accomplishing this without

introducing massively complicated rules into the trans-
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lation procedure.
Sary

While such a complication may be
necesWe should certainly favor a
system in which no

’

such

complexity is required.
A second problem with this approach
is that the formal

language itself is required to be more
complicated if we
follow this approach than is required by
either of the
o

oner three-valued approaches or the Thomason
or Martin

approach.

All of these other approaches have a single
form

of negation and a single form of each of the binary
con-

nectives.
o ought

is

Thus the logical conservatism of this approach

at the price not only of added complexity to the

translation procedure from English to the formal language
bu

i,

at the price of added complexity in the formal language

itself
Thus the three-valued approaches have a number of

drawbacks when considered in the light of our criteria for

which theory is to be preferred.

Unless similar problems

arise in all of the other approaches to the problem, we

would not want to adopt some three-valued theory of sortally incorrect sentences.
Martin's four-valued approach to sortally incorrect
sentences also fails to retain the truth of all tautologies
and the falsity of all contradictions in the full blown
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sense of truth and falsity.

Since Martin subscribes to the

position that sortal incorrectness is "catching,"
his
system gives the result that a sentence
with the

form of

a

classical tautology can have one of two truth-values.

If

the sentence has presuppositions all
of which are satisfied,

the sentence will be fully true,

T=<1,1>.

having the truth-value

however, one or more of the component sen-

If,

tences which make up the sentence has a presupposition

vhich is not satisfied,

value t=<l 0>
,

.

the

sentence will have the truth-

Martin claims that this result does not

entail that there are any changes required in our conceptions of logic,

for according to his approach logic is

only concerned with the first dimension of truth-value,
that of correspondence
The effect of this claim on Martin's treatment of

tautologies and contradictions is the following.

Since

logic is only concerned with the first dimension of truthvalue,

that is, with correspondence, we need not distin-

guish (indeed, cannot on logical grounds distinguish)

between sentences which have all their presuppositions
satisfied and those which have some presuppositions which
fail to be satisfied.

So as far as logic is concerned,

there is no distinction to be drawn between the truth-
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values T and t or the truth-values
F and
tautologies have one of the first

f.

All classical

two values, and all

classical contradictions have one
of the latter two values,
so as far as logic is concerned
all tautologies have the
same truth-value and all
contradictions have the same
truth-value.
Hence we preserve all tautologies
as being
true

(as far as logic is concerned)
and all contradictions

as being false (as far as logic is
concerned).

Indeed for

purposes of logic the four-valued system
reduces to a
tandard classical bivalent logic

.he
o

By retaining a sense in which the classical
tautologies are true and the classical contradictions
are false,

Martin seems to be trying to have his cake and eat
too.

it,

Martin attempts to satisfy our intuitions that

sortally incorrect sentences, at least in the cases of
those which are not logically complex, are not true
by

building a system in which such sentences always fail to
be evaluated as T.

But now Martin turns around and claims

that he has retained the truths of logic because all such

logical truths are evaluated as having either the truthvalue T or the truth-value
a par in logic.

t,

both of which are treated on

What he appears to be doing is saying that,

insofar as our intuitions concerning the non- truth of
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serially incorrect sentences
is concerned, a sentence
with
the tru Th-value t is not
true; while insofar as
our in-

tuitions concerning the truths
of logic are
such sentences are true.

c

oncerned

The problem here seems to
be tied to Martin's notion
of correspondence.

This notion is intimately tied
to his

division of the notions of the
non- truth of sortally incorrect sentences and the non- truth
which is dealt with in
logic, as Martin claims that only
the dimension of corres-

pondence is relevant to the notion
of truth in logic.
Unfortunately, Martin never spells out
just what he means
when he says that a sentence corresponds.
Admittedlv,
our intuitive notion of correspondence
is none too clear.
But Martin's notion is positively mysterious;
for example,

since Martin treats all forms of negation
in the same way,

either the sentence
2.6)

The taste of lemon is breakable

or the sentence
2.7)

The taste of lemon is unbreakable

corresponds, even though both have some presuppositions

which fail to be satisfied.

Martin even allows for the

existence of some simple subject-predicate sortally in-

correct sentences which correspond, although he admits
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that he can think of no examples
of such sentences in a
natural language.
Such claims would seem to require
that
Ha r tin explicate his notion of
correspondence, but no such

explication is offered.
ouch outcomes of Martin's theory do
not show that his
approach will not work, but they do cast some
doubt on
the advisability of his approach.

Further, both Martin's

four-valued theory and the three-valued approaches
suffer
in comparison with Bergmann’s bivalent theory
and Thomason's

truth-value gap approach when compared using the criterion
of simplicity.

than

ohe

Both of these latter theories are simpler

former two in that they require only two truth-

/alues in accounting for sortal incorrectness.

with more

A

theory

uhan two truth-values is less simple than one

which has only two truth-values not only because there
are more truth-values in the former systems but because

such systems must supply us with interpretations for
the additional truth-values.

Even without the problems

concerning logic which we have seen in the three-valued
approaches and Martin's theory, the simplicity of twovalued theories would, all other things being equal, be a

heavy point in their favor.

The additional complexity

inherent in multiplying truth-values shifts the burden of
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proof on to multi-valued theories.

Unless Martin or the

proponents of a three-valued
approach can show us why we
must accept those theories over
bivalent or two-valued
theories, we should adopt a theory
which has only two
truth-values. Martin and the
proponents of three-valued
theories have not shown us why such
approaches must be
adopted; lacking such a demonstration
we must favor twovalued theories.
These considerations narrow the field
to the two

theories which have only two
truth-values--Bergmann'
theory,

on which sortally incorrect subject-predicate

sentences are evaluated as false, and Thomason's
approach,
which evaluates sortally incorrect subject-predicate
sen-

tences as lacking a truth-value altogether.

On the face of it, Bergmann's theory appears
to have
the advantage over Thomason's system when the
two are

compared using the criterion of simplicity.
theories have only two truth-values,

While both

those two truth-values

exhaust the possible ways of evaluating a sentence on

Bergmann's theory, while some sentences lack a truth-value
on Thomason's approach.

Because some sentences are neither

true nor false on his approach,

Thomason is also forced to

complicate his theory by using the method of supervaluations,
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Which requires a three-step
semantics.

With no truth-value

gaps in her system, Bergmann
is able to give a semantics
in which the truth-value of
a sentence is obtained by

referring only to a single,
self-contained set of rules.
In spite of this, it is not
clear that
Bergmann'

system,

taken as a whole,

Thomason's.

is really any simpler than

While Thomason is able to develop
his system

using only the standard logical
operations, Bergmann is
required to introduce a completely new
operator, the "is

sortally correct" operator she symbolizes as

y,

as well

as distinguish between two different kinds
of negation.

Hence Bergmann buys her simplicity in the
semantics of her

system only a t the cost of adding complexity to the
syntax
of the language of her system.

Nor is Bergmann*

may a t first seem.

s

semantics as straightforward as it

By introducing the y operator and

dividing the notions of truth and sortal status, Bergmann
gets a system in which the logical connectives are not
all truth-functional.

This is because the truth-value of

a complex sentence no longer is fully determined,

cases,

by the truth-values of the component parts of that

sentence.
is

in all

Sometimes the truth-value of a complex sentence

determined by both the truth-values and the sortal
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status of the component parts
of the sentence.
Both Bergmann and Thomason
assume a translation
procedure from English into
the formal language for
which
they supply a semantics
rather than stipulating a
translation procedure. Since
Bergmann' s system is syntactically
more complex than Thomason's,
it is reasonable to expect
that anj, explicit translation
procedure supplied for her
theory would be more complex than
the translation procedure needed for a theory like
Thomason's.
For example,
Thomason treats all forms of English
negation as variants

English phrases which are translated
into his formal
language in the same way, while Bergmann
must specify which
negations are to be translated from English
oi

into her formal

language as internal negations and which
are to be translated into her language as external negations.
Since, as

we have earlier noted,

there appears to be some syntactic

evidence for distinguishing two forms of negation
in
English, this does not seem to be an overwhelming
problem
for Bergmann in the way that the similar problem which

arose in three-valued theories with both choice and ex-

clusion negation was an overwhelming problem for that
theory.

But it still cuts into the advantage Bergmann'

system seems to have over Thomason's in terms of simplicity.

186
It is interesting
to compare the two
approaches as to
-here they add complexity
in dealing with

sortally incor-

rect sentences.

Thomason adds complexity
to the semantics
for his artificial language,
leaving the syntax of classical logic untouched.
Bergmann, on the other hand,
adds
complexity to the syntax of
her language, changing
the
semantics only as much as is
required to insure that these
syntactic additions receive
their intended interpretation.
Since both agree that sortally
incorrect sentences are
deviant because of semantic
considerations, it would appear
that Thomason's approach is
more in keeping with
this

shared intuition.

-er b mann

This is not a telling point
against

approach, as there is no requirement
that
semantic features in English be
reflected in a formal
language used to model English only
in the semantics of
that formal language.
However, the fact that Thomason's
approach does mirror a semantic feature
of English in a
s

semantic rather than syntactic fashion in
his artificial
language does seem to count in favor of his
approach.

While it is difficult to decide which of the
two
theories has the edge when compared using the
criterion of
simplicity, it is even harder to decide which
has the edge

when compared on the criterion of logical conservatism.
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As noted before, both reduce
to variants of classical
logic
when restricted to sentences
all 0 f which are serially
correct.
Thomason retains all classical
tautologies as
orue and all classical
contradictions as false, but only
at -he price of saying that,
for example, there are disjunctions which are true even though
neither disjunct is
true.
Bergmann finds this price too high
to pay.
Instead,
she retains the principle that a
disjunction is true only
at least one of its disjuncts is
true, but pays the

n

price of being forced to say that there
are two sorts of
negation in English, and only one of these
can be used to
form a classical tautology.
This, in effect, requires that
she deny that some sentences we thought were
tautologies

are in fact tautologies.
I

When compared along these lines,

can see no reason for preferring one approach over
the

other
This brings us to our third criterion for choosing

between theories, the criterion of generality.
the

It is on

oasis of this criterion that we have a clear choice

between Bergmann's approach and Thomason's approach.
The approach Bergmann takes to account for sortally

incorrect sentences is specifically designed to take care
of that problem, and it is difficult to see how it could
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be extended to deal with
other problems which arise
in
a semantics for natural
languages.
This is because
the approach centers on the
introduction of the y operator,
Which is used to define the

iwmg

interaction between internal

and external negation, the
cornerstones of the system.
The v operator is interpreted
as "is sortally correct," and
hence is only relevant to determining
the sortal status
of a sentence.
So Bergmann's approach is
specifically
designed to deal with the one problem
of sortal incorrectness.
While it may deal with this problem
successfully,
the

technique is not one which is applicable to
other
areas in the semantics of natural language
In contrast to this,

the

introduction of truth-value

gaps by Thomason to account for sortally incorrect
sentences is the application of a semantic technique
which has

been applied

to

a number of other problems in the semantics

of na uural language

bO

this particular problem.

Semantics

vhich include the result that some sentences of a language
are evaluated as having no truth-value at all have been

used to account for the problem of non-denoting definite

descriptions (van Fraassen

(

1969 )), play a part in two

major attempts to avoid the semantic paradoxes (Kripke
(1915)

and van Fraassen (1970a)), and have also been used
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in accounts of future
contingent sentences (Thomason
(1970 )) and conditional obligation
(Thomason ( 19 ? 4 a)).
Except for the semantic determinant
of
the

ication,

vvhich also

sortal specif-

features into Bergmann's semantics,

nothing about the Thomason approach
is adopted specifically
to account for sortally
incorrect sentences.
By taking the truth-value gap
approach we can immediately fit our semantic account of
sortally incorrect
sentences into a comprehensive theory of
presupposition
developed by van Fraassen (1969).
Simply put, this theory
of presupposition works on the intuition
that, if a sentence
has certain presuppositions and if some of
these presup-

positions are false, the sentence is without truth-value.
Viewed in this light, we have the following explanation
of sortally incorrect sentences.

When we say of an object

that it has some property, we presuppose that the
object is
of the right sort to have that property.

In the case of

sortally incorrect sentences, this presupposition is false.
So such sortally incorrect sentences are neither true nor

false.

Like other sentences which have presuppositions

which fail to be satisfied, such sentences have no truthvalue at all.

Such a treatment of sortally incorrect

sentences makes sortal incorrectness a special case of a
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general feature of language
concerning presuppositions.
This way of tying an account
of sortal incorrectness
with a general theory of
presuppositions also diffuses
whatever advantage Bergmann’s approach
may

m

have had on the

grounds of simplicity.
had a

-a - ia claim

Remember that Bergmann's theory
to being more

simple than the

truth-value gap approach in virtue of
the fact that on that
theory all sentences are either true
or false, thus simplifying the theory by not requiring any new
semantic mechanisms for determining the truth-value of
logically complex
sentences which had sortally incorrect sentences
as parts.

We saw earlier that a proponent of the
truth-value gap

approach could argue that this apparent simplicity
is
offset by the complexity which is required in the
syntax
of the language to adequately deal with sortally
incorrect

sentences.

However,

if it turns out that the presence of

truth-value gaps is required to account for such things
ao non-denoting definite descriptions,

doxes,

the semantic para-

or general failure of presuppositions, whatever

complexity is required for the treatment of sortally
incorrect sentences as sentences which lack truth-value
will be required for the treatment of these other problems.
So while Thomason's approach to sortal incorrectness may
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seem more complex than Bergmann's,

the overall theory of

language which will include ways
of dealing with these
other phenomenon will be less complex,
as the complexity
added uy Thomason's approach to dealing
with sortally
incorrect sentences will do double duty
when applied to
these other problems.

Because of this ability to tie a truth-value
gap
analysis of sortally incorrect sentences in to a
general
theory of pressuposition in language, we will adopt
this
approach.

In the following chapter we will present a

truth-value gap theory of sortally incorrect sentences
which, while based on the same sort of semantic treatment
as Thomason's theory, will differ from that theory both
in

minor details and in the way quantification is handled.
In the last section of that chapter a complete grammar for
a fragment of English which includes some sentences which

are sortally incorrect will be presented.

This grammar

will include not only a syntax for the generation of

English sentences and a semantics for a formal language
but will also contain an explicit translation procedure

mapping the English sentences generated by the syntax to
formulas of the formal language.

Once this system is set

out, we will look at what results it gives us in dealing
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With problems not specifically
tied to sortal incorrectness in an attempt to back up
the claim that the theory
teals With such sentences in a
framework which can
be

generalized to account for other problems
in the semantics
of natural languages.
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The semantic system given in Kripke
(1975) contains
the method of super-

oru oh value gaps but does not use

valuations.
However, Kripke does mention that that method
can be used
the system he presents if one wishes to
retain the truth of classical tautologies and the
falsehood
of classical contradictions.
.

m

CHAPTER III
A SEMANTICS FOR SORTAL
INCORRECTNESS

Introduc tion

.

In this chapter we will develop a
semantics for sort-

a^ly incorrect sentences in which
those sentences are
evaluated as lacking any truth-value.
The final goal of
the chapter is the construction of a
grammar of a fragment
of English which includes sortally
incorrect sentences.
This grammar will include a syntax for
generating English

sentences, a set of rules which specify the translations
of the sentences produced by that syntax into a
formal

language, and a semantics for that formal language.
The theory presented in this chapter is heavily

indebted to the work of Montague, Thomason, and Bennett.
The work of Montague (1974a)

provides the framework for

the grammar presented in the final section of this chapter.

Indeed,
are,

the syntax and translation rules of that grammar

for the most part, exactly those of Montague's

grammar; what alterations there are are made to expand the

fragment and to translate the logical phrases generated by
the fragment into the modified intensional logic used to

give the semantics.

The extension of the grammar to

include the generation of pre-nominal and predicate
194
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adjectives is based on the work
of Bennett (1974).
The
semantic system owes much to
Thomason’s theory of sortal
incorrectness.
While the account of quantification
differs
markedly from that in Thomason
(1972), the semantics is
based on Thomason’s intuitions
that subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences are
without truth-value and that
sentences of the language are to be
evaluated by the method
of supervaluations.
The techniques used to produce
these
results differ from those used in Thomason’s
system;

for

the most part these differences are
dictated by the fact

that the final logic given in this theory
is a higher-order
rather than a first-order language.

Rather than simply presenting the grammar, we will
proceed to it by stages.
In the first section of
the

chapter, we will develop a supervaluation semantics
for a

non-quantif ied first-order extensional language.

This

semantics will be much like that presented in the last

chapter in conjunction with the discussion of Thomason's

approach to sortally incorrect sentences, differing only
in some of the technical devices used in the semantics.

In the second section, we will expand the language of
the first section to include both quantification and

identity.

It is in this section that we will diverge from
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Thomason's approach.

The major difference will be in
the

treatment of quantification.

Like Thomason, we will use a

system of sorted quantifiers, but our
method of sorting
those quantifiers will be very different.
The third section will be devoted
to presenting the

fragment of English.

Here again we will expand the formal

language, moving from a first-order extensional
language
to a

higher-order, typed,

tensed,

intensional language.

This section will also include the syntax for the
fragment
of English and the rules for translating English
sentences

generated by the syntax into our formal language.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the results

of

s,he

system,

both for sortally incorrect sentences and

for other sorts of constructions which have been of interest
to

philosophers and linguists.

The discussion of these

issues will center on how the fragment treats a number of

interesting example sentences.
A Non - q uantif ied Predicate Logic

.

In order to introduce innovations slowly, we will

begin by describing a sortal semantics of a non-quantif ied
predicate logic.

Let L^ be a language with the following

as its primitive vocabulary:

an infinite number of names
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a

l’
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'

‘

’

an

i n l'l n i'ts

any number n) P?,p",p£,
"
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.

.

number of n-place predicates (for
.

and the logical signs

We define the set of sentences of

q

and

as the smallest

set S such that:
3-i)

if P^ is an n-place predicate of L and a.,..
J

a
i

3*2)

+n are names of L,1

if A,B£S,

,

then "P n a....a.
'VS
m j
j+n

then "~A," "AvB'VS

To give a model for

we will need to specify a

domain of objects, a sortal specification, and an inter-

pretation function.

The sortal specification will have

the same form it had in Thomason’s theory;

it will be a

junction from n-place predicates of the language to sets
of ordered n-tuples of objects in the domain.

We will

again refer to these sets of n-tuples of objects as the
sortal range of the predicate mapped by the sortal specif-

ication to that set.
Unlike Thomason, we will not interpret n-place predicates as sets of n-tuples of objects in the domain.
stead,

In-

we will interpret the predicates of our language as

partial function from n-tuples of objects to the truthvalues T and

F.

This notion of a partial function requires some ex-

planation.

A function,

f,

from set A to set B is ordinar-
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ily defined as a mapping from
members of A to members of
5 SUCh that
for a11
f(x)€B and such that if y,z<EB
and there is some x€A such that
f(x)=y and f(x) = z then
y=Z
standardly, set A is defined as the
domain of the
’

‘

"

unc

l

i°n f while set B is said to be
the range of the

function

f.

The notion of a partial function
differs in import-

ant ways from the notion of a standard
function.
a

partial function from set A to set

B,

If f is

then for all xfk,

either f(x)€B or f(x) is undefined, and if y,z€B and
is an x€A such that f(x)=y and f(x)=z then y=z.

.here

The

difference between partial functions and our standard

notion

o±

a function is that the latter requires that the

function give a value to every member of the domain.

No

such requirement is made in the case of partial functions.
This notion of a partial function may strike one as
odd,

but a little reflection will show that partial func-

tions are reasonably common.
is

An example from mathematics

the two-argument function f(x,y)=x/y, which has as its

domain pairs of integers and as its range the rational
numbers.

Described in this way, the function f is partial,

for it is undefined for any arguments such that the second

member of the argument is

0.

Another partial function we
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have seen previously is the
function from sentences of a
language to truth-values
characterized by a supervaluation
semantics model in which some
sentences receive no truthvalue.
This function has as its domain
the sentences of
the language and as its range
the truth-values T and F,
but
is such that for some sentences
of the language, the value
of the function applied to that
sentence is undefined.
The difference between our
ordinary notion of a func-

tion and our notion of a partial
function can be demonstrated by seeing how the set-theoretic
representations
of the

two notions must differ.

Ordinary functions are generally

represented or identified with sets of ordered
pairs,
specifically,

if f is a function from set A to set B,

be represented as the

x€A&y=f(x)]

.

f

can

set Xc(AxB) defined as X=f<x,y>:

This sort of definition cannot be used to

represent a partial function, however, for if f is a
partial
^

unc uion it is possible that there is some member
of the

domain for which the function yeilds no defined value when

applied to that member of the domain.

So identifying a

partial function f from set A to set B as the set X=
[<x,y>: x€A&y=f (x)

fully defined.
X

}

will not do, as the set X has not been

On this definition, some members of the set

would be ordered pairs the second member of which is
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undefined.

Nor can we identify a partial
function as the
set X=C<x,y>:x£A&y=f(x)&f(x) is
defined} if we also follow
the standard practice of identifying
the domain
of a

unction as the set which is the union of
the first members
of all the ordered pairs of the set
which makes up the setI

theoretic representation of that function.
we
a
Oi

'the

If we do this,

domain of the partial function being only

subset of the actual domain of that function.

Instead

identifying the domain as all the objects to which we

can apply the function, we will be identifying the
domain
as all the objects to which the function gives a
defined

value

However, we can give a set-theoretic representation
of partial functions.

If f is a partial function from

set A to set B, we can represent f as the set X=<A,C>

where A is the domain of f and

C

is the

set of ordered

pairs defined as C={<x,y>:x€A&y=f(x)&f (x) is defined}.

We

can then say that two partial functions are identical if
and only if they have identical se t-theore tic representations

.

Before moving on, we should note two special sorts
of partial functions.

The first of these are functions

from set A to set B such that, for every member of set A,
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the function is undefined.

Such functions will be
called

null functions.

Note that it is not the case
that there
is a single null function,
as null functions with
different

domains will be represented
set-theore tically as different
sets of ordered pairs.
The second sort of partial
function
of whi^h we will take special
note are what we will call
complete or total functions. A
complete function
is a

partial function f from set A
A,

f x

)

-

B

to

set B such that, for every

This is just our ordinary notion
of a func-

tion, which is now a special case
of the more general

notion of a partial function.

We should also note that

corresponding to every partial function

is

another function

with domain the subset of the domain of the
partial function
for which the partial function yeilds a defined
value,

which is itself a complete function agreeing in value
with
the original partial function for all arguments
which

are members of the union of the two functions
domains.
vvill

We

refer to this function as the complete subfunction

of the partial function.

With this as a preliminary, we can now turn
supplying a sortal semantics for our language
for L

x

to
.

A model

will be a triple M=<D,S,V> subject to the conditions:

3-3)

D is a non-empty set (the

domain)
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3.4)

S is a

L
3-5)

u0

i

function from n-place predicates
of
n
subsets of D (the sortal
specification)

V is a function (the
interpretation function)

from names and n-place predicates
of

such

that:
a)

if a

3f P

n

is a name of 1^,

m

3s an n-place predicate

V(a )eD
n
of L,
1

is a partial function from D n
to

that if <o^
/S^ p

m

)

,

.

.

.

,

n

>6D" and < 0 ^

then V(Pj)(<o M.
1

The set of extended valuations,

I

+
,

i

,o >)

n

,

.

(T-,

.

.

,

V(P

,

F]

n
m

)

such

o^>

is undefined

relative to a model M

is the set of all four-tuples I=<D,
S V, V»> satisfying the
,

conditions
d-6;

D,S,

and V are the domain, sortal specification

and interpretation function, respectively,

specified in M;
3.3)

V'

is a function from partial functions from

D

to

{

T, F}

to complete

functions from D n to

{T,F} such that if f is a partial function from
D

to

C

T, F}

and x€D

and f(x) is defined,

then

(V'(f))(x)=f(x)
The value of a sentence A of

ation

I

on an extended interpret-

relative to a model M, denoted

(A)

1
,

can now be
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defined as
3.8)

if A-"p£a ...a
1

V(a^

,

3.9)

"

then (A)

hv

(

j

v(pJJ)

)

(<v(a

)

)>)

+n
if A="~B” then (A) r =T
iff (B) X =F
(a)

3.10)

1+n

;

otherwi
rwise

=f

if A- " BvC

then (A) I =T iff

"

(

B)

or (c

I
)

-T

;

otherwise (A)^=F
The value of a sentence A
on the supervaluation induced
by
a model M, denoted (A) M *,
can now be defined as

3-11)

(A)
(A)

M
X

*=t iff (A) Z =T for all Ielf

=F for all I?I +

,

(A)

M *=

F iff

and (A) M * is undefined

otherwise
will say that a sentence A of
is true on a model M
if and only if (A) M
T
that A is false if and only if
M*
-F and that A has no truth-value if
M
A)
(A) * is unde<fe

t

y

,.

/

l

;

fined

.

This semantics gives us a system much
like the one
we saw in the last chapter when we
applied Thomason's

theory to a similar language.

On the above semantics, all

sortally incorrect subject-predicate sentences will be

evaluated as lacking a truth-value; this is insured by
clause
vhe

3- 5b),

which tells us that if an object is outside

sortal range of a predicate the function which is the
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interpretation of that predicate is
undefined for that
Object as an argument. We
get the result that all atomic
sentences which are not sortally
incorrect receive a constant truth-value on all extended
interpretations because
of clause 3-7), which in
effect states that the partial
function which is the interpretation
of a predicate on the
model M and the full function which
is the interpretation
of that predicate on any of the
extended interpretations
are identical when restricted to
the domain of the complete
subfunction of that partial function. We
also obtain the
standard results of a supervaluation semantics
concerning
.he truth of all classical
tautologies and the falsity of
all classical contradictions irrespective
of the truth-

value or lack of truth-value of the component
parts of such
sentences
In fact,

the semantics given above differs from that

seen in the last chapter for a similar language not
in its
lesults out rather in the formal machinery used to obtain
these results.

These differences will make the final

semantic account of sortally incorrect sentences fit into
the semantics for a higher-order logic,
the

but at this point

departures from Thomason's theory are minor.

A more

radical departure will be necessary in the next section of
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this chapter,

however, when we add
quantification to our

system

Quantification and Identity

.

In this section, we will extend
our first-order

language to include quantifiers and
identity statements.
The treatment of identity will
be straightforward and
rather standard; our semantics will say
that an identity
statement of the form "a=b" is true if and
only if the

thing named by a is the thing named by
of

Q.

uan "tifica tion

,

b.

Our treatment

however, will differ radically from

the standard treatments found in most semantic
systems

for formal languages.

As we saw in the last chapter, quantification is

troublesome for semantic accounts of sortally incorrect

sentences.

The treatments of quantification presented by

Bergmann and Martin, which took as their domain of quantification all objects, had the unacceptable result that

nearly every universally quantified sentence was evaluated
as being sortally incorrect.

One version of Thomason's

treatment of quantification avoided this problem by re-

stricting the domain of quantification to the sortal range
of particular predicates,

but relied on a number of strong
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and unargued for assumptions about
the way in which the
range of the quantifiers are established.
The

treatment of quantification we will use is
much

like that argued for by Wallace
C

ochiarella (1978 ).

1

(

1965 ) and, more recently,

The intuition underlying this approach

is roughly the following.

Consider

a

quantified sentence

of English like

3-12)
We

All men are mortal

now ask ourselves the question, what objects is this

sentence about? or, more precisely, what objects are rel-

evant to the truth-value of this sentence?

According

to

standard first-order quantification theory, the answer is

every object in the universe.

The approach to quantific-

ation we will take rejects this answer, and instead answers
the question by saying that the sentence is about the

objects which are men, and only those objects are relevant
to the

truth or falsity of 3.12).

Intuitively,

the answer given by standard quantific-

ation theory, that 3-12) depends for its truth or falsity
on all the objects in the universe,

seems absurd--the

mortality or immortality of numbers, theories, and chickens
just does not seem to enter in to our considerations con-

cerning the truth-value of the sentence

.

Standard
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pproaches to quantification avoid
the apparent absurdity
by translating sentences
like 3 .12) into universally
quantified material conditionals;
the standard translation
of
3-12) could be paraphrased in
English as something along
the lines of "take every
object in the universe and it will
be the case that if that
object is a man then it is mortal."
This sentence will be evaluated
as true just in
case all

the

objects in the universe are such that
if they are men

then the 3' are mortal.

Since a material conditional with a

false antecedent is true no matter what
the truth-value of
the consequent, no object which is not a
man will ever

provide a falsifying instance of the sentence.

So the

treatment standardly given gets the effect of saying
that
only objects which are men are relevant to the
truth of
j.12)

by translating the sentence in such a way that all

objects which are not men automatically make the conditional

being quantified over true.

By paying the price of saying

that the objects relevant to judging the truth of sentences
like 3-12) are all the objects in the universe, and then

translating the sentence in such

a*

way that only a small

subset of those objects could actually provide falsifying

instances of the sentence, standard treatments of quantif-

ication gain the simplicity of having only one universal
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quantifier, with a single domain
of quantification, namely
all of the objects in the domain
of the model.
ihis approach,

though counter-intuitive, works well

until we tane sortal considerations
into account.
Remember
that on Bergmann's account of the
quantifiers, the quantified sentence was evaluated as sortally
correct only if
xhe matrix sentence was sortally
correct for all objects

in the domain of the quantifier.

Since the domain of the

quantifier was unrestricted and included every
object in
ohe

domain, sentence 3*12) was evaluated as sortally

incorrect oecause of objects which were not men but
were
also not the right sort of things to be either men
or

mortal.
uhe

Because we are worried about both the truth and

sortal status of quantified sentences, we can no

longer take as the objects relevant to the truth and
sortal status of such sentences all objects in the domain,
for then we must include objects of the wrong sort in our

considerations.

Clearly what we need is a restriction of

the domain of the quantifiers so that the

only objects

which are relevant to the truth and sortal status of a
quantified sentence are objects which are all of the

proper sort.
The way we will accomplish this is to treat the
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quantifiers,

m

effect, as operators which
take two sentences to form a sentence.
One of these sentences will
be used to determine the
domain of the quantifier, while
the other is the sentence
which we are claiming is true
of

all (or some,

in the case of the exestential
quantifier)

of the objects in that domain.

Orthographically

,

we will

follow Wallace and Cochiarella and
represent quantifiers
by expressions of the form "Ax[A](B),"
which can be paraphrased
English as "everything which satisfies
sentence
A also satisfies sentence B."
The role of sentence A is

m

to establish the domain of the
quantifier- -anything which

fails to satisfy the sentence will be irrelevant
to the
oruth or falsity of the quantified sentence.

Roughly,

the

English equivalent of sentences which are used to
establish
the domain of a quantifier are common noun phrases.

The

intention of the system is to come up with a translation
of
3-12) which will look like "Ax[Px] (Mx)
true

"
,

which will be

just in case everything which satisfies the open

sentence

Px

^roughly, any object which has the property

denoted by the phrase "is a person") satisfies the open
sentence "Mx" (roughly, has the property denoted by the

phrase "is mortal").

Since we have restricted the domain

of the quantifier to objects which are persons,

the objects
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relevant

to

be

the

truth or falsity of the sentence will
all

the sortal range

of the predicate "is a person."

In this way we will avoid the
problems Bergmann and Martin

encountered in using unrestricted quantification,
and will
make explicit how the sort of a quantifier
is
determined,

thus avoiding the mystery surrounding the
determination
of the domain of quantification in Thomason's
system.

Rather than attempting
the system,

to give

further motivation for

we will now turn to laying out a language

which uses this kind of quantification.

Let L

be a

£

language with the following primitive vocabulary: an
infinite number of names,
of variables x q x 2 x
3

’

’

'

a-^

,a ? ,a^

,

,

,

,

(

,

)

,

.

.

.

an infinite number

;

an infinite number of n-place

’

predicates (for any number n)
ical signs ~ v = A

,

and

L

,

p£ F?

1.

,

,

.

.

By a term of L 0 we will

mean either a name or a variable of L 2<
ulas of
3.13)

if

is an n-place predicate

P^J

,

•

.

•

,

a

n

are terms of L 0

2

,

S

then "P

"
,

(

AvB

)

"

,

n
cu
m 1

2

.

.

.a

'

,

n

then

"Au[A](B)"€S q

if a,3 are terms of L 9

A model for L

such that

2

and

of

if A,B2S ? and u is a variable of L ?
"~A"

3.15)

The set of form-

will be defined as the smallest set

ar
n

3.14)

and the log-

.

,

then "a=3"€S 0

will be a triple M=<D,S,V> where D

2
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xo a

non-empty set (the domain),

_rom n-place predicates of
spec ii ication)

3.16)

function

to subsets of D n (the sortal

such that

2

if a

3.1?)

is a complete

and V is a function from names and n-place

,

predicates of L

S

is a name

n

of L of
2

V(a )^D
n

is an n-place predicate of L„,

if P
U1

V(P

2

a partial function from D

if x£D

n

and (V(p£))(x)

to

{]T,F(|

is defined,

n
m

is

)

such that
then

x€S(P^)
Sy a g-assignment of values to variables of L on a model
9
M we will mean a function from the variables of L

that for all variables

u,

2

such

g(u)€D.

The set of extended interpretations of L relative to
9
a model M,

I

,

will be the set of all fourtuples I=<D,S,

V,V’> such that:
3-18)

D,S,

and V are the domain, sortal specification,

and interpretation function, respectively,

specified in M;
3.19)

V'

D

11

is a function from partial functions from

to {T,F}

to complete functions from D

n

to

[T,F] such that if f is in the domain of V'

and x£D
f(x)

n

and f(x) is defined, then (V'(f))(x)=
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By the expressions of
L

we will mean the
names

2

predicates, and formulas
of
A of L
2

V

The value of an expression

on an extended valuation

relative to a model M

I

and an assignment of
values to variables,
can now be recursively
defined as:
0

.20)

if A is a name of L

3 .21)
3

.

I,g
)

.

,

<«n>

,a

'

if A- a- 8

if A= "BvC
(C)

I,g

=T;

g=

’

)

(

’

? =g'(A)

then

,

then

"
’

(

A

I.g
)

:

n x S
I,g
(<(a 1
m)

=(p

'

)

1 ,g

I,g

=T iff (a) I,g is

(

I,S

3)

=F
:B)

(

I,g=

F;

(A) 1 ,g =F

then (A) I,g =T iff

,

(

B)

1

’

=T

or

otherwise (A)^ ,g =F
:

if G-Cg'

:

)

"
,

g'

to variables

then
is

an assignment of values

which differs from g in at

most the value g'(u) and such that
=T for all I’^r }/0,
(C)

-*

V A)
1

the n (A)

,

then (A) I,g’n=T iff

if A="Au[B 1 (C
a

n

then (A)

,

if A="~B"

otherwise

3. 27)

1

A

g»

otherwise (A)

3- 26

?

(

1

=V'(V(A))

if A ~ P a
m l
.

3. 25)

the:

£

’

3.,24)

,

denoted (a)

g,

if A is an n-place predicate
of L„
(A

3 .23)

p

if A is a variable of L

22)

variable3i

,

then (A)

I,g

1
(

'

B)

=T iff

=T for all g'cG; otherwise (A) x,a’=F
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if G (as defined above)
=0,

then (A) I,g =T

iff for all g' assignments
which differ

from g in at most the value g'(

which are such that
(C

,g =
T;

)

1
(

B)

’

^

u)

and

are such that

otherwise (A)^’ g =F

Having thus defined the value of
an expression of L on
2
each of the extended valuations
relative to a model and a
g -assignment of values to
variables, we will now define

the

value of an expression A of L

on the supervaluation in-

2

duced by M relative to that g-assignment
of values to
variables denoted A) M *’S, a S;
(

3.23)
3-29)
3.30)

if A is a name of L

2

(A)

,

if A is a variable of L

2

,

M *’ g
=V(A)
(A)

M * ,g

=g(A)

if A is an n-place predicate of L
2>

,M*,g

(A)

=

V(A)
3-31)

if A is a formula of L
T

for all Ifl'

all I€T

;

;

(A)

and (A)

M*

2

,

(A)

M *’ g
=T iff (A) 1

’®-

M *’ g
=F iff (A) I,g =F for
o'

We will say that a formula A of L

is undefined otherwise
2

is true

on a model M

if and only if (A)

=T for all g-assignments of values

to variables on M;

false if and only if (A) M *’ g =F on all

g-assignments of values to variables, and is neither true
nor false (i.e., has no truth-value) otherwise.
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We can demonstrate how
the syste m works by considering
some examples.

Let us begin with sen

would translate into

nate domain and

as the

in which we interpret the
predicates of

the sentence in the

intended way and which assigns them

the appropriate sortal ranges.

The value of the sentenc

on the model will be determined by
the value of the sentence on all of the extended

interpretations relative to

that model.

To get the value of the sentence

of these extended interpretations,
if

the

on any one

we must first determine

set of assignments of values to variables
which

make the open sentence

true on all of the extended

interpretations is empty.

In effect, we are asking if there

is an

assignment of an object to be the denotation of the
variable x which will be mapped to the value T on all the
1

extended valuations.

If our domain contains any objects

which are men, the answer to this question is that the set
is not empty,

for the model will interpret "P^" as a

partial function which maps all the objects which are men
to the value T,

and the interpretation of that predicate
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on all of the extended valuations
must agree with the in-

itial interpretation in cases of
objects for which the
initial interpretation yeilds a defined
value.
By establishing which g-assignments of values
to variables give us
the value T for the formula
on all of the extended

interpretations, we are in effect limiting
the domain of
ohe quantifier to only those
objects which are actually
men on our beginning interpretation.
To find
out if the

sentence is true on the extended interpre tation

,

we see if

all of these g-assignments also make the formula
"P^x
true,

"

that is, we see if all of these objects are mortal.

It is reasonable to assume that they are, and in
fact
ohat

uhey will oe on all of the extended interpretations.

Note that the set G of assignment functions will be identical from one extended interpre tation to another for any

given quantified sentence.

So the sentence which we have

used as the translation of 3-12) is true on all of the

extended valuations, hence it is evaluated as

T on the

supervaluation induced by the model, and hence we can say
that the sentence is true on the model.

And this is the

result we want.
How will the system treat quantified sentences which
we v/ould intuitively judge to be sortally incorrect?
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Consider the sentence
Every theory

3-32)

is shiny

which we can translate into L
3-32-

)

2

as

Ax^P^KpJx^

Again, assume that we are evaluating
the sentence in a
model which gives "P^" an
interpretation and sortal range

corresponding to the English predicate
"is a theory" and
?
an interpretation and sortal range
4
corresponding to
the English predicate "is shiny."
To evaluate this sentence, we must again go

to

the supervaluation induced by

the model and hence must look at the
value of the sentence

on all of the extended interpretations
relative to that

model.

Once again,

the

set of assignment functions rel-

evant to determining the truth of the sentence
on any
ex tended valuation will be made up of
those assignment

functions which assign to the variable x
are mapped to T by the interpretation of

±

objects which
"Fyj"

on all of

the extended interpretations, which will in turn be
the

objects which are mapped to T by the partial function which
is the

interpretation of that predicate on the model.

It

is reasonable to assume that these objects will all be

outside of the sortal range of the predicate "pj" in our
model.

This means that the extended interpretations are
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not constrained in how they specify
the full function which
is the interpretation of "p£" on
that extended interpretctfion as to what value those objects
are mapped to.
Many
of the extended interpretations will
map at least one of

those objects to F, and hence on those extended
interpret-

ations the whole sentence will be evaluated as
having the
value F.
But we must consider the value of the sentence
on all of the extended valuations, and there will
be at

least one of these which completes the partial function

which is the interpretation of the predicate on the model
xn such a way that it maps all of the objects in question
to

the

value

T.

On that extended interpretation, the

value of the sentence as a whole is

T.

So the value of

the sentence varies on different extended interpretations.

Hence the sentence is given no value by the supervaluation

induced by the model, and hence the sentence is evaluated
by the supervaluation as

Again,

having,

no truth-value at all.

this is the result we desire.

In both of the examples we have looked at,

the sen-

tence in question has been a quantified sentence evaluated

at the level of the extended valuations using clause
3.27a).

Clause 3*2 7b) is necessary for the evaluation of

cases in which the subject of the quantified sentence
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translates as a sentence which is
itself sortally incorrect,
as in the cases of the sentences
3-33)
3

•

3^)

Every shiny theory is mortal
Every shiny theory is shiny

which will translate into L

2

(assuming that we have defined

the operation of conjunction,

,

in terms of negation

and disjunction in the standard way)
as
3-33')
3

•

3^'

Ax 1 [P^x &P^x ](p^x
1
1

Ax 1 [pjx

&P^x 1 ](P^x

)
:

l

)

hhen we go to evaluate these sentences at
the level of the
extended evaluations, we will need to use clause
3.27b),

±or assuming that the sortal ranges of the
predicates which
are the translations of the English predicates
"is a theory"

and

is shiny" are disjoint,

it will be

no object will be such that

mapped to the value T by the interpretations of

both predicates on all extended valuations.
the case,

Since this is

we simply look at the objects which are mapped

by the extended interpretations of the two predicates to
the value T by the full function which is the interpret-

ation of "P^" (in the case of 3-33’)) or "P^" (in the
case of

3

•3^'))

case of 3-33'),

on that extended interpretation.

In the

the sentence will be evaluated as T on some

of the extended interpretations and as F on others;

hence
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the sentence will be without
value on the supervaluation

and so will be considered without
truth-value on the model
However 3-34') will be evaluated
as T on
all of the

,

extended interpretations, for any
object which is mapped
to T by the
ce

interpretations of both "P^" and

"P;

mapped to T by the interpretation
of "pf "

1

"

will

So this

sentence, even though it has a sortally
incorrect part,
is given the value T on the model.
This is because 3.34')
has the form of a sentence which is a
logical truth, and
indeed 3-34) is judged by some (including
me)

to be

true.

It is to get this result that clause
3.27b) has been

included in the semantics for the language

I*

t

These examples show how the sorted quantification

system works in a first-order language.
on

bO

the construction of an actual grammar for a fragment

English.
^

HI

We will now move

In giving the semantics for this fragment, we

expand and complicate the language for which we give

a semantics substantially.

However,

the basic idea behind

the semantic treatment of sortal incorrectness and quant-

ification will be the same as the one behind the semantics
just given for
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The Fragment.

In this section, we will develop
our theory of sort-

ally incorrect sentences within the
framework of a Montague
style grammar for a fragment of
English. We will first
lay out the syntax of a higher-order,
tensed,

typed in-

tens lonal logic which will be the
language for which we

will supply a supervaluation semantics,
along with a sketch
o.i
how the language will be interpreted. We
will then

present a syntax for a fragment of English, along
with a
translation rules which will specify a mapping

0

-

r °m sentences of nnglish generated by the syntax
to form-

ulas oi

the artificial language.

Once this is done, we

will specify a semantics for the formal language.
The type structure for the formal language, L
Q

,

is

based on two simple types, which can be thought of as the
type of individual denoting expressions,

denoted by "e",

and the type of truth-value denoting expressions, denoted
by "t".

Since our language will be intensional, we will

also have as a type symbol "s", which can be thought of as
the

type of points of evaluation.

the type structure for the

way.

Let e,t, and

s

be

language

Formally, we can define
in the following

three distinct fixed objects, none
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Of which is an ordered
pair.

sions of the language L

,

3

The set of types of
expres-

T^e,

is defined as the

smallest

set such that:
3-35)
3

06

e

,

Type

tg

if a bg Type then <a b>€
Type

)

,

,

3.32)

if ag Type then <s a>g Type
,

The primitive vocabulary
of L
3

will consist in an infinite

number of constants and variables
of each type ag Type
rhe

set of constants of type a will
be denoted by Con

the nth variable of type a will
be denoted by v

r

.

,

a

;

The

vocabulary also includes as primitive
symbols the logical
signs
"v",
-w, h = » " A " M V „ „ D „'
(

"

X ",

"W’\

"H"

f

••(•',

f

and

,

Given this vocabulary, we recursively define
the set
01 meaningful expressions of type
ag Type as the smallest
set ME such that:
d
3-33)

if a is a variable or constant of type a,
oc€ME

3-39)

a

if a€ME

a

and

u a

variable of type

b,

then

"\ua."gME<b >a >

3-^0)

if a€ME

<a b> and p€ME a

,

then "a(

^

3*41)

if a,3gME

3.-42)

if g.g'gME^,

then

M

8

)

"gME,n

a= 0 "gME.

and u is a variable of any type,
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then

"

"
,

9v9

'

"

.

,

(

)

"vuCeKe

"Au[ 8](

9

')”,

.

<<>0 „

,.
>

"W9"€ME
3-^3)
3.^4)

if a€ME

if a€ME

He( „

_

t

then "*a €ME
,,

d

,

<s a>

,

then

^

" v

<s,a>

a "€ME

a

Having so defined the meaningful
expressions of each type
ior our language L
y we can now define the set of meaningful expressions of the language
as U
a€ Type

The

semantics for L
3

ME
*

a

’

will he specified later, but
it

may be helpful to mention the
intended interpretations of
the primitive logical signs.
»
The signs
",
V

and

will be interpreted in a fairly
standard way as
the sentential connectives of
negation, disjunction, conjunction, material implication, and
material equivalence,
respectively.
The semantic treatment of these
connectives
L
will not differ in any important respect
from the
3
treatment given them in the first-order language

m

L

sign

=

.

The

will be interpreted as identity in a fairly

standard way.

""

The signs

modal operators; since L
3

and "0” will be interpreted as

is a tensed language the

first

of These will be roughly interpre table as
"necessarily

always" while the second will be roughly interpre table
as

"possibly sometimes."

The signs "A" and "V" will be
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interpreted as the universal
and existential quantifier,
respectively.
Both quantifiers are
sorted in that their
domains, in a way to be
made explicit later but
which is
much like that used in L
are restricted
2

to the set of

,

entities which satisfy the
sentence following the quantified variable and enclosed
by brackets.
The signs "W" and
"H" will be interpreted
as tense operators; the
first is
roughly interpretable as "it
will be the case that..."
While the second is roughly
interpretable
as "it has been

the case

that..."

The sign "X" will be used as
an ab-

straction operator; where
d

u is a

variable of type a and

a meaningful expression of
type b,

the expression "Xu9"

will be interpreted as a function
from entities of type a
to entities of type b.
Finally, the signs
and """
will be interpreted as intensional
operators; the first

combines with an expression to give the
intension of that
expression while the second combines with an
expression

whicn is an intension to give the extension
of that
expression at a point of evaluation. We could,

of course,

have eliminated a number of these primitive
logical

signs by defining them in terms of a smaller set in
any
of a number of standard ways.

For our purposes, however,

such conservation measures are unnecessary.

224
To simplify the translation
rules from the English

expressions generated by our
grammar to the language L
Wil1 make USe 0f a number
of abbreviatory conventions,
specifically, we will abbreviate
the variables v
and
Q g
V
as u and v, respectively;
l,e
the variables v
1 <s ,e>
v
and v
as
x,
and
3 <s e>
x
y>
2n, <s e>
n respectively; the
,

,

,

>

,

^ariaole

as p;

/

Q
"

1

,

0

,

V

<s«s

,

e>

,

t»

,«s ,«s

<s

,

e>

the variables v

as P and
,

0 ,<s

,«s

as M;

t». t» as

the variable v~

0

v
0

,

<s

,

«s «s
,

,

e>

,

,

variable
0

<s <e <e

t» «s
,

e>,

t»

and
na

respectively; the variable

’

nT

,

,

,

,

e>

,

,

o

as ^

t»>

t»>

„

5

and^

<s <e t»
"^ e variable
,

,

,

as R

We will also introduce
abbreviations for certain

meaningful expressions of L

.

3

If

3

is a meaningful ex-

pression of type <s,<a,t» and a a
meaningful expression
"t./P e a,
then we will aobreviate the meaningful
expresv
sion
a)( a
as a {a}; if a 6ME
(

)

^
<s,<a,<b,t»>
,

S€ME
v
(

xv

b

,

,

a oiE

and
ana

a

the expression 3{ a ,8} will abbreviate
the expression

3)(8,a) which in turn abbreviates the expression
a,;

(a)) (3).

If u is a variable of type a and

ula, we will abbreviate \u9 as u9 and
if a€ME

e

,

A

\u9 as u9

9

a form-

Finally,

then a* will abbreviate P(P£"a}).

Ha zing specified the syntax of the formal language
we will now turn to specifying a syntax for a
fragment of

,
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English, which we will call
E, along with a set
of rules
for translating expressions
generated by that syntax
into
the formal language L
?

.

The syntax we will give
for our fragment of English
will be a categorial one,
based on the primitive
distinct

categories

and

e

which will be understood as
the categories of entity denoting
expressions and truth-value
denoting expressions, respectively.
The set of categories
for our fragment is inductively
defined as the smallest
set Cat such that:
3 .45)
3

^°

)

e

,

t,

tC Cat

if A Bh Cat then A/B and A//BhCat
,

The role of the categories A/B
and A//B are that,

when a

phrase of such a category is combined
in the appropriate
wa-/ with a phrase of
category B, the resultant phrase is of
category A.
The distinction between phrases of
category
A/ B and a //B is purely syntactic; when
translated
into

the intensional logic

phrases of the two categories

will be mapped to expressions of the same type.
xhe firs
E

t

step in our translation from the language

to the language

is to specify a mapping from categ-

ories of E to types of
3

•

^7

)

f (e )=e

.

We define this mapping,

f,

as
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3.48)
J

'

4°

f(t) = t
f (A/B)=f (A//B)=«s

)

,f(B)>,f(A)>

Certain categories correspond
to traditional grammatical
classes. We will use the following
abbreviations to pick
out these classes:
or the category of intransitive
verb phrases,

is

the category t/e

CN

or the category of common noun
phrases,

’

is the

category t//e
T,

or the category of terms or denoting
phrases,

is

the category t/lV=t/( t/e)
TV,

or the category of transitive verb
phrases,

the category IV/T=( t/e )/( t/( t/e

adj,

xhe

(

is the category

t//e_)

categories so defined serve to index sets of expres-

sions of our fragment E.
cT

)

or the category of adjectives,

CN/CN=( t//e )/

is

two kinds

The members of these sets are

the oasic expressions, which are given by

;

enumeiation, and the phrases, which are defined recursively.
The basic expressions of category a,

“IV

= run
i-

’

3 ={John,
T

B tv- l find,

walk,

talk,

rise,

eat,

love,

,

are defined as:

change]

Mary, Bill, ninety,
lose,

B

he^,

he

date, be,

2

,

he,,,...}

seek, conceive"

1
-
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B

CFT'-

man

’

WOfnan

'

park, fish, pen, unicorn, price,

temperature, theory of relativity, taste
of lemon,
king of France}
B
B

B

/

t/ t

={necessarily, possibly}

IV/t^ Believe that
IV//lV^ tr y
shiny

B ad

B
^

1:0

’

-

assert that, dream that}

wish to}

breakable,

difficult, big, bald}

IV/adj =tbe p"

!

a

=0 if a is any category other than those mentioned

above

By the basic expressions of the fragment E is understood
the set

U

,B

ag Cat a

.

We can now specify the syntactic rules which allow
us

to build phrases of the language E.

Corresponding to

each syntactic rule will be a translation rule, which will
tell us that if a phrase of E is constructed by applica-

tion of a syntactic rule to expressions of E, the trans-

lation into

of the phrase so formed can be determined

by applying the corresponding translation rule to the

translations into

L,,

of those phrases put together by

that rule
In what follows,

let g be a mapping (function) with

domain the set of basic expressions of E other than be,
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P’

S -- e °° aril

/

p ossibly

.

,

-hat if at Cat and

,

and the members of B^,
such

then g(a)ST 2£ e
with f belng
f(a)
~he translation function
from categories to types
specif3 4 ?) -3 49)
rurther, let j.m.b, and n be
distinct
members of Con
Thp
+1
~
in
s / n tac tic rules for
e
the fragment E,
along with the translation
rules, are:

m

.

<x6B

a

,

.

SI:

B

T1:

(a)

p
a E a p or all aC Cat

if a is in the domain of
g,

lates as g(

then a trans-

a)

(b)

be

(c)

necessarily translates as p(D v
p); possibly

translates as lx${y( v x= v y)}

translates as p(O v p)
John, Mary
m*,
)

he

(f)

be

(

e

b*,

if a€P

CN

,

then F

every a

F^ ( q

the a

F

2

(a)=a a or an

word in

,

respectively

translates as RxVP[P{x}]

F^( a)
)

and n*

nine ty translate as j*,

,

u
n translates as ?Pfx
n )J

p

S2:

Bill

,

Q

(

a,

a ),

A

(

R [ P}

F (a), F (a)€P
1
2

T

,

a takes a or

an

CN and a translates as a', then

F

translates as P(Ax[a'(x)l(P[x}))

(

a)

(x)

where

depending on whether the first

if a€P
q

)
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translates as P(V y£Ax[a' x)]x=y]]
(P{x}
/

(

F (a)

translates as P(Vx[a'(x)](P{ x
}))

lf aeP

CN and 96P v

2

:

F

a

3

a

~

^

'

then F

n (a 9)€P CN’ where
'

3,

c

"

na ~"

9

and

'
»

,

9

comes from

'

oy replacing each occurence
of he

—

or

’

gender of

her

it

»

respectively then F^
X ia
m

x

'

or him

9

bv

depending on the

;

a

if a€Pg^ and 9^P^ and a,

^

)

m)^

")

translate into

9

n (a>9)

a'

,

9

'

translates into

where 9" is the result of re-

’

placing all occurences of x

in

9

1

by x

where

,

m is the least even number greater than n which
has no occurence in either
S4:

if a€P
p
F

6

^

^

>

3

and 3€P

T
)

»

ly

F (a, 3)
y

then F

,

i

Fg a
(

3'
4 (a,3)=a9', where

»

8

)

a'

or 9'

4 ( a ,$),
,

and F^

IV//IV’

or P

( a.

,

3

)

€P

where

,

is the result of replacing

the first verb (i.e., member of B
P

F^a.jf),

®

IV/adi'

ly

,

B

iy/4 .,

^y its third person

singular present;
F^(a,3)=a3'» where
the first verb in

3'

3

is

the result of replacing

with its negative third

person singular present;
Fg(a,3)=a3

,
)

where

3'

is the result of replacing
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the first verb in

with its third person sing-

3

ular future
Fr,(a, P)=ag

'

,

where

tne first verb in

g-

is the result of replacing

with its negative third per-

g

son singular future;
Fg(a, $)=a3*

.

where

first verb in

ohe

3'

is the result of replacing

with its third person sing-

3

ular present perfect;
F^( d

3

,

)=a3

1
,

where

tne first verb in

3'
3

is the result of replacing

with its negative third

person singular present perfect.
T4:

if
3'

and 3£Pjy> and a and

translate as

3

a’

,

respectively, then

F^ta.S) translates into

a’

("3')

F^(a,3) translates into ~(a C‘3'))
,

Fg(a,3) translates into W(a'( A 3’))
F^(a,B) translates into ~W(
Fg ( a

,

A

a’

3

*

)

translates into H(a’("3'))

3

F^(a,3) translates into ~H(a'( A 3'))
S5:

if a€P
and p€P
IV/ T
,

F
F
T5:

1Q (a,3)=a3
10 a

*

3

if

)=a him

if a€Pjyy/rp an(^

3

r

then F

1Q a,
(

3

)€P

iy

,

where

does not have the form he

,

and

otherwise

and

a, 8

translate into a',
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respectively, then F

’

0

A

a’

S6

T6

^

0

’

lf a€P

T7:

ix

A

a'

and

^.

0 ?P

CN and

lv/adj and 5€P adj’

0

)

translates into

then F

11 (a,3)€P IV

translate as a',

translates into

)

IV/ / t

^

jy

and 0€P

t

then F

,

and 0^P^. and

11 (a,B)€P ][v

translate into a',

a, 3

A
'

3

(

'

)

Iv^ IV

and 08P

IV

,

if c^Pjv/fy a ^d 0€Pjy,

F^

then

and

a,

3

( ct

,

3

)€P

IV

translate as a',

respectively, then F-^(a,3) translates into
A

'

0

(

'

if a€

)

t// t

and 0€P

if a€P^^_ and

A
'

P

t

,

,

then F

and

11

a, 3

(a,0)€P

t

translate into a’,

respectively, then F^^(a,6) translates into

8'

a

translate into a’,

a, 3

respectively, then F-^(a,3) translates into

3'

T10

^)^ P cn’ where

-oc.8

)

ad

B'

if a€P

a

((I

P

if a7 p

a

S10

~

if a€P

3’

T9:

H

IV/adj and 0€P adi’ and
respectively, then F-^(a,0)
a

8

S9:

translates into

g'

S7:

T8:

then F

CN’

respectively, then F^(a,

a'

S8:

and e€P

adj

if a7P

A

)

)

11 ^

8

3

1

3

lf aeF
P

10 C<x,

(

3

'

)
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Sll:

if 9,e*€P
F 12^ e,e

Til:

t

then F

,

*^

12

and

(e ,A*)

F

13

1

(

&9 *

'

F^

)

(

3

T12:

if a ,3^P
IV

,

9

,

9

»

9

(

9 *)

,

6P

(

x) v3

'

'

(

(

x)

9*)=9 or

if a,33?

T13*

if a,33P m and

T

)

9
,

translates into

*)

translates into (9'v9*')

)

12 (a, 3)

F

,

13

(a,3)3P

translate into a',

3

3

then F

,

P( a' (P) v3

'

respec-

3'

translates into

13

a,,3

3

(ot

(a, 3)3 P

t

translate into
f

respec

a',,3'

translates into

g)

3^?^.*

then

F^

n

(a,3)3P^.,

if a is not of the form he
F

IV

(P)

and

T

(a,3)

F-^

;

then F^

tively,

a)

9

9*'

x)

S13

if a€P

(

where

,

t

then F 12 (a,3) translates into

x( a' (x)&|B
x( a'

*

then F

if a,33P-j-y and a,

tively,

Sl4:

9

13

if 9,9*£P_^ and 9,9* translate into 9',

respectively, then F
12

S12:

^

F

,

l4 n ( a >$)

then

,

,

where

res ult of replacing the

is

first occurence of he

or him

in

^

by a

3

and all other occurences of he .^ or him
in

3

by he, she

,

it or him

respectively, according to

,

her
the

,

it

.,

,

gender of

a;

b)

if a is of the form he,

,

then

F^

n

(

a

,

3
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is

the result of replacing all
occurences

of he

n and him n in

by he

3

or him

fc

k

,

respectively
Tlu.

if

c.3P

t

and

B€P^.

and

respectively, then F
a' (&

S15:

n

3

if a€P

translate into a',

a, 3

u (a,3)

3'

translates into

'

T

and 3^P

CN

,

ant^

then

n a
(

an<^

respectively, then F

,

3

)€P

CN

translate into a ',3'

p 4(n

translates into

(ct,3)

ya'U n (3'(y)))
S16:
Tlo:

if a€P

T

and B€P

ly

,

then F

l4

(
(

if ePP^, and SPPjy and a,

3

respectively, then F-^

(a,3)

ya’ (X (3’ (y)
n

n

a

,

3

)€P

JV

translate into a ',3'

translates into

)

ihe rules S1-S16 can be

taken as a simultaneous in-

ductive deiinition of the notion of a meaningful expression
of category a for the language E; more precisely, we can

say that an expression is a member of the set of expressions
of category a for the fragment E if and only if that ex-

pression is a member of the smallest set closed under SlSl6 and that expression is of category a.

The set of

meaningful expressions of the fragment E will then be the
union of the meaningful expressions of category a for all
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agCat
It

win

be useful at this point
to step back from the

formal presentation of the
language and give an intuitive
account of what each of the
syntactic rules S1-S17 are
doing
si acts as the base clause
of the inductive
definition of a meaningful expression
of E.
Simply put,
SI tells us that the members
of the basic categories, or
the simple vocabulary of the
fragment, are all meaningful
expressions.
Rule S2 is used to put determiners
on common
n ° Un P hrase s, changing them
into term phrases.
In a more
complex grammar we might find that we
wanted to introduce
determiners at the level of the vocabulary
by introducing
a new category of basic
expressions to the fragment and
adding a syntactic rule which put determiners
together
with common noun phrases to produce term
phrases.
Such
an approach has its advantages, and is
taken by Thomason
(1974b).

However,

these advantages are not relevant to

the questions which concern us here and thus
this fragment

utilizes the simplier technique of introducing determiners
via a rule

Rule S3 is one of four rules in the grammar (along

with S13, S14, and S15) which is actually a rule schemata.
The purpose of S3

is

to allow for the generation of
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restrictive relative clauses.

This rule takes a common

noun and puts it together with
a sentence, with the
result
being another common noun.
The rule is productive when
the sentence it combines with
the common noun has an
occurence of one of the "dummy"
pronouns he
This rule is
R
applied in such a way as to bind that
pronoun.
So, for
example, this rule will allow us
to put together the
common noun "man" with the sentence "he
walks " to obtain
2
the common noun "man such that he
walks" which
.

_

is the

rendering in this fragment of the English
common noun
phrase "man who walks."
The fourth syntactic rule is the rule of
the fragment

which allows for terms to be put together with verb
phrases to produce sentences, or phrases of syntactic

category

t.

The six variants of the rule allow for present

past, and future tense constructions along with the sen-

tential negation of any of those forms.

As with deter-

miners in this fragment, it might well turn out that to
more adequately characterize English we would not want to

introduce tense and negation by a rule, but rather have
separate basic expression categories for these parts of
speech.

However, we will again take the simple way out,

as the syntax of English tense and negation is not our
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primary concern in this work.
Rule S5 allows us to generate
intransitive verb
phrases by putting transitive verbs
together with term
phrases.
Rules S6 and S7 are the rules which
allow for
the generation of adjectives in
the

sentences of E; S6

produces pre-common noun adjectives while
S7 generates
predicate adjectives using the "be" of
predication, "be P*

—

"

Rules S8-S10 produce sentences which, while
perhaps
of little linguistic interest, are of
philosophical in-

terest.

S8 introduces sentences in which intentional

contexts like belief and assertion play a major role,
while S9 introduces sentences in which the phrases
to"

and

"

wish to" are the main verbs.

"

necessarily

try

Rule S10 allows

generation of sentences with the modal operators
and

"

"

possibly "

.

Rules S11-S13 allow us to produce conjunctions and

disjunctions of sentences and verb phrases, as well as

disjunctions of noun phrases.

No conjunctions of noun

phrases are generated in this grammar, enabling us to
ignore the problems of giving an adequate syntax and

semantics for English plurals.
The final three rules,

rule schemata.

like rule S3, are actually

These rules allow for the generation of
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sentences with varying scope for noun phrases.
aiiy,

Specif ic-

they allow the implantation of term phrases
into

sentences, common noun phrases, and verb phrases.

The

importance of these rules will be discussed more fully
below, when we turn to the translation rules.

For each syntactic rule SI— Sl6, there is a corres-

ponding translation rule

The idea here is that if a

.

meaningful expression of E is formed by applying one of
rule S1-S16,

the translation of the phrase which results

is obtained by taking the

translation of the phrases put

together by the syntactic rule and putting those translations together in the way specified by the translation
rule.

The members of the basic categories are translated

in accordance to rule Tl; most of the basic expressions

will simply be translated as constants of the appropriate
type by the function g.

For purposes of simplicity, we

will indicate the constant of the language L 0 which is the

translation of such a member of a basic category by using
the following convention:
be written "a'".
"be

"

,

ily "

,

—

"be_

"
,

if a£dom(g)

then g(a) will

Special translations are provided for

the modal operators

and the terms

"

John "

"
,

"

Mary "

possibly " and
"
,

Bill "

and the subscripted dummy pronouns "he

"

,

and

"

necessar -

"

nine ty "
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As they stand,

the translation rules T1-T16
specify a

translation relation which holds
between meaningful
expressions of E and meaningful
expressions of L
this
•

3

relation is not a function as some
meaningful expressions
of E will be capable of being
translated into different
meaningful expressions of L
This is
.

3

We Wlsh

1:0

be ab le to generate sentences
of E which are

amoiguous, even though
de

not suprising, as

is a disambiguated language,

could, however, make adjustments in the
domain of the

translation relation which would make the relation
into a
function.
To do this we need to first introduce
the notion
of an analysis tree for a meaningful expression
E.
of

An analysis tree of a meaningful expression of E will
be a graphic
to generate

representation of the sequence of rules used
the meaningful expression.

Each node of the

analysis tree for a sentence or meaningful expression
will consist of a meaninful expression which is either a
basic expression or an expression generated from nodes

immediately dominated by the node by one of the rules of
the syntax,

S1-S16.

In the latter case, we indicate which

syntactic function was used to obtain the expression by

writing the number of that syntactic function after the

expression produced.

For example, two analysis trees for
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the sentence of E

3.50)

Every man loves a woman

are

3.5D

Every man loves a woman

Every man,

ylove

0

,

4

woman

a

10

,

1

man

love

a

woman

,

2

woman
3.52)

Every man loves a woman
a woman

14,2

Every man loves hinu

2

,

,

1

woman

Every man

,

0

man

4

,

love him

2

10

,

\him.

love

Corresponding to each node of such an analysis tree
will be a single meaningful expression of

translation of that node

.

which is the

To find that translation all

that is needed is to apply the translation rule corresponding to the syntactic rule used to form the node to the

nodes immediately dominated.

It is fairly easy to see

that every sentence of E will have infinitely many differ-

ent analysis trees; for example, we could produce an infinite number of different analysis trees for sentence
by simply using analysis trees which differ from

3

-

3

*

52 )

only in the subscript of the pronoun and in which version
of the rule schema

F-.

14 n
,,

,

is used.

However, most of the

50

)
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different analysis trees which
can be used to represent
the generation of a sentence
can be ignored as inessential^ different, as these trees
will not result in divergent translations of the
sentence of E
into L

The in-

finite number of different
analysis trees described above
for sentence 3-50), for example,
will have translations
Which differ in no way at all at
the level of the whole
formula, and which will differ only
in the subscript on
/ariable sib any lower levGl.

<3.

The device of analysis trees
serves to disambiguate

sentences of the fragment E.

While a given meaningful

expression may have more than one translation
into l
the
combination of a meaningful expression and the
analysis
tree of that meaningful expression which
tells us the

derivational history of that meaningful expression
has
unique translation into
Hence if we took as

a

our

domain of the translation relation meaningful expressions
with their analysis trees,
be a function,

the translation relation would

and we could directly interpret these

meaningful expressions and their analysis trees by way of
the function which is the composition of the translation

function and the ^as yet unspecified) interpretation

function on

.

Having noted that this is possible, we
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will now return to talking about
the translation relation
from meaningful expressions of E
to meaningful expressions
L3
re ^ urn i n S to analysis trees
only when necessary.
It should be noted that the
analysis trees given above
.or sentence 3-50) are not inessentially
different, that
os, the translations of the
meaningful expressions generated by the sequence of rule applications
charted in the
’

orees are not equivalent formulas in
L~

.

The differences

can be traced to the way the term phrase
"a woman " is

brought into the sentence.

In the first analysis tree

the phrase is represented as being generated
directly while

in the second it is represented as being inserted
by syn-

tactic function F-^^.

This difference will be reflected

semantically by a difference in the scope of the translation of the phrase "a woman

.

In the first case,

repre-

sented by 3-51). the phrase "a woman " has small scope,

giving us the reading of sentence 3*50) corresponding to
"every man loves some woman (although, perhaps, different

men love different women)."

The sentence generated by

the sequence of syntactic rules represented by analysis

tree 3*51)

large scope.

on the other hand, gives the phrase "a woman "

This results in a reading of sentence 3.50)

roughly equivalent to "some particular woman is loved by
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ever,,

man.

This ability to generate
sentences which are
amoiguous in this way is given
to the fragment by the syntactic rules S14-S16.
The

syntax and translation rules of
this fragment
differ from those for the fragment
of English presented
Montague (1974a) only in the following

m

ways.

We have

added two basic categories, those of
adjectives and the
0f P redica tion.
We have also added two rules,

—p

S6 and

S7,

which allow for the generation of predicate
and prenominal adjectives.
To the basic category of common nouns
we have added three items, solely
for the sake of generating some sentences which we have talked about
previously

m

this work.

The translation rules involving quantific-

ation have been changed to reflect the sorted quantification system we will be adopting.
uhe

We have also deleted

basic category of intransitive verb making prepositions

and the rule making phrases containing those basic expressions.

This was done simply because such constructions

do not play any particularly important part in the theory

of sortally incorrect sentences to be presented here.

have also added the sentence modifying adverb

and the sentence taking verb phrase

"

"

We

possibly "

dream that";

the

latter was added to allow sentences like those discussed
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by McCauley

(

1971)

to be generated by the fragment,

the

cormer was added for no reason
other than to give symmetry
to the modal operators in the
fragment.
It should be noted that none
of these changes are

strictly necessary if we want

to

develop a theory of the

semantics of sortally incorrect sentences
with the exception ol the variation in the translation
rules required
J

°

a

^ ow

for sorted quantification.

The grammar given by

Montague already allows for the generation
of sentences
like

3-5M

Ninety loves Mary and tries to date her

which seems to be a reasonable candidate for being considered a sortally incorrect sentence.

Making the changes

we have made allows us to discuss familiar examples.

But

not making the changes would not have kept the problem
from arising.
All of what has gone on in constructing the grammar
up to this point is really preliminary work.

What we

have done is to set up a syntax which generates sentences,

some of which are sortally incorrect, and specified a way
to

translate those sentences into a formal language.

We

will now turn to the real work of the chapter, giving a

semantics for the fragment.
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Let A,

I,

and J be any non-empty
sets, which we will

intuitively consider to be the
set of (possible) entities,
possible worlds, and times,
respectively. We define the
set of possible denotations
of type a for aeTyoe relative
to A
I, ana J, denoted by
D
eo
,

J

„

a A
,

3

-

3

-

3

-

55

)

D

56

)

D

5 ?)

D

58

)

D

,

s

J

t,A,I,

<a,b>,A,
»

<s a> A
,

,

,

the

I

a
a A

-

I

=A

e ,A, I,

from d
3
3

,

,

I

t
1

,

jt

D,

A
T
b A
I JT
,

,

= the
„

,

set of partial functions

,

from IxJ to D
A sorted model of

t0

set of partial functions

,

a, A, I,

will be a six-tuple UE=<A

,

I

,

J < E F>
,

,

,

such that
3

.

3

.

3

.

59 )

A,

60 )

- is a simple (linear)

61

E

)

I,

>

if a^Con
<a>b>) E(cc)

.

62

)

F (the

(P(

is a function from IxJ

a,A,I,J>

if a€C on
to

3

is a function from

<a,b> UCon <s,a> for any a b€ Type such that

t 0 (P(D

b)

ordering on J

(the sortal specification)

Con
a)

and J are non-empty sets

<s a>

,

E( a)

is a function from IxJ

IxJ

interpretation function) is a function

from constants of

such that
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if ag Type and agCon

a)

if agCon

b)

a

,

F(a)gD

<s a> A
,

<a b> and

,

,

I

,

and

^

((F(a))(<i, j>))(x) is defined, then

c)

x€ (E(cc)

(<i, j>)

if a€Con

<S(a> and <i’,;j'>gIxJ and

((F( a ))(<i, j>)

<i

j
'

»

’>€ (E( a)

)

(<i

•
,

y>)

is defined,

then

(<i j>)
,

Having specified what a model for

is

the next

to be,

step is to define the set of extended valuations relative
to such a model.

To do this we must first specify a sub-

set of the set of possible denotations of type a for

relative to the sets of entities, possible worlds,

aC Type

and times A,

I,

and J specified in the model.

We will call

these sets the sets of possible complete denotations of
type a relative to A,

I,

and

J,

denoted D*

a aA iT
,

,

,

jT

,

defined

as
3

'

3

-

>

d

64 >

d

63

3.65)

I,A,I,J=

a

?,a,i,j =C °' 1}

D*

h

a

x

j~ bhe se b °b bo tal functions

from D a>A(I>J bo D b>A>I(J
3.66)

D*

A
T T =bhe set of total functions from
<s,a>,A,I,J
.

IxJ to D

Clearly,

T
a, A, 1,
.

T

since total functions are special cases of partial
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functions,

for all a€Tvoe.
D*
~

r-u

a A I J— a A I
,

,

,

,

,

,

The set of extended
valuations relative to a model

UE=<A,I,J,s,e,F> Will be the set
I

*-<A

,

I

,

I

+

of all seven- tuples

J < E F New> such that
,

,

3.6?)

,

A,

,

I,

j,

<,

E

and F are the same sets, rela-

,

ion,

sortal specification and
interpretation
function specified in UE
3.68)

hew is a function from D

<a b> A
,

±or all a bg Type to D*

,

tin
u
,

I

,

< s a> A
,

,

,

I

,

nn*
<a,b>,A,I,j <s,a>,A,I,J

,

,

.

such that
a)

if x€D

then New(x)€D*
<a b> A I
for all
if x(y
is

d,Db > A

j

,

T

,

such that,

,

,

,

)

defined,
b)

if x8D

(

New( x)

<s a> A
,

,

,

l

,

)

(

y)=x( y)

then New(x)€D*

j

<s a> A
,

such that, for all <i,j>eixJ,
is defined,

then (New(x)

)

,

,

I

,

if x(<i,j>)

(<i j> =x( <i j>)
)

,

,

A g-assignment of values to variables
of L ? on a model

UE=<A

,

I

,

J ,< ,E F> will be a function from variables of all

n/pss such

g(u)€D

a

,

6

ha t if u is a variable of type a€ Type

^^j.

The value of a meaningful expression a of

on an extended valuation I*-<A
is a

,

,

I

,

J, < ,E

,

F

New > which

member of the set of extended valuations relative

a model UE

to

on a g-assignment of values to variables on that
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model at a point of evaluation
<i,j>elxJ, denoted by
w
Tv
•

/

r

\

-L

^ l
,

•

,

i
,

'

:-

g

can now be defined recursively as

*

^• 69

)

if

is a cons tant of

oc

(New( F( a)

3-70)

3.71)

)

Uuot)
D

a)

,

(cx)"^"

,

then

(

’

a

’

«5

*

^

’

S'—

,

^

a)

^=g( a)

and u is a variable of type b, then
a
’^’^’ s
=h, the partial function from
to D

b A I J
,

then

(<i j>)

if a is a variable of L
Q
if a€ME

,

,

a A
,

if x?D

,

I

such that
,

b)A I(J then h( x)=(

X*

1

a)

’

§

^

'

where

^

is an

S’

assignment of values to variables

which differs from g only in that g'(u)=x
'

if and only if

for all I*'el +
b)

if x6D

(

^

a)

^

g -{ a
)

I*

a

'

*

j

S
>

;

then h(x) is undefined

b A>I ^j,
^

otherwise
3-72)

if a€ME
(

3-73)

New ( (a)

1 *’ 11

a

if 9€ME +

,

’

j

then

if 9,9’£ME_j_,
if (9)^

)

(

(9)

’

*5

)
(

a( 3

^

)

,g
)

ip an(^ only if

(3)^

otherwise

'S= 0

(q)^

3.75)

then

,

1 *’ 1

,g

is
1 *’ 1

a

then (o=6)^

,

(a)^

3*74)

^

)

if a,$<EME

(o^g)

and 3€ME

<a b>

(

~9

^

^

»

j

)

>

S =1

otherwise (~9)^
then (9v9’)^
or (9

,)I

’

if and only if
’

a

’
’

^’^’S_i ip and only

*i>j*g_p.

otherwise
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(

Similarly for
3.?fc)

9

v9
(

9

’

'

1

j

’

S_.q

’

)

&e

*

)

(e-9

,

if e,a' ? ME

•

)

,

and

(9<-->9*)

and u a variable of type
a,
*’
(AuEeKe’)) 1 1 j-s is
t

then

’

a

if G Cg'ig'

is an

assignment of values to

variables which differs from
g in at most
the value of g(u) and which
are such
that

1
e

(

)

(Au[e](e'))

I *’ i,

^

^

(

b)

1,J,S ’ = lfor

'

^

’

'i

all

then

e =l if
and only if

for all g €G

otherwise

'

Au[ 9]

I

,

9

))

^’^’S> g_ o

if G (as defined above)=j^,
(/\u[ 9]

(

all g

9

'

)

)

^

then

if and on iy if f or

assignments of values to variables

which differ from g in at most the value
of g’(u),

(9')^

)

a)

9

1 *’
'

)

)

1 ** 1
'

then

j

’^o

and u a variable of type a, then

t

Vu[ 9]

’

otherwise

if 9,9'9ME_
(

1 *' 1

*

(Au[ 9] (9

3-7 7

if (e)

’

)

»g i s

if G (as defined in 3 76 a)
.

(

Vu£ 9"]

(

9-)

1

(

9

'

)

)

^

-0

,

then

if an(i only if

=1 for some g'€G; otherwise

249

i

(Vu[9]
b)

'

(

if G=0,

)

»

J

g_Q

*

)

then (Vu[e]

1

)
*

(

»

)

3

>

g =1 if
and

only if there is some g'
assignment of
values to variables which differs
from g
in at most the value of g'(u)
such that
(,)IMU.S =1 and 9 .)l*,i.j.g*
’

(

otherwise
3.78)

if eeME
(e)

1

1

-

then

,

t

{V u[ 9 ]

'j

’

(m

:

;

1

9

>

'

j

*

)

I# 1
-

'

3

'

1

;

S_ 0

s=r if and only if

s =l for all
<i',j'>elxJ;

otherwise

Similarly for (09)
3-79)

if 9€ME
(q)

1

’

1

t

then (We

,

,g

’

and j/j'i

Similarly for
3

u0

)

H

(

X*

1 ’i

’

g =i if and
only if

=l for some j'GJ such that j<j’

otherwise (W9

^

)

^

g=o

He

a^ME^,

then

A
(

a)^

where h is the

partial function from IxJ to D
for all <i*
a)

j
,

^

1 *’ 1

I* £

’

i' ,s

=(a)

I#

'

,1

,g if and
only if
*’

'

’

t3

,g for all

+

»

b)
3. 81)

h(<i',j'>) is undefined otherwise

if a€ME

< s a>
,

,

such that,

’>eixJ,

h(<i'
(a)

A

then

v
(

a)

^

1

’

,g =
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(

New(

I*
(

’

1

’

ct)

^’

g )(<i,

j>)

We are now able to define the
value of a meaningful expres

sion a of L

on the supervaluation induced by
a model UE

3

relative to a g-assignment of values
to variables at a
world and time of evaluation, denoted by
UE,i ’^’ g
(a)

I

Let

some extended valuation relative to
the model UE

be

Then we can define
3-82)

as

if a€ME^ for any a€ Type

(a)^

Uij
(

,

1

»

j

»

)

(a)^

a)

if and only if
*

(

tie

.

E, ^

,

^

& p or a pp I*’£l

,g

(

+
;

a)

’

^

^

^

’

s^

’

g :=

otherwise

is undefined.

will say that a sentence

9

of

is true on a model UE

at a world and time of evaluation <i,j> if and only if
'

^~1

-

°r all g-ass ignments of values to variables

relative to the model UE
0

;

false if and only if

for all g-assignments of values to variables relative

to UE

;

and undefined otherwise.

We now have a syntax which generates a subset of the

set of English sentences, a set of translation rules which

enable us to say, given a sentence and the syntactic

generation of that sentence, what the translation of that
sentence into our formal language
for the language

.

is,

and a semantics

We will now look at a number of
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example sentences to see just what the
results are of
applying this grammar to the problem
of sortally incorrect
sentences

fragment is designed to reflect the intuition
that simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences
are without truth-value.
An obvious place to begin
The

is to

look at how the fragment deals with what have
been taken
as our paradigm sortally incorrect sentences,

3-83)

The theory of relativity is shiny

3-84)

The taste of lemon is breakable

The most straightforward way of obtaining these
sentences

in our syntactic system is represented by the analysis

trees
83

3

The theory of relativity is shiny

'

)

The theory of relativity

,

be

1

^ shiny,
\

11

“7

1

theory of relativity
3.84')

4

,

be

shiny

,.

The taste of lemon is breakable,

4

\

The taste of lemon,

1

taste of lemon

— p^breakable
—
be

r

,

11

breakable

be'

With these syntactic generations, the sentences translate
into

Ijj

3

.

as
83 ")

VyfAxf theory of relativity (x)~!x-y^
'

V

P[P{y}1( shiny (*P) )(y)
'
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^.84

)

Vy[Ax[ taste of lemon
(

breakable

A
'

P)

)

'

(

x) ~lx=v~|VP[P£y}

]

(y)

R oughly,

3.83") can be paraphrased in
English as saying
that there is some object which
is the unique theory of
relativity, and that this object has
some property such
that the property obtained by applying
the function from
intensions of properties to properties
which is the denot-

ation

the term

shiny'

"

to that property is itself a

property which is had by the object which is
the theory
of relativity.
3.84") can be paraphrased in an analogous
fashion
How are these sentences evaluated by the semantics?
Since both sentences have the same logical form,
they will
be evaluated in analogous ways,
a

.,

hence we will only look

how the semantics evaluates 3.83").

sorted model which reflects English.

Suppose we have a
The value of 3.83")

on that model will be determined by the value of that

sentence on the supervaluation induced by the model, which
in turn is determined by the value of that sentence on

each of the members of the set of extended valuations
relative to that model.

To evaluate this sentence,

is an existentially quantified formula,

which

at the level of

the extended valuations we must first determine the members
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of the set of assignments
of values to variables
which
satisfy the sort of the
quantifier on all of the
extended

valuations.

This sentence will be
satisfied only by an
assignment to the variable
y of an object which is identical
to

everything which is mapped
to "l" by the function
"theory of rela tivity " on
all extended valuations.
Such
an object will exist only
if the model interprets "
theory
1

~—

j-ativtfry

as a function which is
defined for and
maps to 1 a unique object,
that is, if on the model
there
is a unique object which
is the theory of relativity.
Assuming that this is the case
on the model, there will

only one g assignment of values
to variables which
will be relevant to the evaluation
of 3.83") on any member
of the set of extended
valuations.
The sentence
be

will be

mapped to

1

on an extended valuation if
and only if there

is some property had by the

object picked out by the g-

assignment on all extended valuations
(and which, therefore
is defined for and true of
the object on the model) which
is such that shiny
applied to the intension of that
’

property is a property had by the object.

However, it is

reasonable to assume that one of two results
obtains when
one applies the function which is the
interpre tation of
2]}j n Y
r

,

t° a
.

property had by the object which is the
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theory of relativity.
*

One result
0 n++
result, gotten
when one applies
the function to properties
like the interpretation
of
or
of relativity "
is that the property
is not of the
right sort for the functi on,
which means that the result
o
applying the function to the
argument will vary from
.

,

'

-

extended valuation to extended
valuation.
The other possibility would be that the
property of the theory of relativity
would be something like' the
property of being thought about
by John, which would be within
the sortal
range of the

function which is the interpretation
of
is reasonable

to

"

shiny

'

"

.

But it

assume that the property which
results

irom applying the interpretation
of

"

shiny

'

"

to such a

property will itself be a property for
which the object
wnich is the theory of relativity is
of the wrong sort.
-^i
i

ther way,

this means that the result of applying
the

unction which is the interpretation of

"

shiny

1

"

to some

property had by the theory of relativity and
then applying
the property which comes from that to the
object picked

out by the g-assignment will vary from extended
valuation
to extended valuation.

On some extended valuations, we

will find that some property had by the object in question
is mapped by the

which,

interpretation of

on that extended valuation,

"

shiny

'

"

to a property

the object does have.
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Buu tnere Wl11 be at least
one extended valuation
on which
all of the properties had
by the object are mapped
to
properties the object doesn't
have by the interpretation
°Hence on some extended
-- rl V
valuations 3.83") i s
evaluated as having the value 1
while on others the sentence
is evaluated as having the
value 0.
So on the supervaluation induced by the model 3.83")
(and, for analogous
reasons, 3-34")) is evaluated as
having no truth-value at
all, which is the result we want.

V

•

.

Ao Wlth the

1

i

rs t-order theory presented in the
second

section of this chapter, the semantics
for our fragment
will evaluate sortally incorrect sentences
which

have the

form 01 tautologies as true.

For example, consider the

sentence

Every shiny theory of relativity is shiny

3.85)

generated in the way represented by the analysis
tree
3

•

8

5

Every shiny theory of relativity is shiny

'

,

Every shiny theory of relativity,
“ ^"o^be

shiny.

be
~
P

shiny

shiny theory of relativ ity. 11

^

shiny

I

\
the ory of

which translates into
3-3 5")

AxC( shiny

relativity

as
A

1

(

theory of relativity

(VP[P{x}l( shiny

A
*

P))(x)))

1

)

)

(x)

4
11
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Since the formula which is the
sort of the quantifier in
this sentence is sortally incorrect,
when we evaluate this
sentence at the level of the extended
valuations the set
of g-assignments of values to
variables which satisfy that
formula on all of the extended valuations
relative
to the

model will be empty.

In such a case, we evaluate the sen-

tence completely within each of the
extended valuations.
On such evaluations, any object which
satisfies the formula

which is the sort of the quantifier will satisfy
the
quantified formula. So on every member of the set

of ex-

tended valuations, the sentence is evaluated as having
the value 1.

Hence on the supervaluation induced by the

model the sentence is evaluated as being true.

Again,

this

is the result we wanted.

Our fragment also allows for the generation of sentences in which a sortally incorrect sentence appears as
the grammatical object of certain verbs.

One such sentence

is

3-86)

John believes that the theory of relativity
is shiny

We can also generate sentences like those cited by McCawley
(1971) such as

2.8 7)

John dreamed that the theory of relativity
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is shiny

Tne first of these, when
generated in a way represented
by the analysis tree

8,8c

'^

£ohn believes that the theory
-f 0

ia

t^vi tv is shiny

— hn

4

,

believe^ that the theor
1

£1 relativity is shiny, 11

/

,°e ,llev0
.

that

xtheory

the

of

relativity is shiny
(as in^ 3 83
.

will translate into
J

®8

4

,

'

as

relieve tha

x=ylVP[P{ y}

1

(

1

(

\/

y A xL the ory of relativity

shiny

which states that the relation

"

(
’

*P

)

)

(

y)

)
'

(

x

(

" j

) )

believe that'" holds be-

tween the intension of the object which is John and the

intension of the interpretation of the translation into
Lj of the sentence

"

the theory of relativity is shiny

.

If we so wished, we could follow Montague and adopt a

meaning postulate reflecting the extensionality in subject
of sentences like this, which would let us further reduce

our translation into a sentence of L which states that a
?

relation holds between the intension of the interpretation
of the translation into

of the sentence

"

the

theory

^]

of relativity is shiny ” and
John himself,

however,

Our concern

is not with the extensionality
of the subject

term in such sentences, but rather
with how we should
treat the grammatical object.
The object of the sentence is
the intension of a

sortally incorrect sentence, that is,
a function from
possible worlds and times to the truth-value
had

by the

sentence at that world and time.
open

m

While this point is left

the semantics we have given,

to assume

it is not unreasonabl

that a sentence like "the theory of relativity

is shiny” will be

at a±l times.

sortally incorrect at all worlds and

If this is the case,

the intension of the

translation of that sentence will be a function which
is

undefined for all points of evaluation; hence the intension will be the null function from worlds and times to

truth-values
The question now is what effect this has on the truth

value of the sentence as a whole.
two possible treatments.

The

theory allows for

One of these would be based on

the intuition that the entire sentence 3.86)

incorrect,

is sortally

that sortally incorrect sentences are not the

kinds of things which can be believed, asserted, or
dreamed.

To get this result requires only that we select
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our sortal specification
function in such a way that
sortally incorrect sentences are
not within the sortal range
of the functions which are
the interpretations of these
-ros Oi propositional attitude.

Doing this insures that

the truth-values of 3.86")
and the sentence which is the

translation of

3

-

3 ?)

into L
3

will vary from extended val-

uation to extended valuation, and
hence that the supervaluation induced by the model will
evaluate these sentences as having no truth-value.
While this is a possible way of dealing
with senfences like 3 86 and 3.87) in the
fragment, it does not
seem to be the best way.
On an intuitive
.

)

level,

it does

not appear that we would want to discount
the possible
truth of a sentence like

3

-

86

)

or 3.87).

On being told

that John believes that the theory of relativity
is shiny
we might wonder about John, and would
certainly have

reason to say that John was confused or unclear about
the
kind of entities theories are.

But

I

don't think that

we would immediately conclude that the speaker of the

report of John's belief was uttering a sentence without
truth-value.

The report is about what John believes, and

John's beliefs may be radically different from our own in
bizarre ways.

We would certainly want to say that,

if
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3,86) WaS true

John

’

beli ®f 3hows a mistake
about fundemental ontological status.
But being able to conclude
all of this about John
presupposes that we understand
3 86) and acce P t i1: as a
true account concerning
John’s
reliefs which would not be
possible under the option
Which results in evaluating
3.86) as a sentence without
truth-value
’

s

'

,

The claim that verbs of
propositional attitude have

sortal ranges which exclude the
intensions of sortally
incorrect sentences is even less
reasonable when we
consider sentences like 3-87).
If John, a graduate student
physics, were to tell us that the night
before his
orals he dreamed that the theory of
relativity was

m

shiny,

we might be amused or,

working too hard.

perhaps, concerned that he was

But we would not be inclined,

I

think,

point out to him that the theory of relativity
was not
the kind of thing which can be shiny and
hence that he
to

could not have dreamed that it was.

This intuition that

sortally incorrect sentences can appear as the objects
of
verbs of propositional attitudes without causing the
entire
sentence to be sortally incorrect is not entirely idiosyncratic, as McCawley (1971) uses such contexts to

produce sentences in which sortally incorrect sentences
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are parts but which are such that
the entire sentence is
-iO t judged as one which
is deviant.
The alternative which appears
preferable,

then,

to take verbs of propositional attitude
to include

is

in

their sortal ranges the intensions of (at
least some)

sortally incorrect sentences.

Using this approach, the

truth-value of sentence

3 .36")

will be determined by what

John in fact believes.

If he believes the proposition

expressed by the sentence "the theory of relativity is
shiny,

then 3*86

)

will be true; if he does not believe

that proposition the sentence will be false.
It should be pointed out that this approach is not

without problems of its own.

Propositions, in this sem-

antics, are identified with functions from worlds and times
of evaluation to truth-values.

Assuming that the sortal

range of a term does not vary from world-time to worldtime,

the object of belief in 3.86")

is a function from

all world-time pairs to no truth-value.
it is the null function from this domain.

This is a function
The problem

with this treatment is that if sortal ranges remain constant throughout the set of world-time pairs, the proposition expressed by all sortally incorrect sentences will
be

the same--they will all express the null function from
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world-time pairs to truth-values

.

So if John does believe

that the theory of relativity is
shiny, on this treatment,
09 also believes the proposition
expressed by every other

serially incorrect sentence.

Yet if we allow belief in

sortally incorrect sentences it would
appear that we ought
to allow for the possibility that
John believes that the
theory of relativity is shiny without
his also believing
that the taste of lemon is breakable.
this is not possible,
the two sentences,

On our treatment

for the propositions expressed by

which are the object of belief, are

identical
However,

this is not a problem brought about by our

treatment of sortally incorrect sentences, but rather a

proolem inherent in the treatment of propositions which
takes propositions to be functions from points of reference
t0

truth— values

•

Once we have identified propositions with

such functions, we are unable to distinguish not only the

propositions expressed by different sortally incorrect
sentences, but the propositions expressed by different

necessary truths (which will all be the function from
points of reference to the truth-value true) or the prop-

ositions expressed by necessary falsehoods (which will all
be

the function from points of reference to the truth-value
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false).

To avoid this problem we need
something more than

a different treatment of sortally
incorrect sentences.
-'/hat

is needed is some way of representing
propositions

which makes finer distinctions between them
than is now
made by our semantics.
A solution to the problem

of dis-

tinguishing between various necessarily true
propositions
should also allow us to distinguish between the
various

proposi oions expressed by sortally incorrect sentences.
A linal pair of examples we will consider are sen-

tences which are not sortally incorrect, but show an

interesting facet of the system concerning the way in

which it deals with definite descriptions.

Consider the

sentences
3-88)

The king of France is bald

3-89)

The man is bald

whose generations can be represented by the analysis trees
3 .88')

The king of France is bald
The king of France

,

1

man

be
be

as

4

bald, 11

} \bald
Jr

and which translate into

bald

be
—

The man is bald,

The man,

4

be_ bald, 11

1

king of France
3.89’

,
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3.33")

Vy[Ax[ king; of France.' (x) 3x=y]VP[P{y}
(

3.89")

(bald'

A
(

P)

)

y

3

)

Vy[Ax[rnan’(x)lx^ylVP[p{ y }l(( bald (-P)
t

)(

v

)

)

Both of these sentences have definite
descriptions which
f ail t0 refer uniquely.
In 3-88), the definite description
^ails to refer because there is no object which
is (presently)

the king of France.

In 3-89),

the definite des-

cription does not fail because there is no object which
is
a man,

men.

but oecause there are too many objects which are
In standard treatments of definite descriptions, both

of these sentences would be dealt with in the same way,

and the truth-value of the sentences would be the same.
In the semantics we have constructed for this fragment,

however,

the two sentences are evaluated differently.

The evaluation of these sentences is somewhat com-

plicated,

due to the fact that in both sentences the sort

of the first existential quantifier is itself a quantified

formula.

In evaluating 3.88”), we must first see if there

are any objects which satisfy the formula "Ax[ king of

France

1

(

x)

!

x=y" in all of the extended valuations relative

to our model.

This in turn requires that we see if there

are any objects which satisfy the formula
(x)" in all of the extended valuations.

"

king of France

This will be the

'
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case only if there are some
objects which are the king of
r ranee;
since there is no (present) king
of France, the
set of g-assignments which satisfies
this formula in all
of the set of extended valuations
will be the null set.
This means that the formula is to
be evaluated using the
second clause of the quantification
evaluation rule, that
is,

the domain of the quantifier will
be all those objects

which satisfy the formula

"

king of France’ (x)" on the

particular extended valuation.

Whether or not there will

be any objects which satisfy this
formula on a particular

extended valuation will depend on how the function
which is
the interpretation of
oha

t

"

king of France

extended valuation.

'

"

is completed on

There are three possibilities we

must consider: either there will be no objects satisfying
the

formula,

formula,

there will be a single object satisfying the

or there will be more than one object satisfying

the formula.

In extended valuations in which no objects satisfy the

formula, every object (vacuously) satisfies the formula
"^xj king of France

'

(x)

n x=y"

on all extended valuations.

Given that there is some object in the model which is bald,
on these extended valuations the sentence as a whole will
be evaluated as having the value

1.
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There will also be extended
valuations in which more
Vhan one object will satisfy
the formula "king of France
:0".
The objects which will do
this are all outside the
sortal range of "king of France’"
but satisfy the formula
oecause of the way the function
which is
'

(

the

interpretation
cing Of France'" is completed
on the extended valuation.
In such a case, no object is
identical to everything which satisfies the formula "
king of France (x)
of

*

.

So we must evaluate the existential
quantifier within the

particular extended valuation.

But we have already seen

that there is no single object on this
type of extended

valuation which is identical to everything which,
on this
extended valuation, is identical to all of the
objects

which satisfy the formula.
bhe
0

So on such extended valuations

sentence as a whole is evaluated as having the value

.

ihe variation of the value of 3 88"
•

in the cases

above is sufficient to show that the sentence is evaluated
as having no truth-value by the supervaluation induced by
the model.

We will look at the third case merely to

illustrate how the semantics works in such cases.
The final possibility concerns extended valuations

in which a single object satisfies the formula "king of
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I^nce'fx)".

On such an extended
valuation, there will be
a single object which
is identical on all
of the extended

valuations to the object which
satisfies the formula on
Shis extended valuation.
The evaluation of sentence
3.88")
on this extended valuation
will depend on whether that
object has a property which
is mapped by the function
which
is the interpretation of
•'bald'" 0 n that extended
valuation
to a property which the
object also has on that extended

valuation.

On some of these extended
valuations the
object Will have such a property
and hence the sentence
will be evaluated as having the
value 1 on
;

others it

will not have such a property and
the sentence as a whole
evaluated as having the value 0
.

Thus we can see that the value of
sentence

3

.

88 ")

-aries from extended valuation to
extended valuation.

Thus

supervaluation induced by a model on which there
is no
present) king of France will evaluate sentence

uhe
v

3.88")

as having no truth-value
The case of 3 89"
•

is somewhat different.

Again, we

must first determine the domain of the existential
quantifier,

so we

first see if there are any objects which sat-

isfy uhe formula

valuations.

’

Axl man

*

x

)

x=y" on all of the extended

To determine this requires that we determine

the range of the universal quantifier in that formula.
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This in turn requires that we
determine if there are any
oo jeers which satisfy the formula
"man'(x)" in all of the

extended valuations relative to the model.

Assuming that

our model has a domain of objects which
includes a number
of men, there will be a number of
objects satisfying that
formula on all of the extended valuations.
But this means
that there will be no object identical to all
of the objects
vvnicn are

of

in the domain of the universal quantifier
on all

the extended valuations.

Nor will there be any obiect

in any particular extended valuation which is
identical
to

all of the objects in the domain of the universal quan-

tifier.
tions,

So on every member of the set of extended valua3

.

89 ")

is evaluated as having the value 0.

Hence

the supervaluation induced by a model with more than one

man in the domain will evaluate 3.89") as a false sentence.
The effect of this is to split the truth-value of

sentences with non-denoting definite descriptions depending
on the cause of the failure of denotation.

If the definite

description fails to denote because of there being no
object in the model which satisfies the description, the
sentence is without truth-value.

If the description does

pick out objects in the model but picks out more than one,
the sentence containing the description as subject is
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evaluated as false.

If we identify lack of
truth-value

with failure of presuppositions (more
on this in Chapter
O, this gives us the result that existence is
presupposed
definite descriptions, while uniqueness
is actually
claimed or entailed by such descriptions.

m

It should be noted that in the above
discussion
of 3.88") we moved from there being no
existing king of

France at this time to there being no object
which is the
.•ving

of France at this time.

This,

however, presupposes

that the only objects that there are are those objects

which exist.

We could have obtained the same result by

saying that the definite description in 3*88) picks out
a unique non-existing object for which all the functions

obtained by applying

"

bald

*

"

to

the intension of one of

that non-existing objects properties were undefined for

that object as an argument.

By taking this approach to

such a sentence, we can begin to apply the semantics we
have developed to the problems of fictional and non-exist-

ent objects, a problem not generally considered to be

connected to the problem of sortal incorrectness.
to

this that we will turn in the next chapter.

It is
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Fo o tno te

°''

— C hapte

III

^and

notior^of

res^mbles^

3

'

McCawley
semantics for his quantification, so
it is difficult tn
h
?n %'?0rre?POnd exactl
y *° the notion
Of restr^cted
d quantification
aLnt?f
given
here.
But
from his
.1^
informalf remarks about the intended
interpretation of his
*
that the unde rlyi£g
Hindd hMs's
v4 to a nd the one presented below intiuions bes system
are the same.
13

"Ter

^ or
those familiar with the workings of a
Montague
style grammar, what follows will at best
be a review.
Such
readers are invited to proceed directly
to the semantics
for the fragment.

CHAPTER

IV

NONEXISTENT OBJECTS
Introduc tion

.

In the last chapter, we
developed a semantics which

utilized truth-value gaps and a
supervaluation approach to
evaluating complex sentences of the
language in order to
account for sentences which are
sortally incorrect. At
-he end of that chapter, we
looked at the results
of

applying that kind of semantics to
definite descriptions
unpacked in a way similar to that advocated

by Russell, and

saw that the results were very different
from those obtained

m

standard theories.

Further, we saw that there are at

least two ways to handle definite descriptions
such as
the one which was the translation of the
phrase
of France

in this iramework.

"the king

One way of handling this

phrase is to say that there is no object which has the

property of being the present king of France, and so the
interpretation of the pnrase is taken to be a function
j.rom

possible worlds and times to objects (or, more accur-

ately,

intensions of objects) which is a partial function

yeilding no defined value for this world and time.
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this approach,

the definite description
fails to denote
because nothing has the property
in question, and in such
a case the sentence "the
king of France is bald" is evaluated as neither true nor false.

However, we noted that our semantics
was open to
another way of treating the sentence
"the king of France
is bald" on which there is
taken to be an object (or,
perhaps, many objects) which have the
property of being
bi.e king of France,
but which are objects which do not
exist.
If there are many of these nonexistint
objects
which have the property, then the definite
description
-ails to denote, but not because there
is no object which

satisfies the description.

In such a case the definite

description in the sentence fails to denote for the same
reason that the definite description in the sentence

"the

man is bald" fails to denote --there are some objects
which
have the property in the description, but there is not a

unique object which has that property.

In such a case, as

in the case with the sentence "the man is bald," the sen-

tence will be evaluated by the semantic system in the last

chapter as having the truth-value false.
hand,

If,

on the other

there is a unique nonexistent object which has the

property of being the king of France (as we assumed in the
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brief discussion of this option in the last
chapter), then
"he sentence "the king of Prance
is bald" will
be

"

a1s

une

’

true,

or !ack a truth-value depending on whether
or not

ooject (which doesn't exist) has the property
of being

bald,

lacks that property,

or is undefined for the inter-

pretation of the predicate "is bald," respectively.
Whether we wish to take definite descriptions such as
"the king of France" to denote nonexistent objects or
to be

descriptions which fail to denote at all is not a question
I

will attempt to answer immediately.

However,

the fact

that we can take such descriptions to denote nonexistent

objects in the semantic system we have developed points
to

another area, distinct from the problem of sortally

incorrect sentences, to which the framework can be applied.
One of the reasons given in Chapter II for preferring the

truth-value gap approach to sortally incorrect sentences
was that such an approach was more general than the other

approaches we were considering in that chapter, and in
that chapter it was noted that truth-value gap semantic

systems were used in attempts to account for such problems
as the semantic paradoxes and the problem of future con-

tingencies.

If we can show that such a semantics is

useful in the solution of problems concerning fictional or
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nonexistent objects, we have
further strengthened our
claim to the general applicability

of such a semantics.

The purpose of this chapter,
pe

then is to show how the

of semantic system developed
in the last chapter to

account for sortally incorrect
sentences can be used to
account ior certain aspects of a
certain type of theory of
nonexistent objects.
The account presented here is
neither
complete nor original.
Much of the foundation
of this

system is based on the Meinongian theory
of nonexistent
objects recently developed by Terence
Parsons
(1974,

1T73).

1975

,

One way of viewing this chapter is to see
it as a

proposal to modify a part of Parsons' theory.

The account

in this chapter is incomplete in that it
does not attempt
to

deal with all of the problems which an adequate
theory

0

fictional objects would reasonably be expected to deal

..

with.
vvill

The language we will use to develop the account
be a first-order language without an abstraction

operator and without relational predicates.

It is not felt

that such a language will be adequate to model a full

blown theory of fictional objects, but that is not the task
of this chapter.

Such a language will suffice to show

how the intuitions behind the account are to be put into

practice in a semantic system, and how such a theory
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interacts with a semantics which can
deal with sortally
incorrect sentences.
That is the modest goal of
this

chapter
-he choice

of Parsons'

theory as a base for the

account of nonexistent objects which will be
presented
here is far from arbitrary.

If nothing else, Parsons'

theory is the most fully worked out semantic
system dealing with nonexistent objects in the recent
philosophical
literature.

His theory also has the following two char-

acteristics, which are necessary components for the type
of system

I

wish to propose.

First, Parsons'

theory

allows for some sentences which are about fictional objects,
such as

Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street

4.1)
to be

true,

the name

and true because there is an object named by

"Sherlock Holmes" which has the property of

having lived at 221B Baker Street.

Secondly, Parsons'

theory allows for there to be objects (among which are
fictional objects) which are what we will call Meinongian
incomplete objects, that is, objects which are in some
sense indeterminate with respect to the having of certain

properties
It will be a consequence of the theory to be developed
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that sentence 4.1)

is true and that some
objects neither

nave nor lack certain
properties.

Since Parsons'

theory

of fictional objects already
has similar characteristics,
his is the theory we will take
as a base for our discussion

If there are other theories
of fictional objects which
have these characteristics, I
believe that the sort of

truth-value gap semantics developed
along the lines of
Parsons’ theory could also be developed
for them.
In this chapter, we will adopt the
following strategy.
»e will first look at the theory
of fictional and nonexis Lent objects developed by Parsons.
We will not develop
ohe

complete theory, but will rather sketch it
in suffic-

ient detail to allow us to see how it works.

We will

then look at an alternative approach based on
similar

metaphysical intuitions but which utilizes a truth-value
gap semantic framework.

When this approach has been

sketched out, we will see how this approach differs from
that 01 Parsons, and how we can fit such an approach into
a

theory which also accounts for sortally incorrect sen-

tences

.

Parsons

'

Theory

.

The theory of nonexistent objects developed by Parsons
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is an attempt to give a
consistent account of objects
along
tne lines sketched out by
Meinong (i960). One of the basic

intuitions behind the theory can be
illustrated in the
.Lollowing wa}
know that there are objects which
.

exist,

and further tha

t

there is a one to one correspondence
be-

tween these objects and certain sets
of properties, namely,
corresponding to every object which exists
is the set of
properties which that object has.
This correspondence
nolds

,

for example, between the object which is
Jimmy

Carter and the set of properties made up of all
the properties Jimmy Carter has.
Given an infinite amount

of time,

we could list all of the objects which
exist and the sets

of properties which correspond in this way to
those objects.

This listing would exhaust the set of existing objects,

but it would not exhaust the set of sets of properties.

For example,

the set of properties consisting of the

properties of being golden and being a mountain (and,
perhaps, some other properties) would not appear on our
listing, for there is nothing which exists which is a

golden mountain.

But,

says Parsons,

there is an object

which corresponds to this set of properties in just the
way Jimmy Carter corresponds to the set of properties had
by Jimmy Carter.

This object is a golden mountain, and it
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is

an example of an object which does not
exist.

Put in an overly simple way, Parsons' theory
tells us
that we have the following set of objects.
of properties you like.

Take any set

There is some object which has

all and only the properties which are members
of that set.
Some of these objects exist while others do not, but
all
of these objects are objects.

When phrased in this simple way, the theory immediately runs into the criticism lodged against Meinong's
theory by Russell (1907).

If any set of properties cor-

responds to some object which has all of those properties,
then consider the set of properties which has as its

members the properties of being golden, being a mountain,
and existing.

If this set corresponds to an object,

it

corresponds to an object which is golden, a mountain, and
exists.

But no golden mountain exists.

So the theory

must be wrong.

Parsons avoids this problem by distinguishing between
two types of properties.

One type of property, which he

calls the nuclear properties, are such that any set of them

corresponds to an object which has all and only those

nuclear properties.

The other type of property, called

by Parsons the extranuclear properties, cannot be used to
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-uild up sets of properties
which correspond to objects.
The properties of being
golden and being a mountain
are
nuclear properties, and so we
can be sure that there is
an object which is a golden
mountain.
But the property
being an existing object is
not a nuclear property.
It
is an extranuclear property,
and the theory is not committed
t0 Saylng that any set
of nuclear and extranuclear
properties corresponds to some object
which has all and only
those properties.
Thus the set of objects is not
in one
to one correspondence with
the powerset of the set of
all properties, but rather in one
to one correspondence
bhe

uh

powerset of the set of nuclear properties.

A natural question to ask at this
point is how do we

determine whether a property is nuclear or
extranuclear?
It is easy enough to give examples of
the two types of

property.

Among the nuclear properties will be such

properties as being red, being hit by Descartes, and being
round.

Among the extranuclear properties will be the

properties of existing, being possible, and being bigger
than a breadbox.

Roughly,

following lines.

If the property in question is one which

the breakdown is along the

everyone agrees is an ordinary property of individuals,
then the property is nuclear.

If,

on the other hand,

the
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property in question is either a comparative
or an example
of a property which some deny is
a property

of individuals

or even a property at all,

nuclear

then that property is extra-

^
.

This decision procedure works for at
least the clear
cases.
No one argues that predicates like "is
red" should
not be interpreted as properties of individuals.
However,

many have argued that the predicate "exists" is
either not

mterpre table as

a

property at all, or if it is it is only

interpre table as a property of concepts or something other
ohan individuals.

>00

on the above decision procedure this

tells us that the predicate "is red" should be interpreted
as a nuclear property, while the predicate "exists" should
be

interpreted as an extranuclear property.
However, no matter how successful our decision pro-

cedure,

it would be nice to have something more.

ically,

it would be nice to have either a definition of

the notions of nuclear and extranuclear property,

Specif-

or at

least a specification of the necessary and sufficient

conditions for a predicate being interpre table as one or
the other.

Parsons does not give a definition of the

notions, and in fact admits that he does not know of any

definition of the notions which is satisfactory.

Nor does
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he ever specify a set of
necessary and sufficient con-

ditions for a predicate being
either nuclear or extranuclear.
He does, however, give the
following test which is
somewhat more satisfactory than
searching the history of
philosophy for controversy concerning
the proper interpretation of a predicate.
It is a thesis of Parsons'
theory that "no nuclear property, F,
satisfies:
(3X)(X is a set of nuclear properties and
F/X and
i

x

p.

i,

)

every member of X then x has F))"(1978,

x nas

19).

Similarly,

it is a thesis of Parsons'

system that no nuc-

lear property is such that there is a set of
nuclear properties which does not include that property and which
is

sucn that every object which has all of the properties
in
that set lacks the property.
0

bviously

,

this test for nuclear or extranuclear

propertyhood will only work if we have a beginning stock
of nuclear properties.

Assuming that we have such a

beginning stock, the test does tell us that the properties
Parsons wants to say are extranuclear are in fact extranuclear.

For example, consider the property of existing

and the set of nuclear properties which is the singleton
set of the property (nuclear property)

of being a unicorn.
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All of the objects which have every
member of that set of

nuclear properties fail to have the
property of existing
'-.or no unicorns exist), and
hence the property

of exist-

ence does satisfy the second of the
tests Parsons proposes
for determining whether a property is
nuclear or extra-

nuclear.

Hence that property cannot be a nuclear
property.

At base, however, the crucial notions of
nuclear and
extranuclear property remain unanalysed and uncharacteri^ed in Parsons'

theory, and no foolproof method is given

±or determining whether a given property is one or
the
other.

This is not a fatal flaw in the theory, for some

terms must be primitive and there is some intuitive backing
for

uhe

distinction.

ite characterization,

It would be nice to have some defin-

however, and this will be discussed

in the revision of Parsons'

theory proposed in the next

section
Once we have (however vaguely) the distinction be-

tween nuclear and extranuclear properties, we can say

what objects there are, what nuclear properties they have,
and what the identity conditions are for those objects.

Given any set of nuclear properties, there will be an
object which has all and only those nuclear properties.
Further, both the laws of the indescernability of identicals
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and the identity of indescernables
holds when restricted
,o nuclear properties.
So x has a nuclear property
if
and onl ^
y has that nuclear property if and only
if
y

‘

0b ^ ects ma y hav ® other

(

extranuclear

)

properties,

but these properties cannot be
used to determine which
objects there are, nor do these
properties play a role in

individuating objects.
3y adding to our stock of objects an object
which has
all and only the properties of any
arbitrary set of nuclear properties, we include in our ontology
objects which
are incomplete.
tha

o

According to Parsons, to say of an object

it is complete is to say that for any nuclear
property

"the object either has that property or it has its
nega-

tion"

(1978,

p.

13

).

of a nac laar property,

Parsons characterizes the negation
p,

as the nuclear property q "which

is had by all and only those existing objects which
don't

have p"

(p.

14).

Given this definition, all existing

oojects are complete.

But there will be nonexisting

objects which are incomplete.

For example, consider the

object which corresponds to the set of nuclear properties
whose only members are the properties of being golden and

being a mountain.

This golden mountain neither has the

property of being blue, nor does it have the negation of
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.hat property.

Hence the object is incomplete.

The theory also allows for there
to be impossible

objects.
1

roundness

For consider the set of nuclear
properties
,

squareness}.

According to the theory, there

is an object which has only these
properties;

Meinong's round square.

Of course,

this is

these properties are

incompatible and therefore no existing object could
have
both of these properties.
But, says Parsons, "that doesn’t

prevent there from being an impossible object which has
them"

(1978,

p.

15 )

Another distinction drawn by Parsons is between objects which are logically closed with respect to their

nuclear properties and those which are not.

This distinc-

tion is just what one would expect--an object is logically

closed if and only if the set of properties had by that
object is logically closed, otherwise the object is not

logically closed.

Existing objects, says Parsons, are all

logically closed, but nonexisting objects need not be.
For example, says Parsons,
...consider the set of properties got by takingall of my properties and replacing "hazel-eyed"
by "non-hazel-eyed ."... there is an object which
has the resulting properties and no others.
This object will be complete but it will not be
logically closed.
For example, it has brownhairdness and it has non-hazel-eyedness but it
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does not. have the nuclear
property of bein^ both
brown-haired-and-non-hazel-eyed.
(1978, p? II-15)
Parsons' theory, as it has been
sketched
.

so far,

allows into its ontology lots
of objects which don't exist,
before going on to sketch his
theory of fictional objects,
it should be noted that there
are some things which

Parsons' theory does not allow
into its ontological realm.
Specifically, Parsons excludes from
the realm of things
which are contradictory objects, that
is, there are no
objects which satisfy any sentence of the
form "(x has P)
and not (x has P)" for any nuclear
property
P.

Some might think that by denying that
there are any

contradictory objects Parsons is in conflict with
his claim
oha

0

there are impossible objects.

After all, Parsons

admits into his ontology objects like the round square
(even though it is an impossible object), and this
appears
to be a likely candidate for the status of contradictory

object, for a round square would seem to be an object

which is both round and not round.

Parsons answers this

objection by noting that the move from saying that the
round square is an object which is both round and square
to saying that it is an object which is both round and not

round relies on the assumption that any object which is
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square is not round.

This move is reasonable enough
if

we restrict our domain of
objects to objects which

exist-

any object which exists and
is square is not round.
BUt that d ^sn't mean that we
can say of any object which
is square that it is not
round, for we have a counterexample to that claim--namely the
round square.
One could
argue that it is a theorem of geometry
that anything which
i° Square 13 not round.
But Parsons argues that geometry
is a theory concerning the
geometrical properties
of

existing objects, and as such cannot be expected
to hold
tor objects like the round square which not
only don't
exist but are impossible

Given the addition of nonexistent objects to the
ontology, Parsons is able to develop a theory of
fictional
oojects.
//hich

By a fictional object here is meant an object

appears in a work of fiction.

Parsons explicitly

restricts his theory to objects in realistic narrative
fiction, although he does at times give hints as to how to

extend the theory to other sorts of fiction.
A preliminary distinction drawn by Parsons is between

what he calls native and immigrant fictional objects.
object is native to a piece or work of fiction if that

object has in some way been created by that piece of

An

287

fiction.

The sense of "creation" used here
is the sense in

which Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes
and Watson.
does not mean that the author brings
it about

It

that there

is such an object,

as the theory of objects underlying

uhis theory of fictional objects holds
that the objects

have always been.

But an object will be native to a work

(or series of works)

of fiction if that work is the source

of information about the object.

Immigrant objects, as the name suggests, are objects
in a work of fiction which in some sense come
from somewhere

else.

In the Sherlock Holmes stories, Holmes and Watson

live in London.

This city is understood to be the real

London, not some city which simply shares the name "London"

with the capitol of England.

So in these stories,

the

city of London is an immigrant object.

Fictional objects can be native to one story and

immigrant in another.

As stated above, Holmes is a native

object in the Conan Doyle stories, but is an immigrant
object in the recent rash of Holmes novels such as The

Seven Percent Solution
Parsons'

.

theory is concerned, for the most part, with

objects of fiction which are native to the stories in
question.

The need for objects to correspond to such
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characters of fiction is shown, Parsons
states, not so
much by the nuclear properties we
ascribe

to those char-

ac ters but because of the
extranuclear properties we

abcnoe

to those characters.

We might,

for example,

think

that we need to have some object
referred to by the name

"Sherlock Holmes" because of the truth of
sentences like
4.2)

Sherlock Holmes was a detective

which are naturally interpreted as saying
that an object,
namely oherlock Holmes, has a certain property,
namely
xhat of being a detective.

But these sorts of truths can

be accounted for by saying that sentences like
4.2)

are

really shorthand for sentences like
4.3)

According to the story, Sherlock Holmes was
a detective

which can be taken to be true even if there is no object

which is referred to by the name "Sherlock Holmes."
The need for some object named "Sherlock Holmes" is

shown, argues Parsons, by true statements about Holmes

which involve extranuclear predicates.

For example, the

sentences
4.4)

Sherlock Holmes does not exist

4.5)

Sherlock Holmes is a better musician than
Travis Magee
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are not true if paraphrased
along the lines of 4
3), for
.

according to the story Holmes
does exist and no mention
of
Travis Magee is ever made
in the Holmes stories.
To
account for the truth of
sentences which attribute extranuclear properties to fictional
objects,
says Parsons, we

must have some object which
either has or lacks the property.

ot.

^arsons sets out, therefore, to
construct a theory
fictional oojects which will accomplish
three goals.

"First," he says,
...we need. a stock of objects from
which to
select the fictional ones ... Second we
need to
h
to tel1
given a body of literature,
"Y\ a
il^icn objects are written about in that
body of
iiterature. .Third, we need to select the
objects
o
iiction
such a way that the theory turns
out to oe consistent with the extranuclear
predications that we make about such obiects
Parsons (1975) p. 78)
,

’

m
:

l

,

xhe first of these goals has already been
accomplished

hot suprisingly, Parsons' Meinongian theory of objects
supplies us with more than enough objects to account for
xhe ones which are native objects in works of fiction.
The second of these objectives can also be accomp-

lished in a fairly straightforward way.
idea is this.
be

Basically,

the

The object named in a work of fiction will

that object which corresponds to the set of nuclear
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properties which the story says the
character has.
only a little more precisely, we
can say that name
out the object

Put
a picks

which corresponds to the set of
nuclear
properties [p: according to the story, a
has
o

p}

The intuition behind this
characterization of which

object is picked out to be,

say, Sherlock Holmes is reason-

ably clear; but it is difficult to say
just what properties
an object has "according to the story."
"Whether
or not

something is true in a story," says Parsons,
-ought to accord with what a normally attentive reader understands to be true in the story.
We can model the origins of such understanding^
as follows: as the reader reads, an account is
cons tructed by extrapolation from the sentences
being read.
The account is modified and expanded
during the reading, and the final result may
be called the maximal account.
Then what is
true in the story is just whatever the maximal
account explicitly says, and nothing else.
The
trick is to get an understanding of the extrapolation process that produces the maximal
account. ..( (1978) p. VII2)
•

•

.

,

Just what extrapolation process we go through in the

construction of a maximal account

is unclear.

Parsons

lists a number of alternatives and shows that none of them
is acceptable.

However, we do in fact seem to be able to

construct maximal accounts from stories, and the common

agreement as

to

what went on in a given story and what

properties a character of that story has can be taken as
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evidence that however we come to
arrive at a maximal
account, we all do it in pretty much
the same way.

Det-

ermining how we go about constructing
maximal accounts
is an important question in
aesthetics and literary

theory,
out it is not a question which will
be addressed here.

Instead, we will simply assume that the
notion is clear

enough to be used, and will assume that it
is understood
for the remainder of the chapter.
Once we have a maximal account, we can determine
which

object is referred to by a name in a work of fiction,
and

what nuclear properties that object has.
aj_so

Further, we can

find out what extranuclear properties are had by the

ob jec t--since we have an object as reference for the name,

we see if the object has or does not have the extranuclear

property in question.

So if we want to determine whether

or not Sherlock Holmes exists, we check and see if the

object named by "Sherlock Holmes" has the extranuclear

property of existence.

Since the object is incomplete

and, according to Parsons, no incomplete object exists,

Holmes doesn't have that extranuclear property.

To see

if Holmes is more famous than any living detective, we

need

to

find out how famous Holmes is and how famous the

most famous living detective

is.

If Holmes is more famous,
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hen he has the
extranuclear proper
+•
proper+v
in question;
uy
if he
then he doesn't
+u
oesn t have
haizo the
property.
To build up a
semantics for discouse
concerning the creatures
of fiction
is also straightforward
(in the simple cases)-a
sentenoe
ascribing a property to
a creature of fiction
is true if
and only if the object
which is that fictional
character
has the property ascribed
to it, and is false
otherwise.
One feature of this
theory which is worth noting
is
the way in which it
handles the truth-value of
sentences
about incomplete objects when
the sentence predicates
of
such an object a property
with respect to which the
object
is indeterminate.
Remember that Parsons distinguishes
"

m

"t

>

between it being false that an
object has a property and
that object having the negation
of that property.
This
distinction does not come into play
with existing objects,
for according to this theory every
existing object is
complete, which in turn means that
every existing object
either has a property or has the
negation of that property
for every nuclear property.
The distinction is
important,

however, when we consider incomplete
objects.

To say of

an incomplete object that it is false
that it has a property is not the same as saying of that
object that it has
the negation of that property.

So,

on the assumption that
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the maximal account
which establishes which
object is
She rlocx Holmes has
nothing to say about
whether or not
Holmes has a mole on his
back,

Parsons'

theory gives us

as true the sentences

4 8)

Xt 1S not the oase tha
-t
Sherlock Holmes has a
mole on his back

H-?)

It is not the oase

'

that Sherlock Holmes has
the

property of not-having-a-mole-on-his-back
But this does not give us a
contradiction, for one can only
move from a sentence of the
form "it is not the case that
a has property P" to the
sentence "a has the property of
nob-P if a names a complete
object.
A final aspect of Parsons'

theory we will look at is

his treatment of definite
descriptions.

Parsons forms

definite descriptions in the usual
way:
you can prefix

if

is a

0

formula,

with "(*x)" to get an expression whioh
is
read as "the thing which is 9."
"The semantical account
of these definite descriptions," says
Parsons,
9

.is to be about as commonsensical as
possible, namely, (7x)e refers to the unique object
thau satisfies 0
if there is one, and otherwise
l?xj9 just doesn't refer at all
1978
p. V23
.

.

,

.

.

(

)

,

In real life situations, according to Parsons,
we must

often represent definite descriptions used in
English in
a non-obvious fashion in our formal language.

For example,
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if someone were to use the
definite desoription "the man
in the doorway
we would not want to
represent this description in our formal language
as " ?x) (Mx&Dx) " for
this
,

definite description would not
pick out a unique individual.
To 0 ee this all that is
necessary is to remember
fhat there are a great number
of objects which have the
property of being men and being in
the doorway but which
are also such that they do not
exist.
In everyday

speech,

says Parsons,

"the man in the doorway" is really
used as

ohorthand for the definite description
"the existing man
the doorway," a description which
would be represented
in our formal language as something
like " ? x E x&Mx&Dx
In our everyday speech, says Parsons,
the context makes
it clear that we are concerned only with
objects which

m

(

) (

!

)

exist
The

truth-conditions for sentences with definite

descriptions supplied by Parsons is just what one would
expec t--a sentence saying of the
is true

9

that it has property P

if there is a unique object satisfying

has P, and the sentence is false otherwise.

9

which

Note that on

this specification of truth conditions all non-denoting

definite description
false

containing simple sentences are

"
.

295

This way of forming
definite descriptions works
fine
existing objects, but makes
it very difficult to
refer
to many nonexisting
objects by the use of such
definite
descriptions.
For example, suppose we
want to refer to
the nonexistent object
whose only nuclear properties
are
roundness and squareness.
The natural way of doing
this
would be to use the
description "the round square."
But
this definite description
will fail to refer uniquely
on
the semantic analysis given
above, for there are all
sorts
of nonexisting objects which
have the nuclear properties
of roundness and squareness.
We can’t even get unique

reference to the object we want
to refer to by expanding
the description with other
properties that the object has,
for the object we want to refer
to only has
those two

nuclear properties.

We might be able to get the
right

object oy adding extranuclear properties,
but it would
be nice if we could take some other
route.
To take care of this sort of case,

Parsons introduces

a special sort of definite description
operator, which he

calls the Meinongian use of "the."

This sort of definite

description is formed by prefixing a formula,
(

mx

)

*

9,

with

Parsons proposes that such a description refer
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to

"'minimum' of the objects
which satisfy
he unpacks as
0

'

a notion

9

^

C
Sa t ^ S:^^ es 9
en (mx )9
refers^ tn tha°^^
^-u
°^^ eCu
w
hose
nuclear
,,
properties
a rp
u
’

4.

b

(mx)e

^ir^ectr^hh

Jec ? satlsfles e then
refers +n
+h
to the
null object. ..( (I978)
p.

h

f

,

By using this Meinongian
description operator, we
Pick out the object which has
only the properties
ness and squareness by the
use of the phrase "the
square" as long as we understand
the "the" in the
tion as the Meinongian "the."
This sketch of Parsons'

V31)

can
of round-

round

descrip-

theory is far from complete,

but it does show some of the
intuitions which serve as the
base for that system and how
Parsons accounts for those
intuitions.
We will now turn to a sketch
of a theory of

nonexistent objects which attempts to
account for those
same intuitions in a semantic framework
like

that developed

in the last chapter to account for
sortally incorrect

sentences

A Modest Proposal

Parsons'

theory of fictional and nonexistent objects

is at base a metaphysical theory.
be

.

The modest proposal to

sketched in this section is an attempt to develop a
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semantic theory of sentences
concerning fictional and
nonexistent objects in the
framework of the semantic
theory
for sortally incorrect
sentences which will be
based, as
as possible, on Parsons’
metaphysical theory.
Of
course, one can’t completely
separate semantic and metaphysical theories, as the
job of a semantic theory
is to
tie together language
and the world, while the
job of a
metaphysical theory is to say
what things
there are in

that world.

The goal in this section
is

to

change the

semantic system for sentences
about fictional objects while
retaining as much of the metaphysical
theory as possible.
-he major change in the
semantic framework will be in
the treatment of sentences
which predicate of an incomplete
object a property for which that
object is indeterminate.
In the theory given by Parsons,

as false.

such sentences are evaluated

In the semantic framework we
will develop,

such

sentences will be evaluated as being
neither true nor
false.

So,

for example, while Parsons' theory gives
us

the result that the sentence

4.10)
io false,

Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his back
as the object which is Sherlock Holmes is
indeter-

minate with respect to the property of having a
mole on his
back,

the semantics we will give in this section will
say
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tnat the sentence is neither
true nor false.
Why say that 4 10 is neither
true nor false? On an
intuitive level, the reasoning
is something like this.
Sherlock Holmes is an incomplete
object, incomplete because
there are some properties
with respect to which Holmes
is
indeterminate.
Nowhere in the maximal account
which tells
US the nuclear properties
had by Holmes is it ever specified that Holmes has the
property of having a mole on
his back or does not have that
property.
’

>

According to

Parsons'

theory,

the author.

this is not an oversight on the
part of

It isn’t that the object which
is Sherlock

Holmes either has the property or lacks
the property, and
the author simply forgot to tell
us.
The object which is
Holmes is really indeterminate in respect

to this property.

But to say that sentence 4.10) is false
seems to be telling
us something determinate about the
relation between the

object which is Holmes and the property of
having a mole
on ones back.

To say that 4.10)

is false seems to say

chat Holmes does not have the property.

The basic intuition behind saying that sentences like
4.10) are neither true nor false is this.
40

We are going

take the intuition that incomplete objects are indeter-

minate with respect to certain properties seriously, so
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seriously in fact that we
will hold that we can
say
determinate about the
relationship between such
an object
and a property with
respect to which the
object is indeterminate
Of course,

this line of reasoning
does not prove
that we must add truth-value
gaps to a semantics for
sentences about incomplete objects.
To see this, we need
only
realize that the above
reasoning assumes that saying
that
false that an object has
a property is saying something determinate about the
relationship between that
object and that property.
Parsons' theory denies this

introducing the distinction between
sentence negation
and property negation.
Recall that Parsons' theory tells
us that while 4.10) is false,
the sentence
,/

4.11)

Sherlock Holmes has the property
of not-havinga-mole-on-his-back

is also false.

The incompleteness of the object
which is

Holmes consists of Holmes neither
having the property of
having-a -mole -on-his -back nor having the
negation of that
property, which we have phrased as the
property of nothaving-a -mole- on-his -back
To say something determinate
.

about Holmes with respect to these properties
would be,
on Par sons'

theory,

to say that Holmes had one of these two
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properties.

Saying that it is false
j-ai.se that he
ho has
h
one only
entails that he has the
other if Holmes were an
existing
.°r at least a complete)
object, which he is not.
Accord
in g to Parsons' theory,
Holmes lacks both the
property in
question and the negation
of that property.
:

This sort of move should
ring some bells; it is
analogous to that made by
Bergmann when she distinguishes
oetween internal and external
negation in her account of
serially incorrect sentences.
The advantage of a semantics which utilizes truth-value
gaps is the same here as
it was there.
By introducing truth-value
gaps and saying
that sentences like 4.10) are
neither true nor false, we
can ao away with the distinction
between sentence negation
and predicate negation, thus
simplifying our semantic
system

Another motivation for using a
truth-value gap semantics for a Parsons style account
of fictional and non-

existent objects can be demonstrated by
looking at Parsons'
discussion of theoretical entities.
"One of the most distinctive aspects of theoretical entities,"
says Parsons,

.is that they seem to be incomplete, in
the
sense that for most mundane predicates it
doesn't
make sense to either apply the predicate to
them
apply its negation. We don't debate whether or or
not a neutrino loves Mary, or whether the element
.

.
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with atomic number
79 is irmcro^
mobile.
auto "
This suggests that
h
ret
Cal
may be analysed within
entities
i
+hp\h
0tS &S
incomplete ob jects
( ( io 78 ?‘
.

.

.

^4imof

Parsons goes on to argue
that the senselessness
of sentences like
4.12)

A neutrino loves
Mary

should not be accounted
for in a theory of fictional
oojects which I think is
correct.
Sentence 4.12)
,

is a

serially incorrect sentence,
and should be accounted
for
in a theory of sortal
incorrectness.
What I think is
important, however, is the
intuition had by those who

think
that sentences like 4.12)
could be accounted for in a
theory of fictional objects.
The intuition, I take it,
is
that the same sort of thing
is going on when we predicate
of an incomplete object a
property with respect to which
that object is indeterminate as
is going on when we predicate of an object a property
for which the object is of
the

wrong sort.

This intuition, when coupled with
the

theory of sortally incorrect sentences
we have presented
earlier, leads to the conclusion that
sentences which

predicate of an incomplete object a property
with respect
ro which that object is indeterminate
results
in a sen-

tence which is neither true nor false.

302

Again,

these considerations do
not prove that we must
handle
° f none * is
objects within a semantic
framewhich allows for sentences
which are neither true
nor
false.
However, they do provide
us with some motivation
for seeing what such a
treatment would be like. We
will
now turn to sketching such
a treatment.
The goal is to
lit a theory based on the
metaphysical intuitions of
Parsons into a truth-value gap
semantics.

^t

We Wl11 be & ln b
y saying what objects there are and

what nuclear properties those
objects have.
Like Parsons,
we will do this by establishing
a correspondence between
the set of objects and something
else.
The correspondence
we //ill use is not between
the set of objects and
the

of sets of nuclear properties
however,

set

since we want to

capture a distinction between an object
lacking a property
and an object being inde terminate
with respect to that
property.

partial

x

We do this by correlating the objects
with

unctions from nuclear properties to truth-values.

Given any partial function from nuclear properties
to
truth-values, we will say that there is an object which
has all of the nuclear properties mapped by that partial

function to the truth-value true, and which lacks all of
the nuclear properties mapped by that partial function
to
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the truth-value false,

and which is indeterminate
with
respect to all the nuclear
properties for which that parrial function yeilds no defined
value.
This tells us what
objects there are, and also tells
us which nuclear properties those objects have, which
they lack, and which they
neither have nor lack.
Of course

,

if we wish to maintain a
correlation be-

tween objects and sets, we could do
so.

The set which

would be correlated to the set of
objects would be the set
of all ordered pairs of the form
<A,B> where A and
B are

disjoint sets of nuclear properties.
be
B

Intuitively, A would

the set of nuclear properties had by
the object, while

would be the set of nuclear properties lacked
by the

object.

Nuclear properties which are not members of the

union of A and 3 would be nuclear properties
for which the
object is indeterminate.

Our semantic treatment of sentences which say of an

object that it has a property will be just what one would
expect.

Such a sentence is true if the object has the

property, false if the object lacks the property, and

neither true nor false if the object neither has nor lacks
(is indeterminate with respect to)

that property.

Notice

that we are now allowing sentences which are not sortally
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incorrect to lack a truth-value.

But this possibility is

already built in to the semantics
we gave in the last
chapter for sortally incorrect
sentences.

All that seman-

tics required was that all simple
sortally incorrect sentences be evaluated as being
neither true nor false.
It
did not require that all sentences
which are not sortally

incorrect be evaluated as either true
or false.
By making a three-way distinction
between an object
having a property, lacking a property, and
being indeterminate with respect to a property, we can do
away with
Parsons’ notion of the negation of a property.
longer,

erty

oe

We no

for example, need to distinguish between the proping ascribed to Holmes in the sentences

^.10)

Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his back

4.13)

Sherlock Holmes does not have a mole on his
back

saying that 4.10) ascribes one property to Holmes and that
4.13) ascribes to Holmes the negation of that property,

which is a separate nuclear property related to the first
only in that all existing objects having one of them fail
to have
to be

the other.

We can now say what seems intuitively

the case, namely that 4.10) says that Holmes has some

property, and 4.13) says that Holmes lacks that very
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property,

since Holmes is indeterminate
with respect to
the property of having
a mole on his bach,
neither of these
sentences is either true
or false.
Further, since we will
be evaluating complex
sentences using a supervaluation
semantics, it will turn out
that the sentence
b.lb) Either Sherlock
Holmes has a mole on his
back
or Sherlock Holmes does
not have a mole on his
back
Will be evaluated as true,
4.10)
to me,

nor 4 13
.

)

in spite of the fact that
neither

has a truth-value.

But this,

it appears

is the correct thing to say.

netting rid of the distinction
between an object not
having a property and that object
having the negation of
tnat property does require that we
come up with some new

characterization of the notion of an
incomplete object.
Parsons defines an incomplete object
as one for which there
is a property, p, such that the
object does not have property p nor does the object have the negation
of the property
p.
Since we have done away with the notion of
the nega-

tion of a property,

this characterization will no longer

do

How,

then, are we to characterize an incomplete object?

The intuition seems pretty clear--an object is
incomplete
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if that object neither
has nor lacks some property.

We

mlght try t0 Capture this
intuition by saying that an
ooject, 0, is incomplete if
and only if there is some
formula of the form -Pn»Pxwhich is such that object o
does not satisfy that formula.
Unfortunately, this will
because we will be using a
supervaluation semantics,
which every object satisfies every
formula of the form
"Pxv~Px," even when the object does
not satisfy either
"Px” or "~Px."
The solution to this problem
appears to be fairly

straightforward.

We want to say that an object is
incom-

plete if and only if there is some nuclear
property such
that saying of that object that it has
that property

results in a sentence which is neither true
nor false.
Since saying of an ooject that it has a
property with

respect to wnich that object is indeterminate yeilds
a
sentence which is without truth-value, this charac terizauion appears to capture our intuition concerning
incom-

plete objects.

Unfortunately, this characterization leads to the un-

acceptable conclusion that most, if not all, existing
objects are incomplete.

For example, consider the existing

object Terence Parsons, and the nuclear property of being
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Prime

Since Parsons is not the
right sort of object to
be
prime, the sentence
"Terence Parsons is prime"
is serially
incorrect and so, on the
semantics given in the last
chapter, neither true nor fai <,,
laise.
So on the
above characterization of what it is for
an
k
n nhipn+
object to be
incomplete,
Terence Parsons is an incomplete
object.
.

The problem we have come
up against is this.
we say that an object
is incomplete,

When

we are not merely

saying that the object neither
has nor lacks some property
or other.
An incomplete object is one
which neither has
nor lacks some property, but
that property must be one
for which the object is of the
right sort to either have
or lack.
That Parsons neither has nor lacks
the property
of being prime should not count
against his being
a com-

plete object, for that property is
one we never expected
Parsons to either have or lack.
If Parsons neither
had

nor lacked the property of having a mole
on his back, we

want to say that he was an incomplete object,
for

'would

is

.he

he

right sort of thing to either have or lack that

property.
It is because of considerations of the sorts of
objects

which can have or lack certain properties that we would be
led to the conclusion that all existing objects are incom-
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plete in the sense given
above.

To be complete in
this

sense requires that an
object either have or lack
both the
property of being prime and
the property of being six
feet
tall.
But existing objects of the
right sort to be prime
are not of the right sort
to be six feet tall, and
existing
objects which are of the right
sort to be six feet tall are
not of the right sort to be
prime.
So all existing objects
would be incomplete.
It should be noted that since
we have said that there
is an object corresponding
to any partial function from

nuclear properties to truth-values,
there will be an object
which has both the property of being
prime and the property of being six feet tall.
But such an object can
reasonably be considered to be an impossible
object in
Parsons' sense, that is, it is an object
which is such that
it is not possible for it to exist.

A theory which

accepts into its ontology round squares should not
feel

uncomfortable with also accepting into its ontology tall
primes

Returning to the problem of characterizing the notion
of an incomplete object,

it appears that we must limit

our original intuition concerning what makes an object

incomplete.

We do not want to say that an object is
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incomplete if it merely
fails to have or lack
some prepay, for then sortal considerations
give us the result
Chat most if not all
existing objects are
incomplete. What
makes the object Sherlock
Holmes incomplete is
not that
it neither has nor
lacks properties for
which it is of
the wrong sort, but
rather that it neither
has nor lacks
properties for which it is
nf
~
ls 01
correct
sort.

This

points to the way in which
we will characterize
incomplete
Objects in this theory.
We will say that an
object, o, is
incomplete if and only if
there
re ls
J
is aa nnn1oa
nuclear property, p,
such that o is of the ii
risrht
snr+ to have or lack
& nx sorw
p but
Which is such that o neither
has nor lacks

^

p.

Given the stock of objects
provided by the set of
partial functions from nuclear
properties to truth-values
we will pick out the
fictional objects (or, at least,
the
native fictional objects 2 using
a method similar to that
used by Parsons.
Again, in determining which
object is
named by, say, "Sherlock Holmes,"
we must first construct
)

a maximal account for the
IS a native

object.

stories in which Sherlock Holmes

The object which is Sherlock Holmes

will be the object which corresponds
to the partial function which maps a nuclear property to
true just in case,

according to the maximal account, Sherlock
Holmes has that
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property; maps a nuclear
property to false just in
case
according to the maximal
account Sherlock Holmes
does not
that property; and is
undefined for all other
nuclear
properties
.Vith

this as background, we
will now turn to the construction of a semantics for
a language which
includes
both sortal factors and
names of nonexistent and
fictional
objects.
As stated before, the point
is not to' give a
complete theory of fictional
objects, but rather to show
how one would go about
constructing such a theory within
the framework of the type
of semantics supplied in
the

previous chapter.

We will,

therefore, give a semantics

for a simple, firso order language
which includes only
monadic predication.
The vocabulay of our language,
L*,

following.

consists of the

We have as terms of the language
an infinite

number of names,

,a

2

,a^

variables, x-^x^x^,...
kinds of predicates:

,

.

.

;

and an infinite number of

The language will contain two

the nuclear predicates P.,P
^

-L

and the extranuclear predicates E!,

,

;

0

£

,

q

,

.

.

J

ln

the vocabulary of the language includes the

standard logical connectives of ~,&,v,- r
sign =;

J

4

Qr
1.

addition,

p

the

—

the

identity

(sorted) quantifiers V and A; and (,),[, and

1.
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The set of formulas of
L* will be the smallest
set S* such
that
4 15>
'

.lo)

lKl,j

lf 1 is a

Plicate

0"

7 a

^2 anc

^

If a,

i erm

(nuclear or extranuclear)
of L *,

are terms of L*,

8

then "2a"€S^

then "a=(3"£S*

if 4,f)'€S* and u a variable
of L|,

"(e&9
(Au[

)
•

^

"(f)v9

"

1

(

^

'

)

)

"
,

)

"

"(e-o

•

)"
t

"(£,„£,

then
)

..

.

and "(Vu[]q~|(8 ))"€S^'
,

As usual,

the sentences of L* will be
all those formulas
in which no variable occurs
free.
A model of L* will be an
ordered fourtuple M=

<D

,

,

g

S V>

where

,

a)

D (the domain of objects)

b)

D

e

is a nonempty set

(the domain of existing objects)

is a subset

of D
c)

S

(the sortal specification)

is a function from

predicates of L* to subsets of D
d)

V (the interpretation)

is a function from names

and predicates of L* such that
i)

if a is a name of L*,

ii)

if 1 is a (nuclear or extranuclear) predicate
°f L

2

{T,F'-

’

v

W

V(a)€D

7S a partial function from D to

such that for all o€D,

if (V(2))(o)
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is defined,

then o€S(3E)

The set of extended
valuations of L* relative
to a
Todel M=<D,D ,S,V>, if wl
be the set „ f all
e
fivetup] es

n

_

I-<D,D

e

,S

a)

,

D

V,V’> such that
D

and v are the same domain
of objects,
domain of existing objects,
sortal specification,
and interpretation specified
’

S

e’

’

in M

b)

is a function from partial
functions from D to
1
lT.F to full functions from D
to {T,F} such that,
^

-

if f is in the domain of V’
and o€D and f(o)

defined,

then

(

V* <f )

) (

o)=f

(

is

o)

Let g be an assignment of values
to variables relative to a model M defined in the
usual way.
We can
define the value of a formula 9 of L*
on an extended valuation I relative to a model M and an
assignment g, written
as

4.13)

if

has the form "la", where I is a predicate

9

and a a name, then
if

has the form

9

and x a variable,
4.20)

if

iff

1
(

9

IEx"

then

,

'

g =(

where
1

(9

has the form "(~9')",

9

)

9
(

'

”^=F

Similarly for &,v,-,--

;

(v(l)

’

IE

)

)

y( a )

)

is a predicate

g =(V (V(I)

then (9)

otherwise (9)^’^=F

d

)

)

’^-T

(g(x)
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4.21)

n

IS of the form
"Vu[e

9

if G-i S

g'

;

•

]

(

9 »

)

thgn

..
,

is an assignment
of values

to variables which
differs from g in at
most the value assigned
to u and which is

such that
then
that
h)

(

9

X

1

(9

'

)

,g

'=T for all

4-u^
t iif
i -p-p
there

)

(e'')

I,g

'

= T;

is some g*GG such

otherwise (,)I.g =P

if G (as deflned
above) =0,

’

I'ti+M,

then

I '§

=T
iff there is some g'
assignment of values
to variables which
differs from g in at
most the value assigned
to u such that
I 'S'
(9
=T
d
-1; otherwise
'

(

9

)

)

J

1
(

’

0

Similarly for A
1-22)

if

9

is of the form
"a=B”,

iff V*(„)

is V*(6),

then

(9

X
)

'S=t

where V- ls a function

from terms of L* to D such
that, if a is a
name of L*
and if-p a is a variable
2’ V*( n =V( n
)

of L*,
^e

V*(a)=g(a)

i

;

otherwise

(

9

)^»S-p

now define the value of a
formula of

9

of L* on

the supervaluation induced
by a model M and an assignment
of values to variables
M
g, denoted (9) *’S, as

4.23)

(9)

M ,g
= T iff

(9

T 'S
)

=t for a

n

I€I +.
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(e)

(e)

M

iff

1
(

0

’

s_ F for
all I€I +

M* g
is undefined otherwise.
,

,

will say that a formula
9 of
1 L*
true
is ^
rue on a model M
^2 ls
M
*>g
i! and only if ( 9
=T flor a11
n S assignments of values
to variables relative
to M, false if and only
if (,)M*.g =p
for all g assignments
of values to variables
relative to M,
and undefined otherwise.
Je

)

This semantics gives us a
framework for our account
of nonexistent and fictional
objects,

overly general fashion.

but is stated in an

To more closely capture
the in-

tuitions and features we sketched
earlier, we need to add
some conditions a model M must
satisfy if it is to be considered as a candidate for being
an intended interpretation
of the language L*.
The first condition we will
impose is designed to

insure that we get a sufficient
number of objects in the
domain, and that those objects have
the right nuclear

properties.

The intuition we want to capture is
that

there is an object corresponding to any
partial function

from nuclear properties to truth-values
which has the

nuclear properties mapped by that partial function
to true
and lacks those nuclear properties mapped by
that partial
junction to false.

To

insure this, we require that for
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a model M to be a
possible intended
interpretation, M
-st be such that for every
partial function f f rom
the

range of V restricted
to the set of nuclear
predicates to
set l T,F 1 there is an
o€D such that (V(P
n ))(o)=
f(V(P ))
The second requirement
has to do with the
interpretation of the first of our
extranuclear predicates, "Eh'.
This predicate is intended
to be interpreted as
the extra-

nuclear property of existence.

We therefore require just

What one would expect, namely,
that if M is a possible intended interpretation, V(E!)
be a function such that
for
all o€D, (V(E!
0 = t if and only if 0
€D
)

) (

)

6

The third requirement we
will lay down on intended

interpretations also has to do with
the way the model
treats the extranuclear predicate
"E

!

"

One of the things

that a model must tell us about
that predicate is what
its sortal range is, and it seems
reasonable to require
that the sortal range of the existence
predicate be the

entire domain of objects.

This amounts to saying that

any ooject is the sort of thing which can
sensibly be said
uO either exist or not exist.
To capture this,
we require

of an intended interpretation that the
sortal specification
S

of that model be such that S(E!)=D.
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In fact,

at is reasonable
to combine the
requirements

stated above concerning
the interpretation
and sortal range
on the existence
predicate into an even
stronger requirement on intended
interpretations.
The idea behind this
requirement is simply that
every object is such that
it
either has or lacks the
extranuclear property of
existence.
o object is of
the wrong
sort tn
6 borx
u0 have the property,
and
no object is indeterminate
with respect to that
property.
This is not quite captured
by the two requirements
r,

we have

laid out above, but it can
be captured by requiring
that
any intended interpretation
be such that V(E!) be a
total
-unction from D to [T,F"f such that,
for any o€D, ( V(E ) (
o
= T if and only if 0 €D
!

.

e

That the intended interpretation
of the existence
predicate is a total function rather
than a partial
± unction differentiates
this predicate from nuclear predicates like "is blue" or "is prime"
in an interesting
'Vay.

This differentiation becomes even
more interesting

when we look at other extranuclear
predicates and the
sortal ranges of those predicates.
'jtfhen

Parsons first introduces the distinction between

nuclear and extranuclear predicates and properties,
he
gives as examples of extranuclear predicates
"exists,"
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"is mythical,"

ble

’"

"

someone

"i s fictional
notional,

1S th ° USht

ab0ut

^

is possible,"

Melnong,"

and "is oomplete"
((1978),

"

"

is impossi _

is worshipped by
i7.

I8 )
When we
look at this list and
ask about the sortal
ranges of the
various predioates, one
fact is striking-all
of these
predicates are such that we
can predicate them of any
object without producing a
sentence which is serially
incorrect.
To say this in another
way, all of the paradigm
extranuclear predicates listed
by Parsons are such that
their sortal range is all
objects.
If we look at some
paradigm nuclear predicates,
such as "is blue," "is tall,"
or "is kicked by Socrates,"
we can see that all of them
are such that their sortal
range is not all objects but
only a proper subset of the set
of all objects.
This
makes it appear that in bringing
together our theory of
p.

.

sortally incorrect sentences and
Parsons' theory of fictional and nonexistent objects, we
have provided a way of
distinguishing between nuclear and extranuclear

predicates.

The nuclear predicates appear to be
those with limited

sortal range, while the extranuclear predicates
are those
whose sortal range includes all objects.

Unfortunately, one type of extranuclear predicate acts
as a counterexample to this claim.

Parsons categorizes
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comparative predicates such as
"being taller than" as
extranuclear.
The sortal range of such
predicates is not
the entire domain of
objects (or,
in this case,

the entire

domain of ordered pairs of
objects), for example, the
number seven is not the right
sort of thing to either have
or lack the property of
being taller than Richard Nixon,
bo if comparatives are really
extranuclear predicates, the
method of distinguishing between
nuclear and extranuclear
predicates based on the sortal range
of such predicates
will not work.
But are comparatives really extranuclear
predicates?
Parsons admits that such a classification
bothers

him, but

gives the following evidence for the
classification:
taller than" were a nuclear predicate,
then I could not be taller than Hercule
Poirot.
For Hercule Poirot does not exist, and so I
would
not have the property, being-taller-than-Poirot
And. since I do not occure in any of the
Agatha
Christie novels Poirot would not have the property, being-such-that-Parsons-was-taller-than-him
bo on both counts, Poirot and I would not be related by the taller than relation.
If "taller
than" were nuclear, anyway.
But Poirot is very
short, and I am at least of average tallness,
so doesn t this establish that I am taller than
him?.
((1978)
p. VI21)
*

'

*

.

.

,

.

,

The argument here is basically the following.

Existing

objects are never related to nonexisting objects by

nuclear relations.

But existing objects and nonexisting
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°^

9CtS are related

V

comparative relations.

So compar-

a.i/e relations are
extranuclear
I±

“

hl ° 1S thS Case

'

then our wa y of
distinguishing

bStWeen nUCl8ar and ex
tranuclear predicates on
the basis
of sortal range will
not work.
But this argument for
the
extranuclear status of
comparatives rests on the
assumption that comparatives
are rplafi
relations „among objects.
This
assumption is open to question.
,

.

Parsons notes that "there is
a lot of evidence
that
comparatives are much more complex
than they might seem
at first," and that "both
philosophers and linguists have
proposed that comparatives are
the surface forms of fairly
complex 'deep structures '"(
( 1978 )
p. VI22).
He goes on
,

to

mention one account of comparatives
which, he says,
S
h nS
this: " x is taller than
"
V 'meanI "x°has a certain quantity,
u, of tailness and y
l has
ha
less
a certain quantity, v,
of tallness, ana u exceeds v"
(1978
VI22)
,

.

.

.

(

)

p

If this

analysis of comparatives is on the
right track,
it supplies us with a way of
avoiding the counterexample
comparatives appear to provide to our way
of differentia uing nuclear from extranuclear
predicates on the basis of

the sortal range of such predicates.

For the distinction

cetween nuclear and extranuclear predicates
is intended
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SPPly

° nly

t0 Predicates which
denote properties or

relations among objects.

On the above sort of
analysis

ci comparatives,

comparatives do not denote
properties
or relations among objects,
but rather denote properties
or relations among properties
of objects.
Thus to say
that Parsons is taller than
Hercule Poirot is not to say
That there is some nuclear
relation between an existing
object and a nonexisting object,
but rather to say that
there is a relation between a
property had by an existing
object and a property had by a nonexisting
object.

These

properties both exist, so there is no
violation of the
principle that no nuclear relation can hold
between the
existing and the nonexisting. Further, there

is no reason

hold on this sort of analysis that comparatives
are
either nuclear or extranuclear
The sorts of things which
are nuclear or extranuclear are properties
and relations
to

.

among objects, not properties and relations among
properties.

We might want to extend the distinction to proper-

ties and relations among properties, and if we did,

I

see nothing problematic about saying that comparatives are

relations among properties which are nuclear relations.
But if comparatives are not predicates which denote

relations among objects, how can it be that some sentences
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using comparative
predicates are sortally
incorrect? After
all, this discussion
originated because of the
problem
caused by the number seven
not being the right

sort of
thing to either have or
r lar'ic
lack the comparative
property of
being taller than Richard
Nixon.
Doesn’t
uoesn t thi,
this require that
.

•

comparatives be interpreted
eipiemec sc;
a +
as relations
among objects?
i

I

do,,

t think so.

If we unpack comparatives
in the

way sketched out above,
part of what is being said
when
we say that the number
seven is taller than Nixon is
that
the number seven has a certain
quantity of height. But
the number seven is not
the right sort of thing to have

any quantity of height.

The sortal incorrectness of
such

a sentence would be explained
along this line without

saying that comparatives are relations
among objects.
If this explanation for why
comparatives are not

properties or relations among objects is
at all persuasive,
then we have reason to deny that
comparative predicates are
not nuclear predicates.
If we have reasons for saying
that comparatives are not extranuclear then
,

we can offer

the

following as a characterization for what predicates
are
nuclear and what predicates are extranuclear:
^•24)

A predicate P is nuclear if and only if the

sortal range of P is a proper subset of the

set of all objects
4 25
.

)

A predicate P is
extranuclear if and only if
the sortal range of P
is the set of all

objects
itfhe

„her or not this method
of distinguishing nuclear
from

extranuclear predicates will
give the correct results
in
cases of complex predicates
or predicates formed by
the
use of an abstraction
operator or comprehension
axiom is
a question beyond the
scope of this
chapter.

It does work
in the proper way to
differentiate the predicates used
as

examples by Parsons to introduce
and give intuitive backing
to the distinction.
It also shows an interesting
interrelation between the theory of
sortal incorrectness and
Parsons' theory of nonexistent and
fictional
objects.

Finally, let us turn to some examples
and see how
the semantic system given for L*
works.
Translating the
predicate "lived at 221B Baker Street" as
"P ", the pred1
icate "has a mole on his back" as "P ",
and
2

"Sherlock Holmes" as "a
4.1)

"

1

,

the name

the sentences

Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street

4.10) Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his back

w ill translate into the language L*
as
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Since the maximal account
which establishes which
nuclear
properties are had by Holmes
tells us that

he does have the

property of having lived at
221B Baker Street, sentence
4-1
Wl11 be evalua "ted as true.
Since that maximal
account says nothing about
whether or not Holmes has a
mole on his back, sentence
4.10') will be evaluated as
neither true nor false.
Further, the translation
)

of the

sentence
^•13)

Sherlock Holmes does not have a mole
on his
back

will simply be 4.10’) prefixed with
the negation sign.
That sentence will also be evaluated
as being neither true
nor false
Since we started this chapter with a
question of how
we should treat definite descriptions,
we should see how
the semantics treats a sentence like

4.26)

The king of France is bald

Transla ting the predicate "is the king of France" as "P "
Q

and the predicate "is bald" as "P^" and using the analysis
of definite descriptions utilized in Chapter III,

sentence can be translated into L* as
4*26'

Vy[Ax[P x3x=y](P^y)
3

this
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this is how we trarmln+o
+w
translate the
sentence into L* the
sentence will be evaluated
as false.
Since there will be
.any nonexistent objects
which have the property
of being
the king of France,
there will
will not k
be a unique object
which
property.
Since, on our treatment
of definite
,

descriptions, a definite
description which fails to
have
a unique reference
results in a sentence which
is false
(ln the Case of sil :)le
"i
sentences), this reading of
the
sentence makes 4.26) false.
However, we could follow
Parsons and say that whenever anyone uses a definite
description like that in 4.26),
that person is actually using
it as shorthand for something
like "the existing king of France."
If this is
the case,

th e n 4.26)

4.26")

should be translated into L* as

Vy[Ax[E x&P x]x=y]
:

3

(

4

x)

Since there is no object (existing
or nonexisting) which
is an existing king of France,
this sentence will be

evaluated (for reasons spelled out in the
last chapter)
as being neither true nor false.
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,

U le

S

ffiParaUveS is somewhat
P
that comparatives are
5 f ° r Saying
extranuclear^n^wheTh
hether or not
those reasons are sufficient
"
de 1
discussed later in
the chapter.

counter-I„?uiUve ?

?L

^o\f r

2

™

The distinction between
_
j
+i im a
d lmmi grant objects
one of the many feature nf
?
rSOns theor y which we
will ignore herp not bPn«,%o
n °? lmportant but
because of the desire to
keen
keep things
th? n
as simple as possible
.

is

>

^
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CHAPTER

v

GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS
Introduc ti nn
Thus far in this work, we
have seen a fairly detailed
proposal for the semantics of
serially incorrect sentences,
and have considered a
suggestion for how the mechanisms
used in that account can be
used to elucidate and modify
a theory of nonexistent
and fictional objects.
In this
final chapter, we will step
back from the formal presentation, and attempt to tie up
some loose ends, say some
things about the general picture
of language painted by
this account, and say where we
might wish to apply these
techniques next.
In the first section of this
chapter, we will return

momentarily to the problem of sortally
incorrect sentences.
The question which will be discussed
in this section
is

a basic

one

— g iven

the semantic account of sortally incor-

rect sentences presented in Chapter III, do we
have any
way of saying, for any sentence of a language
whether or
,

no

b

uhat sentence is sortally correct or sortally incor-

rect?

It will turn out that the semantics does not give
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us

any way of saying in
general which sentences
have what

serial status, so we
will also discuss why
this is so and
•Vhe.her or not this
is a weakness of
the account.
In the second section,
we will look at how
we can
tie the semantic
accounts of sortally
incorrect sentences
and sentences about
nonexistent objects into a
broader
theory of language. We will sion +
11 also try to say
something in
sec ^on about a picture
such a broad theory of
language gives us about the
nature of language.

In the third section,
we will discuss the
possibility
of giving an interpretation
of some of the central
notions
used
the semantic systems of
Chapters III and IV in
-erms of psychological mechanisms
of human beings.
We

m

will also discuss briefly the
importance of such claims
to the psychological reality
of semantic systems.
In the final section, we will
suggest that the semantic methods used in this work
are plausible candidates
or use ln supplying a semantic theory of metaphor.
We
"ill try to briefly sketch why these
methods appear to

applicable to that problem, and to indicate
what questions would be central in an attempt
to give such an
account
be
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Incorrectness

.

Revisited

In Chapter III, we
presented a semantics which
gave
as one result that simple

serially incorrect sentences

are neither true nor
false.

However, we never give a

general account in that
chapter of which sentences
are
so r tally incorrect
and which are sortally
correct.
Since
the job of the semantics
is to account for sortally
in-

correct sentences,

it would seem that the

job has not been
done until we specify some
method for determining, for
any sentence of a language,
what the sortal status of
that
sentence is.

One thing which we cannot do
in attempting to say
which sentences are sortally correct
and which are sortally

incorrect is to identify sortally
incorrect sentences with
sentences lacking a truth-value.
While
it is true that

our paradigm sortally incorrect
sentences are evaluated by
the semantics we presented as being
neither true nor
false (after all, that was the purpose
of the semantics),
it does not follow from this that all
sentences which are

neither true nor false are sortally incorrect.

suggestions of Chapter IV are accepted,

If the

there will be a

host of counterexamples to this claim in sentences
which
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predicate of an incomplete
object a property which
that
object neither has nor
lacks, but for which
that object is
of the proper sort to
either have or lack. More

concretely,

the sentence

^•1)

Sherlock Holmes has a mole
on his back
would, on our analysis
of that sentence, be a
counterexample to the claim that lack
of truth-value is coextensive
° r lden, lcal wlth
sortal incorrectness.
For on
-

our anal-

ysis of 4.1),

that sentence is neither true
nor false.

But Holmes is certainly the
sort of thing which can have
the property of having a
mole on his back or lack that
property, so the sentence does not
predicate of an object
a property for which that object
is not of the proper
sort.
So the sentence, even though
it lacks a truth-value,
is not sortally incorrect.

Even if one does not accept the analysis
of nonexistent objects given in Chapter IV, there
are grave
problems

wi

yh

identifying sortal incorrectness with lack of
truth-

/alue.
she

These problems arise when we attempt to say
what

sortal status of complex sentences is to be.

For

consider the sentence
4.2)

Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
today is Friday
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According to the semantics
given in Chapter III,
this
sentence is true on Fridays,
and without truth-value
on
Other days.
So if we identify sortal
incorrectness with
lack of truth-value, we
will be forced to say
that sentence
A. 2

)

is serially incorrect
on any day hut Friday,
and

sortally correct on Fridays.
clearly not one we would wish

And this conclusion is
to accept.

This type of consideration
leads Thomason to the conclusion that "the notion of sortal
incorrectness does not
extend very well to complex
sentences" ((1972), p. 243).

Thomason makes no attempt to say,
for any sentence of the
language, whether that sentence
is sortally correct or
sortally incorrect.
Instead, he says, "the distinction
is
to be regarded as informal,
part of the data to be explained
rather than of the explanation"
1972
(

(

,

p.

209).

That the distinction between sortally
correct and
sortally incorrect sentences does not extend
to complex

sentences is not suprising if we consider our
intuitive

characterization of such sentences.

Intuitively, we said

that a sentence was sortally incorrect if that sentence

predicated of an object a property and the object was not
ohe

right sort of thing to either have or lack that property.

The problem with extending this to complex sentences
is
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obvious,

for in complex sentences
it is not at all clear
that we can say what, in that
sentence, is the property
being predicated of the object
of the sentence.
In 4.2),
for example, we have two
objects, the day which is today
and the theory of relativity;
and two properties, being
shiny and being Friday.
It makes sense to talk about
the
object and the property being ascribed
to that object in
the simple sentences which are
parts of the complex sentenoe
au " lt does not seem to make
sense to talk about the
object or j^oe property of that sentence.
’

This type of consideration leads us to
the conclusion
that,

if sortal incorrectness and sortal
correctness are

properties of sentences at all, they are not
properties
of all sentences, but rather properties
of simple, subject

predicate sentences.

If we restrict our attention to

these, we can say, using the mechanisms of our
theory,

which simple subject predicate sentences are sortally
correc

t

model).

and which are sortally incorrect (relative to a
The definition will be relatively straightforward;

we will say that a sentence is sortally correct on a model
if and only if the object which is the referent of the

subject of that sentence is a member of the set which is
the sortal range of the predicate of that sentence, and
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that the sentence is
serially incorrect otherwise.
This
tells us which simple
subject predicate sentences
are
serially correct and which
are serially incorrect,
and that
is all the further
we can go.

Ihe Kantian Conception of
Language

.

One of the reasons given
in Chapter II for
attempting
to give a semantic
account of sortally incorrect
sentences
using a system which employs
the devices of truth-value
gaps and supervaluations was
that such an approach attempts
to explain the deviance
of sortally incorrect sentences
by
using general features of language.
It was noted in

Chapter II that truth-value gaps
and supervaluations are
used in attempts to give a
semantics which

will avoid the

semantic paradoxes, analyze sentences
about future contingencies and explain the logic of obligation.
By giving
an analysis of sortally incorrect
sentences which utilizes
,

the

same techniques as are used in attempting
to solve

these other problems, we are in effect
trying to fit our

account of sortally incorrect sentences into a
framework
which would make sortal incorrectness an aspect or
facet
of a more general feature of language.
The account of sortally incorrect sentences and
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nonexistent objects given
here can, in fact, be
seen as an
attempt to fit the semantics
for such parts of
language
mto a general theory of
presuppositions developed along
the lines of Strawson
(1956) by van Fraassen
(1969, l 97 0a)
The general theory of
presupposition, crudely put,
is
something like the following.
Presupposition is a semantic
relation between sentences or
statements.

statement A presupposes statement

To say that

B is to say that,

A to be either true or false,
B must be true.

for

The stand-

ard sort of Strawsonian example
of presupposition is that
the statement that the king
of France is bald presupposes
that the king of France exists.
If the presupposition (or
one of the set of presuppositions)
of a sentence
is false,

that sentence will be neither true
nor false.
The account of sortal incorrectness
given in Chapter

III can be viewed as a semantics which
incorporates a

particular kind of presupposition, which we could
call
sortal presupposition.
To say that an object has a
property, on this interpretation of the theory, presupposes
that that object is the right sort of thing to have or

lack that property.
thing,

When the object is the right sort of

no sortal presupposition is false and,

supposing

no other presupposition of the sentence is false,

the
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sentence itself will be either
true or false.
When the
object is not the right sort of
thing to have the property
however, the sortal presupposition
behind the

sentence is
raise, and the sentence itself is
neither true nor false.
The account of fictional objects
given in Chapter IV
can also be seen as an account of a
special variety of

presupposition.

When we say of an object that it has
a

property, we not only presuppose that that
object is the
right sort of object to have or lack that
property, but
also that the object is determinate with
respect to that

property.

In the case of incomplete objects,

it is this

oecond variety of presupposition which is violated, with
the

result that such sentences are neither true nor false.
Thus the account we have given of sortaily incorrect

sentences and sentences about nonexistent objects can be
fit into an overall theory of a general feature of natural

language

.

The question we will turn to now is what

picture that general theory of language paints concerning
the nature of language

The picture we get is of a language which, according
to van Fraassen,

"is essentially incomplete,

in the sense

that objective facts and conventions governing language do

not suffice to determine the truth-value of every sentence
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(1970a), p. 14).

The idea here

is something

^^

The syntax of a language
allows for the expression
of
sentences which, for one
reason or another, cannot
he given
a truth-value based
on the facts about the
world and the

conventions governing language
which are used to assign
truth-values to sentences. One
reason for failure to
assign truth-value (and
perhaps the only reason) is

failure

of presupposition.

So,

for example, the syntactic
rules

of a language allow for
generation of a sentence by
putting
together a noun phrase and a verb
phrase in an appropriate
way, and following that rule
we can get the sentence

^*3)

The

theory of relativity is shiny

But this sentence will only have a
truth-value if the
theory of relativity is the right sort

of thing to be shiny,

which it is not.
is violated,

The sortal presupposition of the
sentence

leading to a lack of truth-value.

This

reflects the incompleteness of our language in
that the
interpretation of the phrase "is shiny" is not complete,
that is to say,

there are certain objects to which the

predicate does not truly or falsely apply.

This incom-

pleteness is reflected in the semantics of Chapter III by

interpreting "is shiny" as a partial function rather than
as a complete function.
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While language is, on
this view, incomplete
in the
eense that there are
some sentences which
fail to have a
truth-value, it is not
incomplete with respect
to its
Structure.
How meanings are put
together to get other
meanings is determinate,
and is specified by
the super-

valuation semantics.
The picture behind a
supervaluation semantics is
something like this. The
truth-values of sentences
which
are complex (i.e., have
as parts other sentences)
are
determined by the truth-values
of the component sentences
Wh h make UP th0Se
sentences.
But since language
is incomplete, some of
these component sentences may
be

^

themselves without truth-value.
uage itself is incomplete,

But even though the lang-

the structure of that language

is determinate,

by which we mean that we can
tell what the
truth-value of a complex sentence which
has as a component
a sentence which fails to have
a truth-value would be if
that truth-valueless component did
have some truth-value.
The supervaluation model of semantics
tells us that we

evaluate such complex sentences with truth-valueless
com-

ponents by considering what van Fraassen calls the "ideal
extensions" of our incomplete language.
of a language is a language which is not,

An ideal extension
itself,

incomplete;
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an ideal extension
of an incomplete
language

^ Uke

win

be a

that in ° 0raPlete
langUage except
that the
truth Zl ue gaps of
the incomplete
language have been
f illed
ln
F°r
inC ° mplete language
there will be a
'.
number
Of ideal extensions
of that language,
each of which f iUs
ln the truth - valu e
gaps of the incomplete
language in a
different wa y
The structures of these
ideal extensions
are just what one would
get in a standard,
classical twovalued logic, in fact, van
Fraassen claims that
"classical
logic is the theory of the
ideal extensions" of a
language
(U970b) p 64)
These ideal extensions,
of course, are
the extended valuations
of a language on a
supervaluation
,

.

’

-

-

semantics
In evaluating a complex
sentence with a truth-value-

less component, we look at
what the value of that sentence
would be on all of the ideal
extensions (extended valuations)
If the sentence receives the
same truth-value on
all of these ideal extensions,
then we say that the sen.

tence has that truth-value,

if the truth-value of the

complex sentence varies from ideal extension
to ideal extension, we say that the sentence itself has
no truth-

value
The idea here is that if the truth-value of a
complex
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sentence which has as a part a
sentence which is neither
true nor false has a consistent
truth-value
on all ideal

extensions of the language, no matter
what the truth-value
or the truth-valueless
component is on that
extension,

then the truth-value (or lack of
truth-value) of that
component is irrelevant to the truth-value
of the complex
sentence as a whole.
In such sentences, the truth-values
of the component parts of the complex
sentence which do

have a sruth-value

,

coupled with the determinate structure

of the semantics of the language,
uhe

suffice to tell us what

truth-value of the complex sentence is.

In some cases,

such as disjunctions made up of one disjunct which is
true

and ano oher which lacks a truth-value
is true because

,

the complex sentence

the structure of our semantics tells us

that any disjunction with one true disjunct is true, and
the method of evaluating sentences, while incomplete,

does

tell us that one of the disjuncts of that sentence is true.
A more startling case is presented by tautologies or

contradictions the component sentences of which all lack
truth-value.

In such cases,

it is the structure of the

semantics alone which dictates that the sentence is true
or false
If,

on the other hand,

the value of the complex
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sentence does vary from ideal extension
to ideal extension,
this tells us that the truth-value
of the sentence as a
whole does depend on the truth or
falsity of the component
part or parts of the sentence which lack
a truth-value.
In
such sentences, neither the complete
subpart of the language

nor the structure of the language can tell
us the truthvalue of the sentence, and such a sentence
is itself

neither true nor false, a further example of the
incompleteness of our language.
Van Fraassen refers to this view of the world as
ohe

Kantian conception of language," for according

to him

this view of language is analogous to Kant's view of the

world.

According to Kant, says van Fraassen,

...we have experience of objects and events,
and in this experience these objects and events
are given as part of the world... But what is the
status of this part of the world outside my
experience? According to Kant, the world is constituted in my experience, so that this "outer"
part has the status of something yet to be
constituted.
But this constitution is according
to definite rules --and, knowing these rules,
we know the general structure of the world not
yet constituted in experience. But what is real
here are those rules; they do not determine the
further construction uniquely, and what they
leave indeterminate is at this point neither
thus nor so ...(( 1970b
p. 62)
.

)

Whether or not van Fraassen'

s

characterization of Kant's

view of the world is historically accurate is not a point
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at issue here.

What is of interest is the parallel
being

drawn between this sort of view of the world and
the view
of language given by a semantics based on a
presupposition
logic like the one we have constructed.

experience,

Like the world of

language is, on this view, essentially incom-

plete in a way which results in there being some sentences

which are neither true nor false.

But while language is

essentially incomplete, the structure of language, represented by the semantic rules which tell us how the meanings

inter-relate and are built up, are determinate,

just as

the rules which govern the structure of how we will in

the future experience the world are determinate.

This

structure does not tell us how we should go about filling
up the holes which language has,

but they do tell us

certain constraints which must be observed if we are to
attempt to fill in any of these holes.

Further,

the

structure tells us that certain sentences are true and

certain other sentences are false, not because of the way
that the language inter-re la tes with the world, but

because of the structure of language itself dictating that
those sentences have those truth-values.
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~s yc hological

C

onsiderations

.

The semantic systems presented
in the previous

chapters have all been based on the
paradigm of semantic
accounts of the formal languages of
logic.
Because of
this

the semantic systems have been
basically mathematical

,

systems, and nothing has been said
which would directly tie
this sort of semantic system to a
theory of how speakers
of a language understand that language.

Whether or not this is a drawback in the
semantic
systems depends, at base, on what one takes
to
be

of a semantic system.

the

job

Among current practitioners of

semantics there are two very different views on this
question.
The first viewpoint,

held by many philosophers, is

that psychological considerations are irrelevant to the

study of semantics.
to Montague.

syntax,

This viewpoint is ascribed by Thomason

"According to Montague," states Thomason, "the

semantics, and pragmatics of natural languages are

branches of methematics, not of psychology"

((

1974 b),

p.

2).

On this view, one who studies language should be concerned

with saying, in the most general fashion possible, what
the structure of language is.

Psychological facts about
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the beings who use that
language are as irrelevant
to that
study as are psychological
facts

about mathematicians to

the study of mathematics.
A very different viewpoint
is ascribed by Barbara

Fartee to most linguists.

This view, she states,

takes

"the central goal of linguistic
theory to be an account
of what the native speaker of a
language knows when he or
she knows a language, and of how
such knowledge is aquired”
iv lt?3), p. l).
On this view, linguistics is a branch
of

psychology, and the goal of the linguist
is to discover
facts about the structure of language

(specifically, human

language)

in order that those facts can be used
to discover

facts about the human beings who speak that language.

Partee notes that the two approaches are not strictly

incompatible.

There is no reason,

she points out,

for

saying that we cannot study the structure of human psychology using mathematical tools, nor is there any reason to
think that a methematical system of human language cannot
be

interpreted in a way that makes it into

a

psychological

theory.

The different approaches do have some practical

effects,

however.

One who approaches the study of language

from the mathematical viewpoint will attempt to account
for the structure of all possible languages, while one who
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approaches the study of language
from the psychological
viewpoint will attempt to restrict
the structure ascribed
so language to account
for all and only the
languages

spoken by human beings.

Hence the linguist is concerned

with constructing a grammar which
is as restricted as
possible, while the philosopher will
attempt to construct
a grammar which is as general
as possible.
The

semantic systems developed in this
work grow out
of the tradition which takes the
study of language
to be

a part of mathematics,

ever,

I

and not a part of psychology.

How-

do not wish to say that psychological
facts about

human beings are irrelevant to the semantic
systems
proposed.

What

I

consider to be relevant psychological

facts concern the possibility of interpreting
the mechanisms used in the semantics in such a way that human
beings

are capable of evaluating sentences in a way similar
to

that spelled out in the semantics.
a semantic

For example, if we had

account of language which required the carrying

out of an infinite number of operations in order to evaluate
the truth-value of a sentence,

the fact that human beings

have only finite mental capacity (a claim which

I

will

assume to be true) would count against that semantic
system.

For whatever the mathematical merits of that

I
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system,

the fact of human psychology concerning
the finite
capacity of the brain would show that that
system

would

not accurately model the way human beings
do in fact
-L-.rerpre

o

their language.

While

I

don't think that a

oemantic theory is required to supply a
psychological

interpretation of the mechanisms it uses,

I

do think that

it must be shown that the theory is not
incompatible with
the psychological facts.

The concern of this section,

then,

is to see if we

can give a way of connecting the central mechanisms of
our semantic system to mechanisms which are plausible

candidates for being a part of the human psychological
makeup.

The three semantic mechanisms

I

will be concerned

with are partial functions, which play the central role
in our semantic system of introducing the truth-value gaps

the notion of sorts, which is central both to the notion
of a sortal specification and to the account given of

quantification; and the notion of supervaluation, by

which the theory evaluates complex expressions.
In our semantic theory, we interpreted predicates as

partial functions,

in the simpliest case as partial

functions from objects to truth-values.

Is there any

sort of psychological interpretation of predicates which

3 45

could lead us to say that this
mathematical construction
reflects some psychological mechanism?
One such interpretation is given
by Pavel Tichy

(

1971 ).

"One cannot understand the word 'dog',"
says Tichy,

...unless one knows how to distinguish dogs
objects, unless one has a way of
discriminating between dogs and non-dogs. We
may well be quite in the dark about how we
come
to possess such criteria and how we
come to
share them with other people, but we can hardly
help assuming that we do possess and share
them.
For what can my understanding of 'dog' consist
in if not a link in my mind between the word
and a suitable dog-discriminating procedure 9
-Lrom o uher

.

(

(1971)

,

p.

273)

Tichy is here giving a psychological account of meaning-he

is not saying that we can represent meanings mathemat-

ically by discrimination procedures, but rather that the

psychological facts are that meanings of terms like "dog"
are discrimination procedures.
is

Whether or not this account

accurate in fact is not my concern here; for my purposes

it is sufficient to note that the claim that meanings

are discrimination procedures is not one which can be

ruled out by saying that human beings are psychologically
incapable of constructing such procedures.
the time,

We do it all

though the mechanisms for doing it may be

unknown
While we cannot draw a direct link between discrimin-
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ation procedures and partial functions, Tichy
points out
that there is another way of thinking of these
discrimin-

ation procedures.
can,

of course,

A discrimination procedure,

says Tichy,

he thought of as an identification pro-

cedure as well: as a procedure whose application to an

indi/idual results in identification of one of two objects,
say truth and falsehood"

((1971), p.

273).

Such an

identification procedure can be mathematically represented
as a function from objects to truth-values, namely,

that

function which maps all those individuals the application
of the

identification procedure to which identifies the

object truth to the truth-value true, and all those the

identification procedure applies to to identify falsehood
to the

truth-value false

This gives us a link between the mathematical notion
of a function and the psychological notion of an identif-

ication procedure.

But can we get a link between such

procedures and partial functions?

Of course we can, for

nothing about the nature of identification procedures
guarentees that such procedure^ always succeed in identifying something.

We could have an identification pro-

cedure which when applied to some objects identified

either truth or falsehood, and when applied to other objects
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failed to identify anything at all.

Using the same

bsfinition of a function that we used above for representing the identification procedure,

such an imperfect iden-

tification procedure would be characterized by

a partial

function

Let me say again that in the above

I

do not wish to

be read as saying that Tichy's identification of meaning

and discrimination or identification procedures is correct.
The only claim

I

am making is that we can use Tichy's

psychological account of meaning as a way of interpreting
the notion of a partial function in our semantics so that

that notion is not ruled out as a semantic mechanism which
is impossible

in a semantics for human language because

of the psychology of human beings.
A second central feature of the semantic accounts

given in this work is the notion of a sort, which is
related to the notion of a sortal specification and the
theory of quantif ication

.

In this case,

it is easy to

see that it is possible to give a psychological inter-

pretation of the mechanism, for attempts at giving such
an interpretation already exist in the literature.
One such attempt is given by Nino Cocchiarella (1978)
will provide a
in an attempt to construct a logic which
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structure in which we can understand some
of Piaget's
notions of conceptual development.
The logic developed by
Cocchiarella is very much like the first order
quantified
logic we saw in Chapter III with regard
to its treatment
o*

quantification, and the notion of a sortal concept

plays a central role in this logic.

"We shall speak of

sortal concepts,

"in the sense of

'

says Cocchiarella,

socio-gene tically developed cognitive abilities or capacities to distinguish, count and collect or classify things"
((1978), p. 441).

We can interpret both the notion of a

sortal specification and the sort of a quantifier in light
of this.

The sortal specification function will be a

mapping of predicates to the objects which can be distinguished, counted and collected or classified by reference
to

the property which is the referent of that predicate,

and the sort of a quantifier can be interpreted as a

restriction of the domain of that quantifier to a set of
objects which are all distinguished, counted and collected
or classified in the same fashion.

In fact,

this interpretation of the notion of a sort

points to a possible way in which the mathematical and

psychological approaches to sortal notions can compliment
each other.

A mathematical approach to sortal notions can
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produce a general framework like that seen in

Chapter III

which tells how the sortal notions play a part in the
o

uc ture of

L.he

semantic system.

However,

that system

says nothing about what the sortal system is like
is,

,

that

what the conditions on the sortal specification func-

tion are to be.
the psychologist.

This investigation would be the task of
Once we have seen how sortal consider-

ations play a part in the semantics of a language, we can
then try to cut down the number of possible interpretations
or models for the language by restricting the form of the

sortal specification function in ways which mirror the

psychological facts about the conceptual systems of the
speakers of that language.
Finally, we must ask if the central notion of the

semantic systems in this work, the method of supervalua-

falls prey to the problem of psychological im-

tions,

possibility.

It may appear that it does, as that method

appears to be impossible for human beings who have finite
brains.

The method of supervaluations tells us that to

discover the value of a complex sentence, we must see

what the value of that sentence is on all of the members
of the set of extended valuations.
to be

This set would seem

too large to be comprehended by beings with finite
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brains if the language we are dealing with has an interestingly large number of sentences which are neither true

nor false.

For in a simple sentential language with n

simple sentences which are neither true nor false, there

will be

2

n

different extended valuations relative to that

model of that language.

The problem is compounded if we

consider what happens below the sentential level.

For

given any predicate which is interpreted as a partial
function,

if there are n objects in the domain of that

function for which it is undefined, there will be

2

n

distinct extended valuations which represent different
ways of filling in the gaps caused by that one partial
function.

So it would seem that there are just too many

extended valuations for beings with finite mental capacity
to be able to check the value of a sentence on all of those

extended valuations.

If this is the case,

then we can

never know the value of any sentence, which is certainly
false

.

This problem can be dispelled, however, once we

distinguish between the general structure which tells us
how to evaluate any sentence, and the way in which we can
go about using that structure to evaluate a given sentence.
The set of extended valuations relative to a model may be
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°° l a -g e

i>hat

no human being could comprehend all
of them,

-ut in evaluating the truth-value of any particular
sentence,

one need only consider the set of extended
valuations

which differ with respect to the components of that
sentence.

For example,

if we had a sentential logic with an

number of atomic sentences, only two of which,
and

Q,

are given a value by a model,

P

there will be an in-

finite number of distinct extended valuations relative to
that model.
"

(

P&Q vR
)

)

"
,

But if we wish

to

evaluate a sentence like

we need only consider two of those extended

valuations --one of which assigns R the value true, and
the other of which assigns R the value false.

Since we

know the rules which govern the form of any extended
valuation, we know that all of the extended valuations

assign to P and Q the same truth-value, and all of them

assign some truth-value to

R.

So in looking at two of

the infinite set of extended valuations relative to the

model, we know that we have checked all of the possible

truth-values for the complex sentence in question.

While

the other extended valuations will differ in some ways

from the two we have looked at, they will not differ from
one or the other of these extended valuations in the value

they assign to the complex sentence in question.

So even
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if there are an infinite number of extended
valuations

relative to a model, in evaluating a particular
sentence
<ve

^he

need not look at all of them.

Further, since we know

structure which all of the set of extended valuations

must have, we can use facts about that structure to discover

what the value of a sentence will be on all of those extended valuations without having to go through them one at
a time.

This,

for example,

is the way in which we know

that all tautologies are true on all extended valuations.
We know this not because we checked the value of the taut-

ologies in all of the members of the set of extended
valuations, but because we know from facts about the

structure of all of these extended valuations that all

tautologies are true on all of the extended valuations.

Because of this,

I

do not think that the method of super-

valuations falls prey to the criticism of psychological
impossibility.
The mechanisms of the semantics,

therefore,

do not

seem to fall prey to the claim that they are psychologically

impossible as a basis for a semantics for natural language.
Of course, nothing that

I

have said has shown that any

of these mechanisms are part of the psychological basis

of language.

To make that claim would require that one
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supply positive arguments.

Nor do

I

think that the question

is not

an interesting one, or one which
is not important
to the claims of this theory
to correctness

as a semantic

account of natural language.

My claim is not that the

semantic systems presented in this work
reflect the psychological makeup of the speakers of natural
language, but
rather that these systems provide a
plausible mathematical
model for the structure of natural language.
New Direc tions

.

Throughout this work it has been argued that the
account of sortally incorrect sentences and sentences about
fictional and nonexistent objects presented here have the

advantage over some other theories in that they were part
of a general theory of language.

If the mechanisms which

are used in this semantic system are really general

features of the semantics of natural language, one would

expect that there are other problems to which they could

profitably be applied.

In this section,

I

another area in which these techniques can,

will suggest
I

think, be

expected to produce interesting results: in the construction of a theory of metaphor.
We can back into the problem by considering one of our
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paradigm sortally incorrect sentences,
4.3)

The theory of relativity is
shiny

Throughout this work, we have claimed
that 4.3) is a
deviant sentence, and the semantics
we developed was an
attempt to say what that deviance
consisted in.
But there
are conceivable occasions of
use in which the sentence

would seem natural.

If one were,

for example, reading a

poem entitled "An Ode to Einstein,"
and one were to read
as a part of that poem sentence
4.3), it might well seem
that not only was 4.3) not deviant in
that context, but
that it was just the right thing to say.
If pressed by
someone who pointed out that the theory of relativity

was

not the right sort of thing either to be shiny or
not to
be

shiny,

one might well agree, and then point out that
the

sentence was not being used to make a factual claim, but
was rather being used as a metaphor.

That a semantic system which accounts for sortally

incorrect sentences might be used to account for metaphor
may seem obvious,

if for no other reason than that often

the only difference between a metaphor and a sortally

incorrect sentence is the context of use of the sentence.
The approach to sortally incorrect sentences taken in this

work seems particularly appropriate for extension to a
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theory of metaphor, for metaphors also seem to be
sentences

which are neither true nor false, a result which could
be

easily obtained in this framework.
However, a theory of metaphor would have to say much
more about metaphorical sentences than just that they are

neither true nor false.
to

At least, such a theory would have

say what it is about metaphors which gives them what-

ever semblance of meaning they have

While

I

don’t have an answer to that question,

I

will

sketch a suggestion of a possible answer which can be

given within the framework of a picture of language given

earlier in this chapter.
We begin with a picture of language as incomplete, at

least to the extent that there are sentences of the language which are neither true nor false.

On our model,

this

lack of truth-value is brought about, in the simpliest
cases, by interpreting a predicate as a partial function

which is undefined for the object which is the referent
of its subject.

Metaphors like 4.3) will be sentences

which lack a truth-value for this reason.
In this framework we can view metaphors as attempts
to extend language,

language incomplete.

to fill in some

of the gaps which make

On this view, sentence 4.3)

uaken
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metaphorically would be understood as making the
suggestion
that we extend the partial function which is the
interpretation of the predicate "is shiny" in such

a way that

°hat function now maps the object which is the theory
of

relativity, for which it is now undefined,
^rue

.

Metaphor

,

use of language,

to

the value

on this view, would be a truly creative

in which the metaphor functions as a

way of creating extensions of our incomplete language by
suggesting ways of filling in the gaps.
This suggestion, of course,

only presents a picture,

and could itself be viewed as little more than a metaphor.
We talk of metaphors as being appropriate or inappropriate,

apt or bizarre, and say a host of other things about meta-

phors which would have to be explained or accounted for
by an adequate theory of metaphor but which have not been

touched upon here.

I

have no idea how to account for such

features of metaphor; if

I

did,

I

would be presenting the

theory instead of merely suggesting how one might start in

developing such a theory.

But

I

do think that the theory

of the semantics of sortally incorrect sentences and sen-

tences about nonexistent objects given here provides a

framework within which such a theory of metaphor might be
developed, and that the developement of such a theory
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within such a framework is an enticing possibility.
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